JNIM Escalates Sahelian Offensives Amid Fratricidal War with ISSP

JNIM Escalates Sahelian Offensives Amid Fratricidal War with ISSP

Executive Summary:

• The al-Qaeda affiliate Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and Islamic State (IS) affiliate Islamic State in Sahel Province (ISSP) are engaged in a widespread fratricidal war. This violent rivalry has expanded from the Sahel region into littoral West African countries.
• Both jihadist groups continue to make advances against government forces despite heavy casualties from their infighting. They are increasingly attacking state security forces, besieging key locations, and applying pressure to larger towns. 
• JNIM recently partnered with Tuareg forces to contest strategic locations in northern Mali, while a new U.S.-Nigerian military campaign may force IS leaders to heavily prioritize the Sahel. 

On April 6, Islamic State’s (IS) news agency Amaq released a statement from its Sahel affiliate, Islamic State in Sahel Province (ISSP). In the statement, the group claimed to have killed 35 al-Qaeda-aligned Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) militants in Niger’s western Tillaberi region. ISSP also claimed to have seized more than 30 weapons and 10 motorcycles from JNIM (X/@SimNasr, April 6; Reuters, April 9). Around the same period, JNIM uploaded a video to social media showing the capture and execution of an alleged ISGS member in Kebbi State, Nigeria, hundreds of kilometers south of the Niger battlefield (X/@SimNasr, April 8; Reuters, April 9).

These statements are only two of many claims both groups have regularly published during the recent phase of their fratricidal war. For example, on March 29, ISSP released a photo showing spoils allegedly seized from JNIM militants in Burkina Faso (al-Naba, April 2). On April 3, meanwhile, JNIM reported separate clashes with ISSP in another part of Burkina Faso (X/@BrantPhilip, April 3).

The growing volume of attacks between the groups—combined with the long distances across which they are occurring—demonstrates both the seriousness of the jihadists’ rivalry and the multi-layered expansion of their insurgencies across West Africa. Both JNIM’s and ISSP’s attacks on Malian and Nigerien security-force bases and outposts also highlight the evolution of their insurgencies and the danger they pose to state cohesion (see Terrorism Monitor, January 29; February 12, 27; June 5).

Evolution of the Intra-Jihadist Rivalry

ISSP—originally known as Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS)—became a standalone IS province in 2022, after an announcement by IS central leadership. IS and its affiliates have battled al-Qaeda-aligned forces since the end of the so-called “Sahelian exceptionalism” in 2019 (New Lines Institute, June 2, 2020; ACLED, September 30, 2024). The central leaderships of IS and al-Qaeda had already clashed in other theaters by  2014, with affiliates in Africa and Asia later following suit. The Sahel had been the main “exception” until mid-2019, when open warfare between ISGS and JNIM began in Mali and continued thereafter (ACLED, January 13, 2023).

The Sahelian clashes were initially concentrated in the tri-border Liptako-Gourma region, with Mali’s Menaka and Gao regions and Burkina Faso’s Dori area serving as main battlefields. The subsequent withdrawals of French forces from Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, following military takeovers in those countries, created more permissive conditions for the rivalry to spread.

The littoral West African countries have borne much of the pressure from this new phase of jihadist expansion and intra-jihadist rivalry. ISSP and JNIM were both able to move through Burkina Faso and Niger toward Nigeria—West Africa’s largest country—in search of resources and operational depth (Premium Times, August 20, 2025). This coincided with the explosion of the banditry crisis in northwestern Nigeria, where jihadists have exploited local conditions to gain a foothold for further advances (Premium Times, November 3, 2023; see Terrorism Monitor, May 1).

Rivalry Expands Beyond the Sahel

JNIM appears to have successfully blocked ISSP expansion along Benin’s borders with Burkina Faso and Nigeria. ISGS appeared in Benin’s Park W area in 2019, when its kidnapping attempt targeting French tourists prompted a deadly French Special Forces response. After a brief incursion later amplified by IS media in 2022, however, ISSP was prevented from returning to this theater (Republic of Togo, September 16, 2022). IS has since been silent on Benin, while JNIM has monopolized advances into the north and east of the country.

Lakurawa—a jihadist group that emerged in 2024 in Nigeria’s Sokoto State and across the border in Niger’s Dosso region—has mirrored early-stage patterns observed in groups that later formalized ties with IS (Premium Times, December 27, 2025; UN Sanctions Committee, February 3; see Terrorism Monitor, May 1). Lakurawa has entrenched itself in northwestern Nigeria. Its presence could augment the capabilities of Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), which mainly operates in northeastern Nigeria, by linking ISWAP more directly to ISGS through Niger.

JNIM’s purported presence in Kebbi should be seen in the context of Lakurawa’s expansion and recent U.S.-backed strikes. On December 25, 2025, multiple missiles were reportedly fired at IS-linked camps in Sokoto State, Nigeria, an area not previously widely known to host ISWAP or ISSP bases (CSIS, December 26, 2025; Airwars, February 24). While the exact results of the strikes remain unclear, they appeared to provide additional evidence of an IS presence in Sokoto, alongside other evidence from previous JNIM claims in and around the state.

JNIM Offensive in Mali

The clashes between ISSP and JNIM far from their traditional strongholds in Mali highlight the pressure now facing West African littoral states. Despite heavy casualties on both sides, the groups continue to advance in different countries while waging simultaneous campaigns against state enemies. In January, for example, IS claimed responsibility for an attack on Niger’s capital, Niamey, targeting the international airport and reportedly damaging aircraft (Reuters, January 30, 2026; X/@saladinaldronni, February 1). ISSP also regularly attacks military and civilian targets in Niger’s Dosso region, which borders Nigeria (X/@hamid_gade, April 12).

JNIM continues to focus its attacks on Benin, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. Mali has been forced into increasingly humiliating arrangements with JNIM while suffering from the group’s months-long economic blockade. This culminated in JNIM’s campaign in northern Mali, which began on April 25. JNIM and the Tuareg-led Front for the Liberation of Azawad (FLA) claimed coordinated operations around Kidal and other strategic locations, with the city of Kidal reportedly contested or captured amid a wider series of attacks (Reuters, April 25; see Terrorism Monitor, June 5). The attacks pushed Malian and Russian-aligned forces into a more defensive posture in key areas and revived the prospect of northern Mali falling outside Bamako’s effective control again. ISSP sought to exploit the joint FLA-JNIM campaign by probing around Labbezanga and Menaka, which it had besieged for more than three years, before withdrawing under Russian and Nigerien pressure.

Conclusion

ISSP and JNIM are both consolidating their positions and expanding despite fighting each other. The two jihadist groups are no longer satisfied with ruling rural areas. They will likely continue applying pressure to larger towns and cities, both to seize territory and to demonstrate their relevance to rival jihadists.

The new U.S.–Nigerian campaign against ISWAP in Nigeria, which has targeted key global IS commanders around Lake Chad, may force IS central command to prioritize the Sahel and Lake Chad theaters more heavily (Reuters, May 16). This would, however, risk accelerating the further hollowing out of Sahelian states, especially if ISSP and JNIM continue to expand while fighting each other.