Debate on New Kazakhstan Constitution Exacerbates Linguistic and Ethnic Divides

Debate on New Kazakhstan Constitution Exacerbates Linguistic and Ethnic Divides

Executive Summary:

• The debate on a new Kazakhstan constitution, set to be approved by referendum on March 15, has deepened the linguistic and ethnic divides and infuriated Moscow, which sees the revisions as threatening the roles of Russian and Russia itself in Central Asia.
• The new basic law reduces the status of the Russian language to one that exists “alongside” rather than “in equality with” Russian and stops referring to the country as Kazakhstan, a Russian imposition, in favor of Kazakh eli, “the land of the Kazakhs.”
• Such changes will speed the exodus of ethnic Russians from Kazakhstan, as well as the shifts among Kazakhs away from Russian and from Astana toward Moscow, and may be the harbinger of changes across Central Asia, alarming Moscow and prompting it to react.  

The debate over a new Kazakhstan constitution, set to be approved by referendum on March 15, has deepened linguistic and ethnic divides within the country (see EDM, February 17; RITM Eurasia, March 2; Altyn-Orda, March 9).  Moscow sees the revisions as threatening the roles of Russia and the Russian language in Kazakhstan and in Central Asia as a whole (Stan Radar, March 6). Kazakhstan President Kasym-Jomart Tokayev, the author of the new version, did not intend this and has long opposed any linguistic radicalism. He has instead insisted that his goal was to simplify the political system by shifting from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature and by putting provisions in place that will force frequent changes in the country’s leadership  (Spik.kz, April 28, 2025, February 17). While all of Tokayev’s changes have been widely discussed, none has attracted more attention inside the country or abroad than those affecting the status of the Russian language and the country’s name (Vlast.kz, February 9; Altyn-Orda, February 17; Spik.kz, March 10).

The new basic law reduces the constitutional status of the Russian language to “alongside” rather than “in equality with” the Kazakh language and stops referring to the country as Kazakhstan, a Russian imposition, in favor of Kazakh eli, “the land of the Kazakhs.” Some Kazakh nationalists do not feel the changes go far enough. They want all references to Russian eliminated from the country’s basic law (Fond Strategicheskoi Kul’tury, March 3). Ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan, Kazakhs who use Russian as their primary language, and Moscow, however, are worried that they go too far and will speed the exodus of ethnic Russians from Kazakhstan as well as shifts both among Kazakhs away from using Russian and of Astana away from Moscow (Spik.kz, July 5, 2024; Novaya Gazeta Kazakhstan, February 12). Both supporters and opponents of such changes have suggested that what Kazakhstan is doing now could well be the harbinger of similar changes in other Central Asian countries, adding to the Kremlin’s concern about a loss of influence and possibly even disturbing Türkiye, which has taken to calling the region Turkestan (Window on Eurasia, October 11, 2024; Altyn-Orda, February 17; Fond Strategicheskoi Kul’tury, March 3).

Mainstream Russian media have generally reported the change in status of Russian outlined in the draft Kazakhstan constitution accurately. Some Moscow commentators, however, likely reflect the thinking of many in the Kremlin, which is committed to maintaining a Russian world defined largely in terms of language. These commentators  have attacked the new constitution as an insult to Russia and a threat to Moscow’s influence in Kazakhstan. At the same time, relatively few have expressed concern in Kazakhstan except for Kazakh nationalists who are upset that the new basic law does not go far enough in reducing the role of Russian in their country. These sentiments are a possible bellwether of where Kazakhstan is going and where other Central Asian countries may follow. (On these patterns of reportage and discussion in Russia and Kazakhstan, see Novaya Gazeta Kazakhstan, February 12.)

The change in wording regarding language reflects the growing importance of Kazakh in the life of Kazakhstan. It will not, however negatively affect Russian speakers, Kazakh officials say (Vlast.kz, February 9). Under the current constitution, officials are obligated to provide any information they release in equal amounts in Kazakh and Russian. Under the new constitution, they will have to supply it in Russian only upon the request of the citizen involved in the proceeding or application process (see EDM, February 17). Over time, of course, that shift will likely intensify the general move away from Russian to Kazakh. Still, it is not, by itself, the kind of change that threatens relations with Moscow that some Russian commentators fear, or the failure to take action in defense of Kazakhs and against the use of Russian in Kazakhstan that Kazakh nationalists have hoped for.

Instead, this change is most obviously the product of the declining share of ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan’s population over the last two generations. In the mid-1980s, ethnic Russians accounted for 38 percent of the population, outnumbering the Kazakhs. In contrast, now the ethnic Russian share of the residents of Kazakhstan has declined to 14.8 percent (Altyn-Orda, February 20). Another product is the inevitable nationalizing experiences of independence, including the often and increasingly hyperbolic attacks from Russian commentators on even the existence of Kazakhstan and threats from the Russian capital that Kazakhstan will suffer Ukraine’s fate if Astana does not do what Moscow wants (e.g., Našha Niva, February 11; Altyn-Orda, March 8).

The situation regarding the proposed change in the country’s name is similar. The current constitution specifies the name as Kazakhstan, while the new one declares that it is Kazakh eli, “the land of the Kazakhs.” For some time, activists and commentators in Central Asian countries have wanted to change the names of their countries now ending in “stan” because they see it as the imposition of a Soviet Russian definition of their states. They also see it as a name  that leads many there and elsewhere to dismiss them as “the stans,” something exotic and the objects of great power conflict rather than countries and peoples in their own right. Kazakh commentators from the Altyn-Orda portal point out that “the name ‘Kazakhstan’ appeared in the Soviet system of coordinates,” designating a territory but not the historical traditions of the population. The portal continues, “Kazakh eli sounds different: it is not an administration formula but a name arising from the people and its history.” This change thus represents “a symbolic break with the era of things Soviet: it is not a denial of history but a sign of the completion of the post-Soviet era”. It does not mean that minorities such as Russians do not have a place there (Altyn-Orda, February 17).

It is already the case, these commentators say, that “the young generation does not think of itself in terms of ‘the post-Soviet space.’” The youth thinks about itself in “global terms, mobile, and confident.” To them, a new name is not a “radical step but a logical continuation of ongoing processes.” Moreover, they stress that the term is not about exclusion but about the basis of the state. “The Kazakh people have formed the historic nucleus of statehood, but the present-day state remains a hope for all its citizens. The name fixes the cultural foundation, but it is not about any limiting of rights” (Altyn-Orda, February 17). Some ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan will see this change as threatening and decide to leave, further reducing the share of ethnic Russians in the population. Additionally, fewer ethnic Russians fleeing Putin’s repression will see Kazakhstan as a welcoming place, especially if, as is rumored, Astana moves to expel some of those who have gone there since 2022 (Meduza, March 10). The Kremlin will view this as at a minimum a form of lèse-majesté against it and even more likely as a Western plot to diminish Russian influence in Central Asia or even to exclude it altogether, something Moscow has no choice but to respond to.

Some may view this as a minor shift in the rules governing the use of Russian in a country far away and a quaint change in its name. In reality, it may set the stage for new tectonic shifts in the region. These shifts are likely to prove more significant than other developments that have attracted more attention in the outside world.