Kazakhstan Again Worried about Separatism, Russian and Otherwise

Kazakhstan Again Worried about Separatism, Russian and Otherwise

Executive Summary:

• Prior to 2022, many in Moscow thought that Russia would have more success in promoting separatism among ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan than in Ukraine and then annexing the northern third of that Central Asian country to the Russian Federation.
• Since that time, however, Moscow’s focus on Ukraine, the demographic decline of the ethnic Russian community in Kazakhstan, and Astana’s careful management of nationality relations have led to what appeared to be an irreversible decline in that threat.
• Recently, nationalism among ethnic Kazakhs, problems with development in Kazakhstan’s regions, and especially fundamental changes in how those regions are represented and run are raising the specter of separatism, Russian and otherwise.

Before 2022, many political figures in Moscow thought Russia would have more success promoting separatism among ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan than in Ukraine, and then annexing the northern third of that enormous Central Asian country to the Russian Federation (Window on Eurasia, January 31, 2017, February 6, 2022). After Russian President Vladimir Putin began his expanded war against Ukraine, Moscow’s almost exclusive focus on Ukraine, the accelerating demographic decline of the ethnic Russian community in Kazakhstan, and Astana’s careful management of nationality relations led to what appeared to many to be an irreversible decline in that threat (see EDM, October 17, 2023; Window on Eurasia, October 22, 2023, July 25, 2024). In the last several months, however, nationalism among ethnic Kazakhs and the response of ethnic Russians there to it; problems with development in Kazakhstan’s regions, Russian and otherwise; and fundamental changes in how that country’s regions are run and represented are again raising the specter of separatism in Kazakhstan (Window on Eurasia, July 30, August 8, October 10; Altyn Orda, October 29, 30; Spik.kz, November 4). Moscow may decide to try to exploit this specter if and when Putin’s war against Ukraine winds down. One sign that the Kremlin already is thinking in those terms is the suggestion of one Moscow commentator that the West is currently plotting a coup in Kazakhstan—a classic example of the Kremlin’s tradition of blaming its opponents for what it is doing or plans to do (Svobodnaya Pressa, November 3).

Demographically, Kazakhstan consists of roughly three parts. The sector along its southern border is the most heavily populated and overwhelmingly ethnically Kazakh. The west has a small population but enormous natural resources and has been the site of protests against the central government for much of the last decade. The north was historically overwhelmingly ethnic Russian and gave Moscow enormous leverage over the republic as a whole. Until the mid-1980s, ethnic Russians formed a plurality of the country’s population. Since then, their share has declined to less than 15 percent, while that of ethnic  Kazakhs has grown to more than 70 percent. Both that division of the country into three zones and the growing share of ethnic Kazakhs in its population have shaped the government’s policies. The government has always been alive to the possibility of ethnic separatism in the north and a class-based one in the west. Since independence, it has taken steps to limit such threats to the territorial integrity of the country, such as promoting the diversification of the economies in the regions, the movement of people from one region to another, and making sure that the regions are well represented in the central government (Window on Eurasia, April 19, 2022, May 3, 2023; The Times of Central Asia, May 13).

Saule Isabayeva, one of Kazakhstan’s leading political commentators, pointed out that the danger of separatism has always been present in her country. She suggests that it is much less now than it was in the 1990s (Spik.kz, November 5). Then, Kazakhstan lacked the security apparatus to block other states’ efforts to create separatist movements in various parts of the country and in the ethnic Russian north in particular. Now, as recent arrests show, however, Astana has both a better understanding of the problem and how to control it, and a more extensive set of institutions to monitor and suppress separatism wherever it emerges. (For evidence that she is right, see EurAsia Daily, November 3.) Problems remain, Isabayeva says, largely because few are willing to talk about it regularly. Therefore, any incident can lead to apocalyptic conclusions because there is no context to put things in. The thrust of her argument is that in the last several years, Astana has faced fewer separatist challenges because Moscow is looking elsewhere and the nationalism of the ethnic Kazakhs that ethnic Russians complain about—even as the Kazakhs insist it is a response to Russian actions—is no longer the main driver. Instead, and Isabayeva is very clear about this, the Kazakhstan authorities have taken a step that seems likely to make the problem far more serious.

Kazakhstan President Kasym-Jomart Tokayev pushed through constitutional amendments that change parliament from a bicameral legislature to a unicameral one and make party-list voting the exclusive method. While many have celebrated these moves as modernizing Kazakhstan and tightening its integration, some, like the Barayeva Telegram channel, argue they will seriously weaken links between the central government in Astana and Kazakhstan’s far-flung, diverse regions. People in the regions will no longer have representation in an upper house based on regions or identify with a specific candidate (EurAsia, October 8). As a result, the Barayeva channel continues, regions will view the capital as different and distant, especially as they retain senate-type government structures and use single-member district voting. In a crisis, this could threaten national integration and, in turn, the country’s territorial integrity, especially given differences in the ethnic composition of the regions and their economies. Should that prove to be the case, what is now being celebrated as a step forward may prove to be something else entirely. Kazakhstan political scientist Bauryzhan Makhanov echoes all of these points (Spik.kz, August 7). 

Senior Kazakhstan official Zhandos Asylbekov, head of the statistics department of Kazakhstan’s prosecutorial staff, points out that the shift to a unicameral legislature and party list voting will mean even fewer Kazakhstan citizens who are not ethnically Kazakh will hold government positions. He says that is certain to cause problems but has not been widely discussed because of what appears to be “an unspoken taboo.” He acknowledges, however, that some ethnic minority leaders have already complained about this consequence of Tokayev’s reforms. Unless this changes, Asylbekov suggests, there will be problems in the event of a crisis, something that radical ethnic or religious groups or outsiders are certain to try to exploit (Spik.kz, July 29). If he is right, then there is a very real possibility that Tokayev’s reforms will have exactly the opposite effect he intends and create a situation where separatism, either based on ethnicity or economics and involving both domestic radicals and foreign opponents, will again be a feature of Kazakhstan’s political life.

That is all the more likely because Astana is now proposing steps to ensure that does not happen. Particularly, the capital is increasing repression of those who oppose the government and is spending more to move people from one region to another to dilute separatist feelings (EurAsia Daily, November 3; Spik.kz, November 4). These efforts seem unlikely to end the threat of separatism. They may even make things worse, especially if domestic political entrepreneurs, with or without foreign support, choose to make an issue of what is now happening in Kazakhstan’s political system.