General Gabriel Tang: South Sudan’s Prodigal Son or Khartoum’s Agent of Chaos?
General Gabriel Tang: South Sudan’s Prodigal Son or Khartoum’s Agent of Chaos?
In the months following January’s successful vote for secession from the Republic of Sudan, South Sudan’s inherently weak government is already threatened by rebel militias, tribal violence and clashes between gunmen in its oil-rich Jonglei state, South Sudan’s largest. Prominent among the insurgent generals imperiling the unity of South Sudan as it approaches full independence in July is Major General Gabriel Tang (a.k.a. Gabriel Gatwich Chan Tanginya, i.e. “Long Pipe”). Though Tang, a Nuer tribesman from Jonglei’s Fangak County, began his career as a separatist rebel, he has long been counted as a Khartoum loyalist. Today, General Tang is a Southern warlord of uncertain loyalties following a recent series of professions of loyalty to the Government of South Sudan (GoSS), interspersed with a spate of armed revolts carried out by his followers known as the Tangginyang. General Tang’s future direction will play a crucial role in the development of South Sudan’s massive oil potential—its only important source of revenue and the key to the embryonic nation’s transition from autonomous region to internationally recognized state.
Gabriel Tang Joins the Anyanya I Rebellion
Gabriel Tang began his career by taking up arms as a youth in the Anyanya separatist rebellion (1955 – 1972) that broke out in South Sudan after a number of Southern garrisons mutinied in the lead-up to Sudanese independence in 1956. [1] Under the terms of the 1972 Addis Ababa Peace Agreement, most of the Anyanya rebels were absorbed into the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF). However, some of the Anyanya fighters rejected integration into the SAF, with a part finding a home in the Ugandan Army of Idi Amin. Tang was in the camp of those who rejected the attempt at SAF integration. He remained in the Upper Nile district until he joined one of a number of dissident militias operating in the South under the umbrella term “Anyanya II.”
The SPLA and Anyanya II
Tang’s differences with the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M) and its late leader Colonel John Garang date back to 1983–84. During that period, the Anyanya II movement came into conflict with the Garang’s then-nascent SPLA, which had renewed the rebellion against Sudan’s central government. Many in the ethnic-Nuer militias of Anyanya II rejected what they viewed as ethnic-Dinka domination of the SPLA’s leadership.
By 1984, Khartoum began to exploit these divisions, providing arms and funds to a more formally organized “Anyanya II” under the leadership of Nuer leaders such as William Abdullah Chuol and Paulino Matip Nhial. The hope was that this pliant militia would help secure the oil fields of Jonglei; but as the Anyanya II enjoyed only limited support amongst the Nuer, the result was a bitter conflict between Nuer militia members and Nuer forces under the SPLA banner. [2] The pro-Khartoum Anyanya II were successful in disrupting SPLA supply routes and attacking columns of SPLA recruits headed to Ethiopia for training. By 1988, however, most of the movement had decided to join the SPLA. Those remaining hostile to the SPLA, including Gabriel Tang, began to be more closely intertwined with Sudan’s military intelligence and regular army.
Rivalry within the SPLA during the Second Civil War
The SPLA suffered a devastating split in 1991 when three senior commanders, Riek Machar, Gordon Kong Chuol and Lam Akol, announced the overthrow of John Garang as the movement’s leader. In practice, however, Garang remained in the field with substantial forces under his command. The following decade witnessed a brutal civil war within a civil war between Garang’s SPLA-Mainstream (a.k.a. SPLA-Torit) and Riek Machar’s SPLA-Nasir faction. As Riek Machar’s pro-Khartoum tendencies became clearer (they were eventually sealed in a 1998 agreement with Khartoum), SPLA-Nasir began to splinter and once again there were numerous clashes between different Nuer factions.
Following Riek Machar’s 1998 agreement with Khartoum, his SPLA-Nasir forces were renamed the United Democratic Salvation Front/South Sudan Defense Force (UDSF/SSDF). A clear Khartoum loyalist by now, Tang became a leading commander in the SSDF with a close association to the SAF. After the 1998 agreement, SSDF figures such as Riek Machar and Gabriel Tang were commonly seen about in Khartoum. Even after Machar’s 2002 reconciliation with John Garang and SPLA-Mainstream, Tang remained a pro-government militia leader. The SSDF became so closely identified with Northern interests that it was not allowed to be an independent party to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) talks on the grounds the movement had become synonymous with Khartoum.
2004 Campaign against the Shilluk People in the Upper Nile
General Tang’s most notorious campaign took place in the Shilluk tribal lands of the Upper Nile in 2004. The origin of the violence dated back to 1991, when Shilluk leader Dr. Lam Akol broke away from the SPLA to form the ironically named SPLA-United. Fighting between the SPLA and the breakaway “United” faction continued until the Fashoda Peace Agreement of 1997 landed Lam Akol’s movement firmly in the pro-Khartoum camp. When Akol rejoined the mainstream SPLA in August 2003, Khartoum took steps to bring the Shilluk country in Upper Nile back under government control. Pro-Khartoum Shilluk militias were joined by SAF gunboats and pro-Khartoum Nuer militias under the leadership of General Tang, General Paulino Matip and Tang’s lieutenant, Thomas Mabor Dhol in an offensive along the west banks of the Nile and Bahr al-Ghazal rivers. They attacked the village of the Shilluk king, among others. Shilluk communities were devastated, suffering large losses of civilian life and tens of thousands displaced (Sudan Vision, March 13; IRIN, March 13, 2004). Tang’s efforts were rewarded with a promotion to Major General in the SAF.
A Three-Day Battle in Malakal
When many Nuer leaders of pro-Khartoum militias went over to the SPLA in 2006 after signing onto the Juba Declaration, Tang remained firmly in the Khartoum camp, unwilling to associate with the Dinka commanders in the SPLA who he believed intended the subjugation of the Nuer.
After a dispute between the SPLA and the Tangginiya, shooting broke out in the Upper Nile State capital of Malakal, with both sides claiming the other had fired first. The SSDF accused GoSS president Salva Kiir (see Militant Leadership Monitor, November 2010) and Riek Machar of engineering an “assassination attempt” on “SSDF Chief of Operations, Major General Tang” that began with an assault on Tang’s Malakal residence (SSUDA-SSDF Press Release, March 29, 2009). The dispute turned into a pitched battle, with Tang’s force falling back on a barracks close to the Malakal airport (Reuters, December 2, 2006).
After three days of fighting and looting that had scattered bodies in the streets and left Malakal without a water supply, Salva Kiir cut short an official visit to Uganda to return to South Sudan (New Vision [Kampala], December 1, 2011). Malakal residents began to draw water directly from the Nile, which was contaminated with dead bodies, exacerbating an outbreak of cholera in the area (Reuters, December 2, 2006). Leaving thousands of local residents displaced or in mourning, General Tang returned to the security of Khartoum.
Collapse of the Joint Integrated Units in Malakal
Under the terms of the 2005 CPA, Tang had the option of aligning his men with either Khartoum’s SAF or the Southern SPLA. After opting for the former, Khartoum decided to send Tang’s fighters south as part of the Northern component of the newly formed Joint Integrated Units (JIU). Given Tang’s history in the region, Khartoum’s decision to deploy Tang in his regional home capital of Malakal could be described as somewhere between mischievous and provocative.
The Joint Integrated Units were created by the CPA as a means of providing security in the South and various border regions in the run-up to the 2011 Southern independence referendum. The units were envisioned as a cooperative mix of regular army and SPLA troops that could, in the event of a vote against independence, serve as the basis for an integrated Sudanese army. In practice, however, the northern and southern elements of the JIUs remained segregated, typically living in separate barracks and running separate patrols. Khartoum’s practice of sending pro-Khartoum Southern militias who were at odds with locals and the SPLA rather than elements of the regular army in many cases only aggravated the security situation.
General Tang’s surprise return to the southern city of Malakal in February 2009, resulted in new clashes involving tanks and artillery between the JIU’s Tangginya and the SPLA, which left 60 dead before Tang’s men withdrew (New Sudan Vision, February 25, 2009; see also Terrorism Monitor, March 13, 2009). Tang found his militia fighting on its own when the commander of the remaining JIU/SAF unit of 200 men decided to leave Tang to his own devices. Tang’s commander handed himself and his unit over to the SPLA (UN Integrated Regional Information Network, February 28, 2009).
In the context of the 2005 CPA and Tang’s decision to align his militia with the SAF rather than the SPLA, SPLA deputy chief-of-staff Major General James Hoth described Tang as “a spoiler… He has never been in the SPLA. He has been with the government militia” (UN Integrated Regional Information Network, February 28, 2009). Reflecting the urgency of the situation, SPLM Information Minister Gabriel Changson Chang said at the time: “We think Tangginyang have been used to unleash another civil war in South Sudan (AFP, February 25, 2011).
Tang claimed in a local radio interview that he was oblivious to his status as a wanted criminal in South Sudan. He went on to state that he had no desire for people to die because of his presence, though he finished the appearance on an ominous note: “This is a time for peace, not for war. I thought what happened in Malakal in 2006 was not my fault. If I knew that I am the one [responsible for the violence], I would not come to Malakal again. I know the time when I will fight my war in Southern Sudan.” Tang claimed the purpose of his return was to prepare the funeral of a daughter and to begin renovation of his house, “which collapsed a long time ago.” (Sudan Radio Service, February 27, 2009).
Tang Accepts the Amnesty, October 2010
Under an amnesty declared by SPLM President Salva Kiir, Tang arrived in the South Sudanese capital of Juba in October 2010 to meet with Kiir and the now Vice President of the GoSS, Riek Machar, pledging his full allegiance to the SPLA/M leadership. The militia leader promised he would not be returning to Khartoum and would oversee the assimilation of his troops into the SPLA [3]. Surprisingly, Tang announced that he had been set ahead to prepare for the arrival of rebel generals George Athor and Gordon Kong Chuol, who Tang said were ready to rejoin the Southern government (Sudan Tribune, October 15, 2010).
General Tang and the Jarch Management Group
Only days after joining the SPLA, Tang also joined the advisory board of New York-based investment firm, Jarch Management Group Ltd (JMG), which had leased an enormous area of 4,000 square kilometers of farmland in Jonglei in 2009 [4]. Nearly all the oil-rich land covered by the leases is inhabited by members of the Nuer tribe, who complain the formula for local shares of oil revenues are not being followed by the GoSS. In doing so, Tang joined fellow Nuer SSDF commanders Paulino Matip, Peter Gadet Yakah, Gordon Kong Chuol and a number of others who had found roles with JMG. According to a statement from JMG, Tang’s presence on the board “further strengthens us. He expands the company’s knowledge base as he hails from Jonglei state and will give the company much needed expertise in Jonglei and expand its expertise in Greater Upper Nile” (Sudan Tribune, October 23, 2010). JMG’s lease of farmland surprised many, particularly as the company had always shown an interest in energy development rather than agriculture, (agricultural investment in South Sudan was exempt from sanctions).
A 2006 SSDF press release noted: “with the production and sharing agreements that we have signed with JMG over the past few years, this company is set to become the largest producer of oil and gas in South Sudan” (SSUDA/SSDF Press Release September 20, 2006). The GoSS hopes that proper development of the huge Jonglei reserves will allow Southern oil production to increase to 2,000,000 barrels of petroleum per day (bpd) from the current 450,000 (Sudan Tribune, January 13).
Yet, JMG did not receive a unanimous welcome in the Nuer lands. The Nuer Congress described JMG as “a destructive oil business company; if left unchecked, it will cause unprecedented destructions in the great Upper Nile region, particularly in areas inhabited by the Nuer and the Dinka where it finances rogue groups” (Gurtong.net, October 19, 2006).
JMG claims that numerous contracts for oil and gas exploration in Jonglei were signed by JMG and the SSDF in 2003 and 2004, prior to the formation of the GoSS. A clause in the contracts said they would remain in force should the SSDF join forces with other groups to create a GoSS. The SSDF reaffirmed the oil contracts in 2006 (SSUDA/SSDF Press Release September 20, 2006).
New Clashes in Malakal
Fighting again broke out in Malakal, once more in early February, when Tangganiya in the JIU refused to give up their weapons, including tanks and artillery, which were scheduled to be returned to Khartoum along with the Northern troops in the JIU. Tang’s troops also rejected plans to redeploy them to Juba and wanted to retain their (inflated) ranks and keep their units intact during integration with the SPLA. The SPLA was also alarmed that Tang continued to recruit new fighters at the assembly area even as his forces supposedly awaited integration. The view among many SPLA commanders was that Tang continued to be paid by Khartoum and was deliberately disrupting the peace process in South Sudan (Sudan Radio Service, February 7, 2011; Sudan Tribune, April 25, 2011).
The disputed artillery was brought into action in the fighting that followed (Anyuak Media, February 4, 2011). At least 50 people were killed in the resulting clashes before SPLA and United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) troops were able to restore order (AFP, February 5, 2011; February 6, 2011). According to an SPLM minister, Tang “was personally involved in the fighting but narrowly survived because he ran away to Kolnyang after our forces overran his headquarters” (Sudan Tribune, April 25, 2011). Eventually the SPLA helped return the weaponry to the North. Before the fighting erupted, Tang was scheduled to become one of South Sudan’s many Lieutenant Generals, a rank generously doled out to various warlords and militia leaders who supposedly agreed to bring their troops under the SPLA’s force umbrella.
General Tang Surrenders
Fifty-seven of Tang’s militiamen were killed in a battle with SPLA forces in northern Jonglei on April 23. The fighting was reported to have broken out after a senior officer of the Tangginiya was killed for refusing to participate in integration operations (Sudan Tribune, April 25, 2011). Two days later, Tang surrendered along with his two top commanders, Mabor and Gatwech, as well as 1,300 of his men. An SPLA spokesman claimed efforts to integrate Tang’s men into the SPLA would continue (Sudan Radio Service, April 26, 2011; AFP, April 25, 2011). It was uncertain whether the amnesty would continue to apply to Tang, but the General claimed he still wished to pursue integration, describing the February battle in Malakal as “unexpected” (Sudan Tribune, April 25, 2011).
The latest information states General Tang is under house arrest while it is being determined what to do with him. An SPLA spokesman said a court martial would not necessarily follow: “The next step is for the government of southern Sudan, because it is a political issue. It is not a pure military scenario. Because we are in the army, we don’t manage the law. It is the government of southern Sudan that will decide upon it” (Sudan Radio Service, May 4, 2011).
Conclusion
General Tang has been a resolute opponent of the SPLA and what he perceives as its agenda for Dinka domination of the South. As such, his assertions of loyalty to the SPLA appear strategic rather than heartfelt. The extraordinary patience of the GoSS with Tang is explained by the government’s need to pacify the Nuer community living above Jonglei State’s oil-soaked Bloc B held by French oil giant, Total (AFP, January 13, 2011). To be taken seriously as a viable nation-state, South Sudan cannot be seen to enter full independence in July while fighting half a dozen bush wars on its own territory. With ongoing fighting in the oil-producing border region of Abyei (still disputed between Khartoum and Juba) fostering the possibility of a fresh round of North-South military confrontations, it is also essential for Juba to present a unified military front. However, given General Tang’s record of duplicity and taunts, it seems unlikely that he can be counted on to become a pillar of Southern unity in the difficult days of consolidation and state-building that lie ahead for South Sudan.
Notes
1. Anyanya is defined as “Snake Poison” in the Madi language of South Sudan.
2. Douglas H. Johnson, “The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars,” International African Institute, Oxford, 2003, pp. 68-69.
3. Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment – Small Arms Survey, March 2011, Available at: www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/pdfs/facts-figures/armed-groups/southern-sudan/emerging/HSBA-Armed-Groups-Tang.pdf.
4. The Jarch Management Group Ltd—headed by a former AIG executive called Philippe Heilberg–lists its contact address on its website as being in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region while a Google search lists it as being registered on the island of Tortola in the British Virgin Islands, Available at: www.jarchcapital.com/contact.php; www.sudantribune.com/spip.php.
