Georgian Dream Sends Mixed Messages Amid Push for U.S. Diplomatic ‘Reset’

Georgian Dream Sends Mixed Messages Amid Push for U.S. Diplomatic ‘Reset’

Executive Summary:

• Tbilisi appears to be trying to “reset” its relationship with Washington. New plans for Georgian partners to build a Trump Organization-branded “Trump Tower” in Tbilisi are considered part of Georgian Dream’s effort to signal improved ties with the U.S. administration.
• Georgian Dream highlights limited diplomatic contact with U.S. officials, including a March 30 call between U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze, as signs of “reset” relations despite other announced meetings being delayed or not materializing.
• The shift from confrontational rhetoric to a more conciliatory tone toward Georgia’s relationship with the United States suggests that Georgian Dream does not always maintain a clear foreign policy line and may act in a fragmented, uncoordinated manner.

News of a plan to build a “Trump Tower” in Tbilisi sparked mixed reactions in Georgia. On April 18, The Wall Street Journal reported that the Trump Organization, founded by U.S. President Donald Trump and managed by his family, plans to brand an approximately 70-story building in Tbilisi, which would become the tallest building in the South Caucasus (The Wall Street Journal, April 18; OC Media, April 19). If completed, this would be the first large-scale Trump Organization-branded project in the South Caucasus (Civil Georgia, April 19). Some commentators view this new building as Georgian Dream’s attempt to “reset” their relations with the  Trump Administration through business projects. These commentators believe the project is aimed at improving relations or at least creating the impression within Georgia that relations are improving (Eurasianet, April 22). The Georgian companies “Archi Group” and “Biograpi Living,” which have close ties to Georgian Dream, are the Trump Organization’s local partners on the project (Interpressnews; Civil Georgia, April 19; Eurasianet, April 22). Georgian Dream’s rhetoric toward its relationship with the United States has vacillated over the past few years and now Tbilisi appears to be seeking opportunities to repair it.

Georgian Dream reacted positively to a March 30 phone call between U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze. The officials discussed “security in the Caucasus and the Black Sea region” (U.S. Department of State, March 30; Civil Georgia, April 30). Georgia’s regime-aligned political discourse presented this discussion as a potential signal of improvement in relations between Georgia and the United States. The details of the conversation remain undisclosed, however, and may have focused on the Iran conflict rather than rapprochement between Georgian Dream and the United States.

In early April, Speaker of Georgian Parliament Shalva Papuashvili and Tbilisi Mayor Kakha Kaladze announced that a delegation of influential figures from Washington would visit Georgia later in the month (YouTube/@tvpirveli.ge, April 3; Civil Georgia, April 4). The U.S. Embassy, however, told the Georgian service of Radio Free Liberty/Radio Europe that it had “no visit to announce” (Radio Tavisupleba, April 7). No influential figures from Washington came to Tbilisi in April. Local media alleged that Georgian Dream may have been expecting a visit from the U.S. president’s son, who was rumored to have been persuaded to come to Tbilisi for the ceremony to launch the Trump Tower project (Alia.ge, April 30).

Levan Makhashvili, a Georgian Dream member of parliament, claimed at the end of April that Georgia–U.S. relations have been restored. Makhashvili noted that the relationship still needs to improve and said that Georgia seeks to “restore” its strategic partnership with the United States, which—though still in place on paper—is functionally much diminished (Interpressnews, April 30).

In December 2024, Kobakhidze stated that Georgian Dream wants the “formal, paper-based” strategic partnership with the United States to become one that “features tangible content, specific objectives, and a clear agenda” (Info.medi.ge, December 9, 2024). According to Georgian Dream officials, they want the introduction of a visa-free regime and the launch of direct air connections with the United States. Earlier in 2024, Papuashvili stated that if the United States were to introduce a visa-free regime for Georgian citizens, the country’s population of 3.5 million would not pose a significant migration risk to the United States. He also said, somewhat critically, “It is understood that the United States does not have visa-free travel with many countries, but it does have visa-free travel with the unrecognized entity of Taiwan” (1tv.ge, February 28, 2024).

In practice, Georgians’ access to the United States has become more difficult. In January, the United States placed Georgia among 75 countries affected by a temporary suspension in the issuance of immigrant visas for their citizens (Travel.state.gov, January 14). On April 2, the U.S. State Department included Georgia in its list of around 54 countries whose citizens are required to post a visa bond because they are designated as a “high-risk” of overstaying B1 and B2 visas (Travel.state.gov, March 18). While Georgian Dream presented the issue of easing U.S. visa requirements for Georgian citizens as a purely political matter and an effective instrument for strengthening ties between the two countries, they have presented the subsequent tightening of visa conditions by the United States as unrelated to politics. Georgia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs told its citizens that the decision is based solely on the high rate of violations of the visa regime (Radio Tavisupleba, March 18). The Georgian Dream government emphasized that this measure should not be interpreted as a result of strained relations with the United States.

Georgian Dream’s claims about the restoration of relations between the two countries raise doubts. On March 30, the same day as the Rubio–Kobakhidze call, government-aligned Georgian media reported that the United States had maintained sanctions against Russia, which include Bidzina Ivanishvili—the honorary chairman of Georgian Dream, the richest man in Georgia, founder of Georgian Dream, and former Georgian prime minister—for another year. These sanctions were originally introduced in December 2024. Representatives of Georgian Dream expressed dissatisfaction with Washington’s decision, calling it unfair and disappointing (Tvpirveli.ge, March 30).

Georgian Foreign Minister Maka Botchorishvili said that, instead of in April as initially advertised, “in May, representatives of the U.S. State Department will visit Georgia. Meetings are planned not only with me, but also with various representatives of the Georgian government” (YouTube/@1tv.ge, May 1). On May 7, U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the Caucasus and European Security and Political Affairs Sonata Coulter arrived in Georgia. During the meeting, Kobakhidze “confirmed the readiness of the Georgian government to reset bilateral relations and renew the strategic partnership ‘from a clean slate’ based on a concrete roadmap focused on achieving tangible results” (Facebook/GeorgianGovernment, May 7).

Georgian Dream’s statements about a “reset” in relations have not yet been accompanied by concrete, verifiable steps, and many of the expectations voiced by Georgian officials remain unfulfilled. The Georgian Dream government is clearly seeking common ground with the Trump Administration and publicizes minor developments as evidence of significantly improved bilateral ties. Government-aligned media presented Georgian First Lady Tamar Bagrationi’s participation in the “Together for a Better Future” summit on March 24–25 in Washington, hosted by First Lady of the United States Melania Trump, as proof of a warming in relations with the United States (1tv.ge, March 23).

Georgian Dream is making every effort—including, according to some local media, employing lobbyists in Washington—to establish contacts with the Trump Administration. At the same time, Tbilisi selectively tells its population that friendship with the United States harms Georgia’s interests. For example, a main Georgian Dream ideologue, Zaza Shatirishvili, wrote, “Who still thinks that we will perish without friendship with the United States?” in an open letter published at the end of January to the Georgian public (1tv.ge, January 20). In early April and May, however, Georgian Dream shifted from confrontational rhetoric to a more conciliatory tone, expressing its desire to develop official relations and friendship with the United States. Such inconsistency suggests that Georgian Dream does not always maintain a clear foreign policy line and may act in a fragmented, uncoordinated manner. This vacillation creates the impression that Georgia’s foreign policy does not reflect a consistent strategic approach but rather follows the expressed will, personal preferences, and shifting attitudes of individual political figures.