IS Khorasan’s Renewed Leadership Question: A Profile of Slain Leader Sheikh Abdul Haseeb Logari

IS Khorasan’s Renewed Leadership Question: A Profile of Slain Leader Sheikh Abdul Haseeb Logari

The Islamic State’s Khorasan (IS-K) group in Afghanistan suffered a major setback in late April 2017 when a joint U.S. and Afghan military raid killed Sheikh Abdul Haseeb Logari, the Wali (governor), along with many IS-K militants in eastern Afghanistan’s Nangarhar province. [1] The group, which is mostly comprised of disgruntled Pakistani Taliban commanders and foot soldiers who pledged allegiance to IS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, has been creating mayhem in Nangarhar, Uruzgan, Logar and Kunar provinces. Since its emergence in 2015, this activity has seen the group blamed for a massive militant mobilization across the Afghan-Pakistani border. Haseeb Logari’s death came at a time when IS-K was seemingly recovering from a leadership vacuum that struck the group in mid-2016.

Abdul Haseeb survived the major U.S. bombing in Afghanistan on April 12 — U.S. forces dropped the Massive Ordnance Air Blast (MOAB), America’s largest non-nuclear bomb — targeting a network of caves and tunnels in the Achin district of Nangarhar province with the objective of decimating IS-K. Hundreds of IS-K militants were reportedly killed in the bombing, including several senior commanders. The MOAB’s blast also killed several Indian IS-K recruits who were reportedly trained by Haseeb Logari. However, Haseeb Logari’s streak of good luck was short lived. On April 27, Haseeb Logari was eliminated along with other senior commanders and foot soldiers, when nearly 90 U.S. and Afghan commandos raided an IS-K compound in Nangrahar’s Mohmand Valley (Tolo News, May 8).

Background

Early life details of Abdul Haseeb, a former Taliban member, could not be verified due to a paucity of information available in open sources — either a result of him maintaining a low profile as a preacher and religious scholar or strictly managing his public profile for security reasons. After his death, however, local media was able to confirm some details about him through close tribal and family sources. The 37 year-old Abdul Haseeb’s real name was “Hayat,” and he belonged to the Ahmadzai tribe. Before joining the Taliban, he had a brief stint teaching mathematics, English and Islamic studies at a local school in central Logar province. Additionally, he worked as an Islamic preacher under Tabligh Jama’t between 2005 and 2009. He defected to IS-K sometime in 2014. Besides his reported command of the English language, Abdul Haseeb was fluent in several other languages, including Pashtu, Dari, Arabic, Urdu, Chechen and Uzbek (Pajhwok Afghan News, May 10).

Like most IS-K militants who have either a military or spiritual association with Pakistan’s jihadist infrastructure, Abdul Haseeb too had a strong connection with Pakistan’s infamous Islamic seminaries that have nurtured the likes of the Taliban and Lashkar-e-Taiba. He reportedly received his Islamic education in two seminaries in Peshawar, (Khyber Pukhtunkhwa) Jamia Imam Bukhari and Ganj madrassa, both managed and controlled by Jama’at al-Da’wa ila al-Quran wal-Sunna (JDQS), a Salafist group influential in eastern Afghanistan’s Kunar province. It was also reported that Abdul Haseeb was briefly associated with Darul Uloom Faizul Quran, located in Waziristan Agency. These internationally blacklisted Islamic centers have historical ties with the Taliban, al-Qaeda and the Haqqani Network (HN) (Fortress News, November 19, 2016). Besides Peshawar’s seminaries, his links with Islamic centers in Lahore, Pakistan and India’s Deobandi have also emerged following his death (Pajhwok Afghan News, May 10).

According to reports, beyond his Islamic knowledge, Abdul Haseeb’s close associations with slain IS-K leader Hafiz Saeed Khan and his ideological conviction for the establishment of an Islamic State were some of the reasons behind his appointment as the chief of IS Khorasan. Additionally, he might have also received IS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s stamp of approval in his appointment to lead IS-K (Fortress News, November 19, 2016).

As his name suggests, Abdul Haseeb Logari was from the Akbarkhel area of the Azara district in Afghanistan’s Logar province, infamous during the Soviet-Afghan war for being the “gateway of Jihad.” Logari was not known for his military prowess or war fighting skills when he took control of IS-K in Afghanistan. However, Logari rose to a leadership position amid the loss of key IS-K commanders in military operations. His less than nine month stint as chief of IS-K defined Haseeb Logari as a ruthless leader. Logari led and orchestrated several high profile attacks against the rival Taliban, the Afghan government and civilians. Under his leadership, the group withstood stepped-up military offensives by U.S. and Afghan forces to eradicate IS-K in Afghanistan.

IS-K Operations Under Logari

General John Nicholson, the commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, aptly characterized IS-K’s activity in Afghanistan, saying they have waged a “barbaric campaign of death, torture and violence” against Afghan civilians and government forces in southern Nangarhar (Pajhwok Afghan News[Kabul], May 8). Not exclusively active in and around its stronghold, the Khorasan group has also successfully orchestrated attacks in the heart of Kabul, beyond the boundaries of its so-called fortress.

A cursory look at IS-K’s operations under Abdul Haseeb’s leadership shows an elevated level of violence targeted at government installations, Afghanistan’s Supreme Court, mosques and international agency workers engaged in Afghanistan.

In one of the most deadly strikes under Haseeb Logari’s leadership, IS-K militants targeted the Sardar Mohammad Daud Khan military hospital in Kabul on March 8. Nearly 50 people were killed in the attack, with scores more injured (Afghan Online press, March 9; Tolo News, May 2). This attack showed the barbarism of IS-K; militants resorted to indiscriminately stabbing and shooting at doctors, patients and workers at the facility before using vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) and grenades to maximize civilian casualties. Syria based Islamic State claimed responsibility for the hospital attacks through its online Amaq News Agency. Its affiliate on the ground in Afghanistan also claimed responsibility for the strike on the hospital (Khaama Press, March 9).

According to IS propaganda magazine Rumiyah, five inghimasiyyin (suicide bombers who are willing to die in militant operations) militants of IS-K — Abdur-Rahman Tajiki, Ibrahim Tajiki, Saad al-Khurasani, Jaafar al-Herati and Muslim al-Kabuli — carried out the attack on the Kabul military hospital. [2] The propaganda machinery of Islamic State, however, erroneously claimed to have killed nearly 400 people belonging to the Afghan army and intelligence service in the half-day long operation.

Both the Presidential palace in Kabul and the Pentagon issued statements identifying Abdul Haseeb as the one who directed the Kabul hospital attack. The Presidential Palace’s statement said: “[Haseeb Logari] had ordered the attack on the hospital in Kabul that resulted in the death and injuries of a number of our countrymen and women. The Afghan government is committed to continuing its operations against Daesh (IS-K) and other terrorist groups until they are annihilated” (Ariana News, May 8; Tolo News, May 8). Abdul Haseeb was also accused by the Afghan government of ordering the indiscriminate beheading of local tribal elders in IS-K strongholds and the abduction and forced marriage of women and girls to IS-K militants (Geo TV News, May 8).

Though the hospital attack is the most significant IS-K attack carried out under the direction of Abdul Haseeb Logari, other attacks executed under his leadership warrant mention here. In early February, IS-K militants killed six Red Cross employees in the Qush Tepa district of Jawzjan province and abducted two others. A day after, on February 7, at least 22 people were killed in a suicide attack outside Afghanistan’s Supreme Court complex in Kabul (Khaama Press, February 8, Tolo News, February 9).

Sectarian strikes primarily targeting Shia places of worship also spiked during Haseeb Logari’s stint as IS-K’s top commander. On November 21, 2016, IS-K militants carried out a suicide bomb attack inside the Baqir-ul-Olum mosque in Kabul. Nearly 30 Shia worshippers were killed in the attack, including women and children (Afghanistan Times, November 22, 2016). A month before the Kabul mosque attack, IS-K claimed responsibility for the Karte Shakhi shrine attack in which around 18 Shia worshippers observing the Ashura festivity were killed. Again, IS’ Amaq News Agency claimed responsibility for the attack and released a picture of the suicide bomber who reportedly triggered the blast at the mosque (Activist1 Blog, October 12, 2016).

During Haseeb Logari‘s brief reign as IS-K’s top commander, similar levels of anti-Shia violence were also orchestrated in neighboring Pakistan. In February, nearly 80 Shia devotees — including women and children — were killed in a suicide attack at the Lal Shahbaz Qalandar shrine located in Sehwan (Jamshoro district) of Sindh province. This suicide blast left over 300 people injured and is considered to be Pakistan’s deadliest sectarian attack in years (Geo TV News, February 17). A similar attack on a Shia place of worship was carried out by IS-K militants at the Shah Noorani shrine in Khuzdar, Balochistan in November 2016 (The Nation, November 12, 2016).

Conclusion

Analysis of IS-K’s operations in eastern Afghanistan shows that the death of Abdul Haseeb was a significant blow to the group. Furthermore, evidence suggests that the rise of Haseeb within IS-K was itself an indication of a leadership crisis within the group. Abdul Haseeb Logari was only elevated to the post because a high number of influential senior commanders were killed in rapid succession, either during military campaigns or by U.S.-led drone strikes. Some experts speculate that after the death of Abdul Haseeb, leadership may pass to Aslam Faruqi, an IS-K commander from Orakzai agency. [3]

Since March 2017, Afghan and U.S. forces have launched a joint counter offensive against IS-K to eliminate or displace them from their sanctuaries in Nangarhar, especially in the provincial capital Jalalabad. The unrelenting offensive has brought about the killing or capture of hundreds of militants affiliated with IS-K. The campaign has liberated several IS-K controlled districts so far. Despite its loss of territory due to increased Afghan military offensives and a persistent turf war with the rival Taliban, IS-K has proved to be a resilient jihadist group. After the death of Abdul Haseeb Logari, once again the Islamic State’s Khorasan faction faces the major challenge of selecting a new consensus leader amid the inherent internecine conflict within Afghanistan and Pakistan’s changing militant landscape.

 

NOTES

[1] USFOR-A Public Affairs Office, “Combined Afghan/U.S. Raid Kills ISIS-K Emir”, May 07, 2017, https://twitter.com/USFOR_A/status/861514995179417600/photo/1

[2] “Military and Covert Operation,” Rumiyah, No. 8, April 2017, p. 27.

[3] Borhan Osman, “The Battle for Mamand: ISKP under strain, but not yet defeated,” Afghanistan Analysts Network, May 23, 2017, https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/the-battle-for-mamand-iskp-under-strain-but-not-yet-defeated/