Geopolitical Socialism: Xi and Putin Build Bloc Power

Geopolitical Socialism: Xi and Putin Build Bloc Power

Executive Summary:

• The People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Russia are entering a new phase of institutionalized interdependence, built through unprecedented systemic coordination and guided by Beijing’s ambition to transform the geopolitical foundations of global order. The latest summit and surrounding activity show this agenda being embedded across economic, political, scientific, informational, security, and military domains, with energy, trade, and defense cooperation operating as components of a much broader strategic architecture.
• The connective tissue of this emerging bloc is being built through interlocking institutions and infrastructure. Railways, customs systems, industrial standards, research networks, elite training, media cooperation, and security mechanisms are binding the two states together while creating continental arteries capable of moving resources inward and PRC goods, technology, personnel, and coercive support outward—including under sanctions, blockade, or wartime conditions.
• This integration is also increasing Beijing’s capacity to set the relationship’s operational agenda and exercise political influence inside Moscow. The PRC increasingly supplies the doctrine, technology, standards, financing, and institutional architecture through which Russian capabilities are organized, while expanding its access to Russian elite formation, regulatory practice, scientific development, information systems, and internal-security institutions.
• The same coordinating approach is becoming characteristic of PRC relations across Eurasia and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. By connecting formally sovereign states through overlapping logistical, political, security, and knowledge systems, Beijing can build an alliance-equivalent formation without formal alliance commitments. Future net assessments must therefore evaluate these opaque connections as components of a wider strategic formation—and measure their combined strategic depth, sanctions resilience, internal control capacity, and war-making power accordingly.

Strategic cooperation between Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is reaching new levels, as a variety of recent activities attest. Most prominent is a meeting between Foreign Minister Wang Yi (王毅) and his counterpart Sergey Lavrov on July 24, at which Wang said that both sides should “plan for the next stage of high-level exchanges, maintain the momentum of pragmatic cooperation, and enhance the resolve and resilience of cooperation” (谋划好下阶段高层交往，延续务实合作增长态势，增强合作定力和韧性) (People’s Daily, July 25).

Earlier in the month, the two countries celebrated the 25th anniversary of their bilateral Treaty of Good Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation. Several events and conferences were held to mark the occasion, which fell amid joint naval patrols and drills that began on July 13 and concluded on July 30 (CCTV, July 22; PLA Daily, July 30). Underscoring the breadth of cooperation, a prominent Russian academic interviewed by Xinhua said that the two countries “share highly aligned strategic goals and interests” (战略目标与利益高度契合) and that there was “enormous potential” (有巨大发展潜力) for coordinated development in political, economic, cultural, and international affairs (Xinhua, July 16).

The anniversary was made all the more significant by Russian president Vladimir Putin’s May 20 state visit to Beijing, at which he and General Secretary Xi Jinping recommitted to the treaty (Xinhua, May 20). During the summit, the two also issued parallel statements on strategic coordination and international order, and oversaw the signing of 20 new cooperation documents. This proliferation of institutional connections is reminiscent—not in degree of control, but in organizational form—of the former Soviet Union’s relationships with its satellite states: formally sovereign governments connected through parallel political, security, military, economic, infrastructural, and knowledge systems. These connections are becoming the connective tissue of an emerging PRC-led bloc order spanning Eurasia.

While Beijing is in control, and there is real and growing asymmetry between the two countries, excessive focus on Moscow as a weakened “junior partner” that fights costly wars, supplies discounted energy, and repeatedly seeks concessions from Beijing misses both the integration now taking place and the strategic assets Russia still contributes. Moscow remains a nuclear power possessing substantial military capacity, territorial depth, energy and mineral resources, and a willingness to absorb escalation risks that Beijing prefers to avoid directly. A better model of the relationship sees it building on the “rapid thickening of coordination” that had already produced a functional Eurasian architecture spanning finance, technology, energy, and geopolitical power projection, but with Moscow now supplying “praetorian” power within an increasingly Beijing-designed bloc architecture intended to remake international order (China Brief, March 20).

From Strategic Partnership to Alternative Global Order

The Xi–Putin summit reaffirmed a common strategic purpose but also expanded the mechanisms through which it could be transmitted across both states and converted into coordinated action (Xinhua, May 20). Vice premiers responsible for bilateral mechanisms reported on investment, energy, trade, Northeast China–Russian Far East cooperation, and people-to-people exchanges, while the two foreign ministers briefed the leaders on coordination in international and regional affairs. Xi described the relationship as entering “a new stage of greater accomplishment and faster development” (更有作为、更快发展的新阶段) and called on the two governments to upgrade cooperation in a range of areas. The presence of senior officials indicated that implementation would extend across the Party center, State Council, diplomacy, industrial planning, investment, and people-to-people mechanisms. [1]

Beijing framed Putin’s visit as the opening of a new phase in a relationship that had reached its “historical highest level” (历史最高水平). On May 21, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun (郭嘉昆) called the talks “in-depth, friendly, and fruitful” (深入友好、富有成果的会谈), and described the summit as a “new starting point” (新起点) for building higher-quality political trust, mutually beneficial cooperation, people-to-people connectivity, and international coordination aimed at reforming global governance (Ministry of Foreign Affairs [MFA], May 21). The same briefing exposed the limits and asymmetry of that integration. Asked whether the visit had advanced the Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline, Guo indicated no agreement, saying only that energy cooperation would continue on the basis of mutual benefit. Beijing thus advertised a relationship at a historic high while remaining noncommittal on Moscow’s most sought-after energy project (MFA, May 21; Eurasia Daily Monitor, June 16).

The contrast over Power of Siberia 2 indicates that cooperation is deepening most rapidly where it serves Beijing’s institutional architecture and international agenda. The principal expression of that agenda was the much longer joint statement through which Xi and Putin extended and expanded their 2001 treaty (Xinhua, May 20). The original treaty chiefly stabilized the post-Cold War relationship through non-aggression, sovereignty, border security, crisis consultation, and generic cooperation (MFA, July 16, 2001). The 2026 statement filled that foundation with a denser program driven by “head-of-state diplomacy” (元首外交) and extending to encompass military activity, among a range of other efforts, effectively repurposing the relationship’s stabilizing treaty foundation as a platform for institutional integration.

Beijing’s strategic intent is to build a PRC-led bloc capable of replacing the U.S.-led order with its own “multipolar” (多极化) vision. The joint statement on “Promoting a Multipolar World and a New Type of International Relations” (倡导世界多极化和新型国际关系的联合声明) makes this clear (Xinhua, May 20). It follows a lineage of PRC–Russia declarations contesting U.S.-led globalization, NATO, and liberal-democratic norms, including statements on multipolarity and a new international order, international order in the 21st century, major world issues, and international relations in a new era (United Nations Digital Library, 1997; Consulate-General of the PRC to San Francisco, July 1, 2005; MFA, July 4, 2017; President of Russia, February 4, 2022). The 2026 summit thus joined the institutional deepening of the bilateral relationship to a decades-long effort to construct an alternative international order.

The statement cast both countries as founders of the United Nations, permanent UN Security Council members, and “important forces” (重要力量) in a multipolar world beset by challenges implicitly blamed on the United States. [2] Within that diagnosis emerged a division of labor in which Russian security concepts were enmeshed with Xi’s “Four Global Initiatives” (四大全球倡议). The statement called for “equal and indivisible security” (安全平等且不可分割), opposed alliance expansion, hybrid war, and proxy war, and urged “balanced, effective, and sustainable” (均衡、有效、可持续) global and regional security architectures (Xinhua, May 20). It also opposed forcing sovereign states to abandon neutrality, tracking Moscow’s objections to NATO enlargement and Western guarantees to Ukraine.

Those Russian priorities form the coercive core and praetorian capacity within Beijing’s broader program to provide the world with an alternative structure of rules, institutions, values, and development norms. The statement defended each country’s “independent choice of development path and development model” (自主选择的发展道路和发展模式), rejecting any one-size-fits-all approach, and emphasized civilizational and value diversity while opposing politicizing human rights. It also grounded global governance in sovereignty, international law, multilateralism, people-centered principles, and action.

Forging a Continental System for the Long Emergency

The agreements concluded during Putin’s visit and by senior PRC emissaries dispatched before and after it show Beijing driving implementation across both states’ economic, infrastructural, informational, legal, and military systems. Beyond the two joint statements, 40 cooperation documents were signed or announced (see tables 1 and 2). Relatively few concerned the commodity trade traditionally anchoring the relationship, instead emphasizing the connective systems needed to reorganize Russian capabilities around an increasingly PRC-directed Eurasian order: transport, industrial and scientific capacity, regulatory coordination, elite training, information management, and coercive power.

Implementation has partly focused on insulating trade and investment from external actions. On May 18, National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) deputy director Zhou Haibing (周海兵) and Russian deputy economic development minister Dmitry Ilichev convened the China–Russia Investment Cooperation Committee to advance bilateral projects (NDRC, May 21). Two days later, commerce minister Wang Wentao (王文涛) and Russian economic development minister Maxim Reshetnikov pledged to “jointly resist unilateral coercive measures and trade protectionism” (共同抵制单边胁迫措施和贸易保护主义) (PRC Ministry of Commerce, May 21). Their statement opposed restrictions imposed in the name of national security, environmental protection, or climate policy and said negotiations with third countries “should not target the other side” (不应针对另一方)—a response to U.S. and allied sanctions, trade restrictions, and supply-chain standards.

Beijing also used the summit to build logistical corridors and the institutional, scientific, and technological networks that operate them. Agreements covered a second standard-gauge track on the Manzhouli–Zabaikalsk railway, customs training, agricultural inspection, antitrust and intellectual-property coordination, industrial production, nuclear science, software, artificial intelligence (AI), Beidou satellite navigation, technical standards, and urban development (China Brief, May 1; MFA, May 21). The largest category—roughly one third of the package—concerned education, research, media, and elite formation. It linked the Central Party School with the Russian Presidential Academy, paired universities through joint institutes and degree programs, and expanded cooperation among major state-media organizations. The package thus connected physical infrastructure with the procedures, technologies, expertise, personnel, and narratives needed to operate a common system (see tables 1 and 2).

The omissions were equally revealing. Rather than delivering Moscow’s desired commodity or financial windfall, the summit integrated Russian infrastructure, science, industry, regulation, elite training, and information into PRC networks. Only one document explicitly concerned energy—green certificates—and none announced a major oil or gas project, banking accord, or currency-settlement initiative.

Beijing effectively used the summit to determine which connections to deepen and which Russian capabilities would serve a wider architecture whose technological, institutional, and normative direction it could determine. The emerging model moves beyond the 2025 project of building parallel systems to one in which expanded rail, customs, and border capacity will principally move PRC machinery, manufactured goods, and technology outward while carrying Russian energy, minerals, and agricultural commodities into the PRC (China Brief, May 14, 2025). Moscow supplies territory and resources; Beijing increasingly supplies the equipment, standards, capital goods, and demand that infuse the system with economic and technological ballast.

Turning Coordinated Power Against Japan

The most concerning development in the bilateral relationship is the deepening of military and security cooperation. Official statements on military cooperation link closer interoperability to political support for each state’s confrontation with the U.S.-led order. At the PRC Ministry of National Defense’s first monthly press conference after the summit, spokesperson Jiang Bin (蒋斌) chose to answer a question on Russia first, pledging to improve cooperation mechanisms; expand exercises, training, and maritime and air patrols; provide “firm mutual support” (坚定相互支持) on core interests; and raise strategic coordination to “a new level” (迈上新台阶) (PRC Ministry of Defense, May 28).

In both words and actions, it is increasingly clear that the two countries are going beyond their treaty commitment to “not target third countries” (不针对第三国). On July 24, foreign ministers Wang Yi and Lavrov agreed that their two countries must “never allow Japan to rearm” (绝不允许日本重新武装) (People’s Daily, July 25). And the July Joint Sea-2026 (海上联合-2026) naval drills and related patrols show those commitments becoming operational. The two forces practiced reconnaissance, air and missile defense, and anti-ship strikes before patrolling into the Pacific (State Council Information Office, July 6). Near Okinotori, a PRC destroyer then conducted the first publicly disclosed Chinese live-fire training inside waters Japan claims as its exclusive economic zone (USNI News, July 22). This provided only the latest evidence that Russia is helping Beijing stretch Japanese surveillance and air-defense resources via more frequent and intrusive joint activities, pressuring a central U.S. ally. [3]

On the security front, Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission Secretary Chen Wenqing (陈文清) traveled to Moscow in late May to present Xi’s Global Security Initiative to Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu as the answer to rampant “hegemonism and Cold War thinking” (霸权主义与冷战思维甚嚣尘上), “countercurrents” (逆流) against globalization, and rising technological risks (People’s Daily, May 30). This placed bilateral coordination within Beijing’s program for global and regional security governance.

Bureaucratic commitments followed. Public Security Minister Wang Xiaohong (王小洪) and Chief Justice of the Russian Supreme Court Igor Krasnov agreed to deepen cooperation against transnational crime and coordinate through multilateral platforms. In Moscow, National People’s Congress Chairman Zhao Leji (赵乐际) called for the leaders’ agreements and major projects to “take effect” (落实见效) and for wider exchanges on national security, AI, and foreign-related rule of law, which senior officials connected through parallel mechanisms (People’s Daily, May 31).

Conclusion

The Russian agreements show that Beijing is building a continental system designed to function under sanctions, blockade, and war. Under this system, energy and raw materials move inward while Chinese goods, technology, standards, personnel, and coercive support move outward. Through adjoining projects, these arteries could also sustain North Korea, Iran, and potentially Southeast Asian states. The “Hormuz dilemma” captures only one vulnerability addressed; the larger purpose is strategic durability. Russia is pivotal because it straddles Eurasia, supplies military power, resources, territory, and risk tolerance, and shares Beijing’s historical familiarity with the organizational forms through which socialist states mobilized for prolonged geopolitical conflict.

Beijing’s deeper wager is that it can recreate those forms without the brittleness that destroyed the Soviet Union. Rather than a single formal empire, it is assembling parallel military, security, logistical, scientific, educational, and informational systems around a PRC core, while sovereign partners supply differentiated praetorian functions. The PLA’s reported training of Russian specialists is emblematic of how Beijing is both drawing upon Russian coercive power and helping reproduce it (Reuters, July 1). Future net assessments must discard the shibboleth that the PRC “does not have alliances” and evaluate these opaque connections by their functions in crisis and war: distributing strategic depth, sustaining internal control, regenerating coercive power, and operating together. Xi appears to believe he has perfected geopolitical socialism—making warfighting and internal survivability mutually reinforcing and building a political organism capable of enduring the long emergency of the 21st century.

Table 1: Agreements Signed in the Presence of Xi and Putin

(Source: PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 21)

Table 2: Other Agreements Announced During Putin’s Visit

(Source: PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 21)

Notes

[1] These officials included Cai Qi (蔡奇), Ding Xuexiang (丁薛祥), Wang Yi (王毅), He Lifeng (何立峰), Zhang Guoqing (张国清), and Shen Yiqin (谌贻琴).

[2] These include “unilateral coercion, hegemonism, bloc confrontation, and neo-colonialism” (单边胁迫、霸权主义、阵营对抗及新殖民主义), as well as fragmentation and a return to the “law of the jungle” (丛林法则).

[3] Japan has recorded repeated PRC–Russian naval activity since 2021 and ten joint long-range bomber patrols since 2019, nine over the Sea of Japan (Japan Times, June 28). Annual bomber patrols in 2019–2021 became twice-yearly operations in 2022–2024. In December 2025, bombers passed through the Okinawa–Miyako gap into the Pacific off Shikoku for the first time, accompanied by PRC fighters. On June 27, 2026, a larger formation repeated the route with Chinese H-6 and Russian Tu-95 bombers, Russian Tu-142 maritime-patrol aircraft, and fighters from both countries (Japan Joint Staff, June 28). Although the aircraft remained in international airspace, the route now penetrates Japan’s southwestern approaches and Pacific flank.