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Marwan (Source: FBI)

From Jemaah Islamiya to Islamic State: Marwan’s Mission Ends in Mindanao

Publication Militant Leadership Monitor Southeast Asia Volume 6 Issue 4

04.29.2015 Jacob Zenn

From Jemaah Islamiya to Islamic State: Marwan’s Mission Ends in Mindanao

In June 2011, Militant Leadership Monitor profiled the Malaysian-born and U.S. educated veteran of the 1990s civil war in Afghanistan, Zulkifli bin Hir (a.k.a. Marwan). In 2011, he was considered to be the highest-ranking of the estimated 20-30 Jemaah Islamiya (JI) fighters in the Philippines. Less than one year after the article was published, in February 2012, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) carried out an airstrike on a training camp in Sulu, Mindanao where Marwan and Muawiyah—an ex-Singaporean military officer of Indian descent involved in the 2002 Bali bombings with Marwan—were hiding (Interaksyon, February 16, 2012). Though Marwan and Muawiyah were initially reported as killed, it later became clear that Marwan had survived. He was killed, however, three years later on a farm in Mindanao. In February 2015, an FBI test of the DNA of Marwan’s finger confirmed this when it found a match with his brother, Rahmat, a U.S. citizen who has been in prison since 2007 for “contributing goods and services to a Specially Designated Global Terrorist”—Marwan (U.S. Department of Justice, August 3, 2007; Philippine Daily Inquirer, January 30).

After his near death in 2012, Marwan used his new lease on life for the next three years to build relationships among jihadists in the Philippines and shift their orientation from al-Qaeda to the Islamic State. His efforts, in turn, played a role in Southeast Asia becoming an area under the influence of the Islamic State (Straits Times, March 5). Southeast Asia’s shift towards Islamic State, in turn, has played a role in Islamic State’s overall upending of al-Qaeda as the vanguard of the international jihadist movement.

This profile of Marwan reflects on the operation that led to his confirmed death in February 2015 and the web of jihadist networks with which he associated.

Early Life

Marwan was born in the town of Muar, in peninsular Malaysia’s Johor State, in 1966. He may have been influenced to embark on a career in terrorism early on in life by his family members. Marwan’s elder brother, Rahmat Abdkhir (a.k.a. Sean Kasim; Sean Kalimin), is a naturalized U.S. citizen who lived in San Jose, California and studied computer science in the United States. Rahmat was arrested by FBI agents at his place of employment in Sunnyvale, California in 2007 on charges that included “contributing goods and services to a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (Marwan)” (U.S. Department of Justice, August 3, 2007).

Marwan’s younger brother, Taufik bin Abdul Halim (a.k.a. Dani), is in an Indonesian prison serving a life sentence for terrorism charges. In 2002, he botched the bombing of a Christian prayer group in the Atrium Shopping Mall in Jakarta. He placed a bomb in a cardboard Dunkin’ Donuts box, but it exploded prematurely as Taufik was carrying it into the mall, costing him one of his legs (New Straits Times [Kuala Lumpur], May 7, 2011).

During his time in secondary school at Sekolah Datuk Abdul Razak in Seremban from 1979 to 1983, Marwan earned a reputation among his fellow students for being a jihadist sympathizer (Zambo Times, June 6, 2007). Many of the details of Marwan’s life from 1983 to 1989—the years following his graduation from secondary school—are unclear. However, during that time he is believed to have studied engineering in the United States and may have received bomb-making training under the tutelage of JI explosives expert Dr. Azahari Hussin, who was killed in 2005 by Indonesian anti-terrorism police. Those learning experiences helped to propel Marwan’s later career as an explosives master.

Marwan first engaged in jihad overseas in 1989 when he traveled to Afghanistan to join the mujahideen fighting alongside Bin Laden. From 1989 to 1992, he was deployed to a combat zone to defuse remaining Soviet ordinance and landmines and recycle them for use by the mujahideen (Zambo Times, June 6, 2007).

After Marwan returned to Malaysia in 1992, he began working as a district engineer in a local council. At that same time, he was the leader of a Malaysian JI cell and helped to found Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM), an organization comprised mostly of former Afghan mujahidin that advocated the overthrow of the government of then Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Muhammad and the creation of an Islamic state comprising Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Brunei and the southern Philippines. While leading KMM in Malaysia, Marwan maintained close contact with militant groups in Chechnya and Bosnia and allegedly recruited Malaysians to fight in those two countries (The Star [Petaling Jaya], March 29, 2007).

In January 2002, Marwan fled from Malaysia to Indonesia after Malaysian police raided and detained JI members who operated the “JI Ivy League” Lukmanul Hakiem religious school in Ulu Tiram, Johor State in 2001. [1] In Indonesia, Marwan became involved in the October 12, 2002 bombings in Kuta, Bali’s jam-packed tourist district, with the help of his older brother, Rahmat, who provided him with radios and cash that were used to carry out the attack. On September 5, 2003 Malaysia offered a $16,500 reward for Marwan’s capture, but by August 2003 Marwan was already in southern Mindanao under the protection of Abu Sayyaf and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).

Marwan began to live more permanently in southern Mindanao after 2003. There he trained Abu Sayyaf members in explosives and sniping and helped to set up terrorist camps. His record includes attacks on U.S. interests and military bases, as well as involvement in a number of bombings in Central Mindanao in 2006-2007, conducted with a member of the MILF, Abdulbasit Usman (see Terrorism Monitor, April 5, 2007). His cell was broken up on March 3, 2010, when the AFP arrested three of his men in a raid in Manila’s Maharlika district, which is home to a large Muslim community (Reuters, March 3, 2010). Marwan’s disciples and trainees have also been responsible for numerous bombings that have plagued the Philippines since his arrival.

Death on the Farm

Marwan was killed on a farm that served as one of his training and recruiting camps in Mamasapano, Maguindanao in Mindanao, which was run by two militias that signed a peace agreement with the government in March 2014—the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) (GMA News, February 25). BIFF, however, has, according to government sources, abandoned the peace agreement because it did not provide Muslims with an adequate guarantee that they can implement Shari’a in Mindanao. This is likely why an internationally-wanted terrorist like Marwan, who had the same ideology as BIFF, received shelter on the farm in contravention to the agreement (Interaksyon, April 14).

Recruiting for Islamic State

Marwan reportedly traveled to Maguindanao from Sulu after the airstrike nearly killed him in February 2012. Abu Sayyaf commander Radulla expelled Marwan from Sulu because he was too much of a “magnet” for airstrikes and raids by Philippines and international forces (Philippine Star, February 1). According to the interrogation of a former Abu Sayayf leader, Khair Mundos, who was arrested in June 2014, Marwan’s main task in Maguindanao was recruiting young jihadists for the Islamic State (Manila Times, April 24).

Marwan likely benefitted from being among BIFF militants because they and allied militant groups, such as Khalifa Islamiyah Mindanao (KIM), and the Islamic State, share the goal of a global Caliphate (rather than MILF militants, who would settle for autonomy in Mindanao), and therefore Marwan could recruit more easily for the Islamic State. Up to 200 militants from Mindanao may have joined with Islamic State from these networks, although that estimate may conflate Mindanaoans with other Southeast Asians, including Australians. Among the Mindanaon militants in Syria is reportedly an ethnic Mindanaoan Tausug who reportedly took part in the beheading of U.S. aid worker Peter Kassig in Syria (Manila Bulletin, July 9, 2014; Manila Bulletin, May 22, 2014).

Still Operational

Despite being confined to BIFF areas in just a recruitment role, Marwan still had lethal, operational ambitions. For example, when Pope Francis visited Manila in January 2015, Marwan planned to bomb the Pope’s convoy, but the plot failed, perhaps due to Marwan’s remoteness from Manila (Interaksyon, February 9). Reports that an Islamic State-trained Philippine engineer was involved in a separate plot on the Pope in Manila suggests that Marwan may have known of the Islamic State’s interest in an attack on the Pope. Therefore he may designed his own plot to attack the Pope to win further credibility with the Islamic State, for whom he was recruiting young militants (Get Real Philippines, March 15).

Conclusion

The case of Marwan shows how militants evolve in their careers and can shift loyalties depending on their location and the opportunities that are presented to them. It also exemplifies how intelligent militants, like Marwan, an engineer, can play hybrid roles both in recruiting and carrying out attacks, which makes them more valuable for the militant groups. At the same, it also shows that the combined efforts of the United States, international and Philippine security forces over the course of nearly a decade hunting Marwan ultimately bore fruit, with the report of his death in February 2015. Nonetheless, Marwan’s recent efforts to recruit BIFF militants into the Islamic State likely means Marwan’s disciples will pose a threat to the interests of the Philippines and other countries in the future.

Jacob Zenn is an analyst of African and Eurasian Affairs for The Jamestown Foundation and consultant on countering violent extremism, international law of freedom of association, socio-cultural analysis for geospatial visualization.

Note

1. Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged but Still Dangerous, International Crisis Group, August 26, 2003, p.26, www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-east-asia/indonesia/063-jemaah-islamiyah-in-south-east-asia-damaged-but-still-dangerous.aspx.

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