Iran to Deepen PRC Ties Despite Lack of Military Support

Iran to Deepen PRC Ties Despite Lack of Military Support

Executive Summary:

• Security-minded figures within Iran’s power structure will ensure Iran pursues the Look East policy and engages more forcefully with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) after the conflict with the United States and Israel.
• The PRC’s cautious wartime response has sparked serious debates over future relations with Beijing, as many in Tehran view it as prioritizing ties with Arab states and dialogue with the United States to protect energy flows through the Strait of Hormuz.
• This debate has intensified reformist-conservative divisions and strengthened the influence of security institutions, which prefer operational independence over restrictive alliances.

Iran’s Look East policy is rooted in the ideological ideals of the 1979 Revolution, which, with the slogan “Neither East Nor West,” sought to establish an order independent of the two power blocs. Over time—and under sanctions and international isolation—this slogan gave way to practical convergence with Eastern powers, especially Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). [1]

Across different presidential periods, this policy has pursued varying objectives. During Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s tenure, the Look East policy took on an ideological, confrontational tone toward the West. Under Hassan Rouhani’s administration, this policy complemented engagement with the West and operated within the framework of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) nuclear agreement. Under Ebrahim Raisi’s government and thereafter, however, Look East has transformed into an exclusive strategy and a substitute for engagement with the West, materialized through documents such as the 25-year agreement with the PRC and accession to organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS  (Middle East Council, September 2023). [2] This approach, rather than being based purely on economic interests, reflects the security-oriented, conservative outlook emphasized by Iran’s security and military institutions (Khayrion, June 6, 2024).

The security establishment has consistently emphasized that countries such as Russia and the PRC are Iran’s strategic partners. With this argument, they condemn relations with the West and advocate placing exclusive emphasis on relations with Eastern partners, which, from their perspective, represent the new poles of the international system (Khamenei.ir, July 22, 2022).

The current conflict with the United States and Israel has led to the emergence of serious and important debates on future relations with the PRC. The core debate centers on the fact that the PRC has not provided direct military support to Iran during the conflict. Beijing’s response has largely been limited to diplomatic calls for de-escalation and respect for national sovereignty, which many assessed as a “balanced” and “conservative” approach (Foreign Affairs, April 17). This has disappointed many in Iran and raised questions about the PRC’s commitment and reliability as a strategic partner. 

Iran’s Perception of the Relationship with PRC

A serious theoretical debate has emerged in Iran over two divergent pathways for the future of cooperation with the PRC. Reformists believe Iran should follow the PRC’s economic development model—one based on a productive economy, openness to the world, and attracting foreign investment. In this view, the PRC is an ideal partner for revitalizing Iran’s economy and breaking out of isolation, but it should not be seen as Iran’s strategic partner in future confrontation. 

Many Iranian experts advocate for focusing on economic relations with the PRC. From this perspective, adopting a Cold War mindset and expecting military support from the PRC misreads Beijing’s foreign policy. In their view, the PRC does not fundamentally subscribe to an international order based on military alliances (Tabnak, May 12). Accordingly, they argue that the PRC should not be criticized for its lack of military support for Iran, as its foreign policy focuses on mutual non-alignment and non-alliance. This principle means the PRC is not committed to entering a war if Iran is attacked (Tabnak, May 12).

Jalal Dehghani Firouzabadi, Secretary of Iran’s Strategic Council on Foreign Relations, argued that the PRC and Russia interact with the United States within the “great power management” model (Iran International, May 29). Therefore, the PRC and Russia have adopted a policy of positive neutrality toward the conflict—one that requires them to maintain a baseline of strategic relations with all countries involved. Russia and the PRC’s decision to abstain from, rather than veto, UN Security Council Resolution 2817 condemning Iranian attacks against regional neighbors fits within this policy framework (UN Security Council, March 11).

In contrast, conservatives—and, at their forefront, military-security groups—are more inclined to expand relations with the PRC along the Russian model: strengthening military capability, relying on oil revenues, and confronting the West. One of the reasons for Iranian conservatives’ opposition to relations with the West, particularly the United States, is the cultural impact such relations would have on Iranian society and, consequently, on their revolutionary slogans, leading to delegitimization and diminished acceptance of their revolutionary and ideological principles among the Iranian public (Middle East Institute, September 25, 2023).

Impact on the Domestic Balance of Power

Despite internally recognizing Beijing’s lack of direct support, Iran is likely to continue its turn toward the PRC. Iran’s military-security apparatus is the most significant variable in policymaking. Over 45 years, the security organizations have determined the “big game” of Iran’s foreign policy to the detriment of successive presidential administrations. Presidents can engage in a “small game” of foreign policy maneuvers, provided they do not disrupt the overall power structure (Manara, February 21, 2022). Beijing’s support for security-affiliated groups in Iran limits the pathway for reformists and moderates to gain power within Iran’s power structure and further strengthens the IRGC’s position within it. Accordingly, rather than relying on Iran’s formal state institutions, the PRC is coordinating with IRGC-affiliated operational networks that control a substantial share of Iran’s economy and security (Strategic Analysis Network, May 28).

Discussions have also emerged about fully implementing the two countries’ 25-year strategic cooperation agreement. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi described his visit to the PRC—the first visit by an Iranian official to the PRC since the start of the conflict—as one of the most significant trips in Iran’s history (International Institute for Iranian Studies, May 17). During this visit, Araghchi emphasized Iran’s trust in the PRC. This trust creates a favorable environment to pursue the objectives outlined in the 25-year agreement (Al Jazeera, May 6). This visit, rather than announcing a new position on the document, sought to redefine Iran’s standing with the PRC after the war and secure trust for subsequent steps in implementing the agreement. This visit, therefore, should be seen as a prelude to more serious discussions on operationalizing 25-year cooperation in a post-conflict era.

Iran’s approach frames ties with the PRC as part of a broader strategy to position itself in the emerging global order. The most significant indicator of this approach is the appointment of Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf—a prominent conservative figure and Speaker of Parliament—as Iran’s special representative for PRC affairs. This appointment, proposed by Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and approved by Iran’s new Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei, demonstrates unprecedented coordination among power institutions and the executive, legislative, and leadership branches in prioritizing relations with the PRC (Tasnimnews.ir, May 17).

Ali Larijani, the late Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, previously held this position and played a key role in signing the 25-year Comprehensive Cooperation Agreement between Iran and the PRC (Fars News, May 17). Ghalibaf’s appointment signals a determination to revive and implement this document. Beyond his parliamentary role, Ghalibaf is a former Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commander and currently leads Iran’s negotiating team with the United States. This tripartite role enables him to coordinate effectively across military, political, and economic systems and remove obstacles hindering cooperation with the PRC. By entrusting the PRC portfolio to Ghalibaf, Iran has effectively linked negotiations with Washington to cooperation with Beijing, using this as a lever to increase bargaining power against U.S. pressure. 

These developments suggest that the 25-year Iran-PRC agreement—which envisions Chinese investment in infrastructure, oil, and military sectors in exchange for discounted oil—may be implemented more rapidly. Following de-escalation, therefore, the PRC could become the primary reconstructor of Iran’s damaged infrastructure.

Conclusion

Iran’s Look East approach has evolved from a purely economic strategy. Rooted in the country’s strategic literature, Iran’s approach rests on the belief that the U.S. unipolar order is declining and the world is moving toward multipolarity. Iran defines itself as an emerging power in this landscape and argues it needs “strategic alignment” with Eastern powers to consolidate its position. Sanctions and international isolation have made the PRC and Russia Tehran’s only serious partners. From Iran’s perspective, these collaborations can raise the costs of confrontation for Washington. 

Iran’s relations with the East are defined on a new model of cooperation without commitment. Many in Iran have recognized that the conflict has revealed the limitations of the PRC’s support. The PRC and Russia have offered rhetorical and limited political support to Iran as a partner, but have not provided security guarantees or practical support. This approach, however, aligns fully with Iran’s military-security institutions, which prefer operational independence over restrictive alliances. Iranian leaders have therefore concluded that these partnerships, despite any limitations, are the best and only available options for survival.

Notes:

[1] Fred Halliday, Revolution and World Politics: The Rise and Fall of the Sixth Great Power, Duke University Press Books, 1999, p.127.

[2] BRICS is a loose political-economic grouping originally comprising Brazil, Russia, India, the People’s Republic of China, and South Africa, and now comprising 11 member states.