Ibrahim Ahmed Mahmoud al-Qosi: From Guantanamo Bay Detainee to AQAP Leader

Ibrahim Ahmed Mahmoud al-Qosi: From Guantanamo Bay Detainee to AQAP Leader

The U.S. State Department offered a $4 million reward for Ibrahim Ahmed Mahmoud al-Qosi (a.k.a. Abu Khubaib al-Sudani) through its Rewards for Justice program in November, bringing the longtime al-Qaeda figure back into the international spotlight. The reward comes over seven years after al-Qosi was released from Guantanamo Bay and repatriated to Sudan before subsequently traveling to Yemen and becoming a key figure for al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).

Al-Qosi is a Sudanese citizen born in Atbara in 1960 and raised in a religious middle-class family. Little else is known about al-Qosi’s adolescence and path to al-Qaeda. He began his tenure with the terrorist group in 1989, providing logistical support to al-Qaeda cell members in Sudan before fighting briefly in Afghanistan and becoming the deputy chief financial officer in Peshawar in 1991. Between 1991 and 1995, al-Qosi organized the receipt of donations from non-governmental and charitable organizations and weapons in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Sudan. He also put in a brief stint fighting against the Russians in Chechnya. Osama bin Laden’s expulsion from Sudan in 1996 ultimately led al-Qosi back to Afghanistan, where bin Laden had taken up residence. Al-Qosi first traveled to Pakistan in 1996 and was directed to Peshawar before traveling to Jalalabad and onward to bin Laden’s hideout in Tora Bora. Al-Qosi primarily stayed with bin Laden as he moved about Afghanistan, acting as a cook, messenger, bodyguard and driver, but also was sent to the frontlines in Kabul as part of a defensive mortar crew under the leadership of Abd al-Salam. [1]

As Kabul was falling in 2001, al-Qosi and dozens of other men who had escaped to Tora Bora fled to the Pakistani border, where they paid local tribes to cross into Pakistan and were ultimately turned over to Pakistani authorities in December 2001. Pakistan transferred al-Qosi and several others to U.S. custody at Guantanamo Bay. In 2010, al-Qosi pleaded guilty to conspiring with and providing material support to al-Qaeda in a pre-trial deal that would ultimately see him released back to Sudan in 2012. [2]

In December 2015, al-Qosi appeared in a video released by al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, marking the first public indication that he had traveled to Yemen and become a key AQAP leader and one of the few non-Yemenis in positions of authority. In the video, the veteran al-Qaeda member encouraged jihad against the West and lauded the actions of the Charlie Hebdo attackers. With the loss of key ideologues and leaders such as Nasir al-Wuhayshi, Anwar al-Awlaki and Samir Khan among others, it is likely that al-Qaeda sought out the high-profile veteran member to serve as both a key leader and the group’s new public-facing ideologue. Al-Qosi brings a wealth of jihadist experience that AQAP lost with the death of several senior leaders. He trained at al-Farouk Camp, fought on the frontlines, served as deputy finance minister, and acted as Osama bin Laden’s bodyguard and confidant, giving him a well-rounded skillset to pass off to more junior AQAP members. His operational role is not entirely clear, but, given his background, he likely serves as a top-level coordinator in terms of recruitment, funding and strategy.

Al-Qosi has since appeared in at least a dozen videos released by AQAP, with a notable focus on maintaining jihad against the West, the group’s relationship with its Somali affiliate al-Shabaab, and operational security. The latest video, featuring al-Qosi praising al-Shabaab, was released in October and was closely coordinated with the release of a similar message from core al-Qaeda that emphasized the enduring relationship (Jihadology.net, October 16). Al-Qosi also featured prominently in the group’s video series titled “Demolishing of the Espionage” (Jihadology.net, October 20). In the series, al-Qosi and other veteran leaders highlight alleged Saudi and Islamic State spies that infiltrated AQAP’s ranks as well as methods to counter espionage and securely communicate with one another, which has been a notable problem leading to the death of several prominent AQAP figures. The coordination of video releases and al-Qosi’s messaging in general has fueled speculation that al-Qosi could also be filling a position within core al-Qaeda, which would not be surprising as former AQAP leader Nasir al-Wuhayshi—who certainly crossed paths with al-Qosi as Osama bin Laden’s secretary—served concurrently as core al-Qaeda’s second-in-command.

Despite being featured less prominently in international headlines due to a lack of widespread operations, AQAP remains a potent force in Yemen. The frequency of the group’s messaging and al-Qosi’s increased prominence in the past few years could mean that the group’s leadership has begun to somewhat stabilize after several years of turmoil and may still be poised for notable gains if given the opportunity. On December 9, AQAP released a 27-minute video that featured al-Qosi and highlighted attacks in the Yemeni governorate Abyan against forces aligned with the Southern Transitional Council (STC) (Jihadology.net, December 9). AQAP’s attacks have primarily focused on the local Islamic State branch. However, both al-Qosi and AQAP in general have released countless statements condemning the UAE, its STC allies, and attempts to create an independent South. AQAP’s clearest path to making notable gains would be through the return of conflict between the Hadi government and STC forces. Al-Qosi is likely to feature prominently in both the direction of forces and the messaging surrounding AQAP’s operations to capitalize on the disorder in Southern Yemen.

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