Heading al-Qaeda’s Syrian Resurgence: An Updated Profile of Abu Humam al-Shami

Heading al-Qaeda’s Syrian Resurgence: An Updated Profile of Abu Humam al-Shami

On February 27, 2018, a new jihadist entity calling itself Hurras al-Din (Guardians of the Religion) released a statement through social media channels announcing its establishment in Syria (al-Modon, March 2). In the statement, Hurras al-Din urged fellow Muslims to assist the jihadists fighting against the recent Syrian Army offensive aimed at capturing the rebel-held area of eastern Ghouta. Further, the group called for an end to jihadist infighting in Idlib province and a renewed focus on fighting Syrian government forces. The statement also revealed the name of the group’s emir as Abu Humam al-Shami (Alaraby, February 28).

An Old al-Qaeda ‘Friend’

For those closely following the Syrian conflict and, more generally, al-Qaeda’s history, the name Abu Humam al-Shami’s (a.k.a. Samir Hijazi and Farouq al-Suri) is a familiar one. Despite a lack of information on his personal life, the Syrian militant Abu Humam is in fact a veteran senior al-Qaeda member. He traveled from Syria to Afghanistan in 1998 or 1999, where he undertook militant training in the Kandahar area. There, he gradually rose in status, ultimately being appointed to manage the affairs of his fellow Syrians training with al-Qaeda in Afghanistan (see Militant Leadership Monitor, May 31, 2015).

After 9/11, Abu Humam fled to Iran, as did several other al-Qaeda members. He remained in Iran until 2003, when he moved to Iraq. There he was arrested by Iraqi forces and quickly extradited to Syria (al-Quds, March 7, 2015). In 2004, Syrian authorities released him, reportedly because of a lack of evidence linking him to terrorist activities. Nevertheless, he soon returned to such activities, training al-Qaeda operatives in Syria to fight U.S. forces in Iraq (OrientNews, March 5, 2015). His militant early career included time spent in Lebanon and again Afghanistan, until his return to Syria in 2015, when he joined Jabhat al-Nusra (JaN), the al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria (al-Jazeera, March 6, 2015).

As a core al-Qaeda member, Abu Humam played a key role in the nascent rivalry between JaN and Islamic State (IS), which culminated in IS’ expulsion from al-Qaeda’s network in February 2014 (Almodon, August 26, 2016). According to reports, Abu Humam was directly involved in the efforts to mediate between the two groups, meeting senior IS members in a bid to reach an agreement to end the dispute. In March 2015, reports emerged suggesting that Abu Humam was killed in an airstrike carried out by the Syrian army in the village of Habeet, in the northern Idlib province (Alaraby, March 6, 2015). At that time, Abu Humam was presented as JaN’s masul al-askari al-amm (general military official), highlighting his high-profile status within the jihadist group and his close relationship with JaN emir Abu Muhammed al-Julani (24.ae, March 1).

Taking al-Qaeda’s Side

Information on Abu Humam re-emerged in August 2016, at a time of nascent discord between JaN and, this time, al-Qaeda loyalists.  In early June 2016, al-Julani and his closest aides initiated contact with senior al-Qaeda figures with the objective of dropping the pledge of allegiance JaN had made to al-Qaeda. Indeed, on July 29, 2016, al-Julani announced the complete cancellation of all operations under the name of Jabhat al-Nusra, and the formation of a new group operating under the name of Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (JFS), stating that this new organization had no affiliation to any external entity (al-Jazeera, July 29, 2016). At that time, many interpreted this split as a mere attempt by JaN to disassociate its name from al-Qaeda as to better embed itself in the Syrian Islamist opposition while covertly retaining the relationship. However, new information has emerged over the last few months indicating that al-Qaeda emir Ayman al-Zawahiri had, in reality, not approved the move. [1]

Already back in August 2016, Abu Humam and Abu Julaybib, another senior JaN member close to al-Qaeda, announced their defection from the group in response to the establishment of JFS in a letter published by local Arab media (Elmarada, August 19, 2016). The letter also reveals that Abu Humam was dismissed from his post as a general commander before the missive had been dispatched, which indicates that Abu Humam had likely been involved in that discussions about the opportunity to formalize the split from al-Qaeda. Information that surfaced online after Abu Humam’s decision to leave JaN also exposed his previous military role within the group—he was responsible for the military operations in Daraa, eastern Ghouta and the Damascus countryside—as well as his strong influence over the “Jordanian current” inside JaN (Almodon, August 26, 2016). This influence also likely explains why the first nucleus of militants that left JaN included several Jordanians close to al-Qaeda, among them Eyad al-Tubasi (a.k.a. Abu Julaibib al-Urduni), Bilal Khuraysat (a.k.a. Abu Khadija al-Urduni) and Sami al-Uraydi, former JaN chief Shari’a official (Almodon, August 26, 2016; Ennabaladi, December 1, 2017).

Emir of Hurras al-Din

Tensions between JFS—which in the meantime changed its name to Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in January 2017—and al-Qaeda loyalists in Syria resurfaced in November 2017, when HTS arrested four senior al-Qaeda figures and former al-Nusra members. Among those arrested were Abu Julaibib and Sami al-Uraydi, who HTS accused of disseminating “discord” within jihadist ranks in Syria (Asharq al-Awsat, January 29, 2017; Asharq al-Awsat, November 30, 2017; Twitter, November 28, 2017). This move followed a series of open critiques that the al-Qaeda loyalists had published and disseminated on social media, which focused on the split with al-Qaeda. [2]

Notwithstanding the liberation of the al-Qaeda loyalists in December 2017, the relationship between HTS and al-Qaeda loyalists in northwestern Syria remained tense. According to reports, a mediation effort over the course of December 2017 into early January 2018 resulted in a cease-fire agreement reached in late January (Shaam.org, February 9). The reconciliation committee was convened by al-Jolani and Abu Humam, the first as HTS’s emir and the second acting as al-Qaeda representative for Syria (Shaam.org, February 9). Abu Humam agreed on accepting former HTS fighters to join his faction only after receiving written approval from HTS officials. The al-Qaeda veteran also promised to not allow former IS fighters to join his faction. For its part, HTS agreed to allow al-Qaeda loyalists to keep their heavy weapons and equipment as long as they were used under the HTS umbrella (Muraselon, March 24). That agreement, which stipulated the peaceful coexistence of HTS and the al-Qaeda loyalists, not only highlighted Abu Humam’s key role in the decision-making process of al-Qaeda in Syria, but also laid the foundation for the emergence of the new entity Hurras al-Din.

Conclusion

Hurras al-Din is not yet an official al-Qaeda affiliate, as Ayman al-Zawahiri has not yet made any comments about the new group. Nevertheless, the group is run by a senior al-Qaeda veteran with strong links to the group’s senior leadership—Abu Humam al-Suri. It consists of all the senior al-Qaeda figures currently in Syria, al-Qaeda sympathizers and former HTS factions—namely, Jaysh al-Badia, Jaysh al-Malahim, Jaysh al-Sahel, Sariyat Kabul and Jund al-Sharia—all of which reject a formal split from al-Qaeda (Arabi21.com, March 1; Alahednews, March 19). As such, its emergence can be interpreted as al-Qaeda’s latest attempt to maintain its relevance in the Levant and capitalize on the dwindling fortunes of IS.

The fact that a veteran al-Qaeda member like Abu Humam al-Suri has been appointed to lead this new jihadist enterprise both highlights the high profile of the Syrian militant and reveals that some form of communication between Abu Humam and the al-Qaeda senior leadership is ongoing. The next few months will be critical in gaining a clear picture of Hurras al-Din’s real size and operational capabilities and, more importantly, in understanding whether, under Abu Humam al-Suri’s leadership, the group will transcend the borders of the Syrian conflict to fully embrace al-Qaeda’s global ideology.

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