Kurdish Diaspora Complicates PKK’s Peace Deal with Türkiye
Executive Summary:
- On November 4, 2025, Finnish authorities arrested three suspected Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) financiers during a high-level Turkish diplomatic visit, a move seemingly designed to reinforce Finland’s commitment to the 2022 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) related counterterrorism memorandum.
- Despite announcing its dissolution in May 2025, PKK leadership has paused peace efforts to demand the release of the group’s leader, Abdullah Ocalan, and the ratification of amnesty legislation known as the “Homecoming Law.”
- It is still unclear whether Kurdish diaspora networks will disband alongside the parent organization, while PKK commanders also warn of retained military capabilities pending Turkish political concessions.
On November 4, 2025, Finnish police arrested several individuals in southeast Finland on suspicion of terrorism-related offenses. Authorities later confirmed that the suspects were three Kurdish men believed to be linked to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). They were accused of financing terrorism by collecting money from the Kurdish community in Finland since October 2023 (Helsingin Sanomat, November 11, 2025).
Coincidental Timing?
The arrests occurred on the same day that Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan visited Helsinki for discussions with his Finnish counterpart. The timing drew attention, as Türkiye had previously delayed Finland’s and Sweden’s accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 2022–2023. At that time, Türkiye demanded stronger cooperation on counterterrorism before granting its approval (see Terrorism Monitor, June 16, 2022).
In June 2022, Türkiye, Finland, and Sweden signed a trilateral memorandum on counterterrorism cooperation, paving the way for the Nordic countries’ eventual accession to NATO (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland, June 29, 2022). Türkiye continued to closely monitor alleged PKK activities in Finland. In August 2024, the Turkish National Intelligence Organization (MIT) and the Istanbul Police Department conducted a joint operation capturing a Finnish–Iranian national known by the alias “Naze Ad,” who was reportedly a senior figure in the PKK’s Finland branch (TRT World, August 21, 2024).
Turkish security officials claimed that communication between PKK cadres in Finland and the group’s senior leadership facilitated recruitment and financial flows. Turkish media reported that her arrest also yielded key intelligence on PKK networks in Finland (Türkiye Today August 21, 2024; Yeni Şafak August 22, 2024). In an unexpected turn, however, Turkish authorities released her a few weeks later after an Istanbul court dismissed the terrorism charges. She was subsequently deported to Finland (YLE, November 7, 2024).
It is unclear whether intelligence gathered during Naze Ad’s August 2024 arrest contributed to the Finnish police’s ability to identify additional PKK structures in Finland. Regardless of a possible connection, the recent arrests may be interpreted as Finland demonstrating its commitment to the counterterrorism obligations outlined in the 2022 trilateral memorandum.
PKK Waiting for Reciprocity
The PKK agreed to a ceasefire with Türkiye on March 1, 2025. This was followed by an announcement on May 12, 2025, of its full dissolution and support for political solutions. Whether these developments will influence legal proceedings in Finland against the three suspected PKK fundraisers in custody remains to be seen (Etelä-Saimaa, December 8, 2025).
In early December, the jailed founder and leader of the PKK, Abdullah Ocalan, stressed his determination to see through ongoing peace efforts with Türkiye. At the same time, he urged Ankara to finalize the legal groundwork for the process. His remarks came just days after senior PKK commander Amed Malazgirt—who is based in northern Iraq’s Qandil mountains—publicly stated the PKK would take no further steps in the peace process until Türkiye frees the now 76-year-old Ocalan (Barrons, December 3, 2025).
Besides Malazgirt’s statement, PKK commander Murat Karayılan’s also caused tensions in Ankara, when he indicated that the peace process with the PKK—after initially making quick progress—is now facing challenges. Karayılan confirmed that his fighters in northern Iraq have withdrawn from Zap and Metina near the Iraqi–Turkish border. He stated that at the same time, “[the] PKK is not stupid and knows how to protect itself,” claiming that the group has the capability to shoot down Turkish armed drones (Middle East Eye, December 3, 2025).
A central PKK demand revolves around the plan formulated between Ocalan and Turkish intelligence, foreseeing Türkiye’s parliament ratifying laws granting amnesty to some PKK fighters so they can return to Türkiye. The draft legislation, known as the “Homecoming Law,” is reportedly almost ready. The parliamentary commission drafting the law is expected to issue a report before submitting the draft to Parliament (Middle East Eye, December 3, 2025).
Conclusion
Statements by Malazgirt and Karayılan highlight the complexities surrounding the effort to end the four-decade-long PKK insurgency. PKK leaders appear to be seeking some form of reciprocity from the Turkish state after, in their view, having met all required conditions. These include officially declaring the group’s dissolution, withdrawing fighters from Türkiye and its border areas, and handing over certain weapons. For Turkish and European intelligence and law-enforcement authorities, including in Finland, however, a key question will be whether PKK-linked structures within the Kurdish diaspora will follow suit and disband themselves alongside their parent organization.
