Leading Pakistan’s Nascent Form of Extremism: The Rise of Khadim Hussain Rizvi

Leading Pakistan’s Nascent Form of Extremism: The Rise of Khadim Hussain Rizvi

Barelvi sect extremism has recently emerged as a new phenomenon in extremism in Pakistan. It is unique in that Pakistanis are accustomed to various Deobandi and Salafist militant groups carrying out violence in the Sunni-majority country but not to Barelvi sect adherents. For their part, Deobandi and Salafist terrorist organizations—like Terhreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), al-Qaeda, Harkat ul Mujahedeen and number of others—have perpetrated more than 18,000 terrorist attacks throughout Pakistan over the last 16 years, creating upheavals across the country [1].

During these tumultuous times, adherents of the Barelvi sect, a majority Sunni sect in Pakistan, remained vocal against the Islamist terrorist organizations. Often they were even the victims of terrorism themselves, suffering terrorist attacks at their mosques and Sufi shrines. [2] All of this changed, however, after the assassination of Salman Taseer, governor of Punjab province, in January 2011, by his own police bodyguard Mumtaz Qadri. The assassin was angry about statements about Pakistan’s anti-blasphemy laws that the governor made when he visited a Christian woman imprisoned on charges of blasphemy. Further investigations revealed that the assassin was associated with the Barelvi proselytizing group Dawaat-e-Islami and that he was incited by a local Imam to murder the governor (Express Tribune, September 12, 2011). The assassination of the governor, and the execution of his murderer in 2016 after a long trial, paved the way for the rise of Khadim Hussain Rizvi, a previously unknown preacher. Rizvi founded the Tehreek-e-Laibak Ya Rasool Allah (TLYRA), a Barelvi politico-religious movement, in defense of Pakistan’s blasphemy laws. Initially, the Rizvi-led movement appeared to be non-violent, though the group gradually turned toward violence under the direction of its founder and his militant views and ideology. Apart from this triggering event, some evidence suggests that the Barelvis wanted to compete with the Deobandis and Salafists in violent acts and exerting their influence [3].

Background

Born in the Punjab province’s Attock district in 1966, Khadim Hussain Rizvi received his early education at the madrasa in his village and went on to preach at a mosque in Lahore. Rizvi is a former employee of the Auqaf Department (religious affairs) of the provincial Punjab government. He was fired by the provincial government when he refused orders to stop using derogatory and inflammatory language that further enflamed sectarian strife (Dawn, December 3, 2017). Due to a 2006 traffic accident, Rizvi is wheelchair bound.

Rizvi capitalized on the growing sectarian tensions in Pakistan. One follower of Khadim Rizvi attributed the rise of Rizvi in Punjab to the problems facing the people of the Barelvi sect. Although the majority of Punjabis adhere to the Barelvi school of thought, many Deobandi and Salafist militants operate in Punjab province. These militants occasionally target Barelvi sect Muslims by carrying out terrorist attacks at the shrines of Sufi saints, which Barelvis revere, and forcibly taking control of Barelvi mosques (News International, February 17, 2017). Meanwhile, as the Barlevis continued to perceive there situation as worsening, a leadership vacuum within the sect came to the fore. [4]

The turning point for Rizvi was the assassination of Punjab Governor Salman Taseer in January 2011. He lauded the assassin, Mumtaz Qadri, and eulogized his act (YouTube, March 25, 2016). He later spearheaded the movement for Qadri and received public support in Punjab and elsewhere. After Qadri was sentenced to death and later executed, Rizvi launched the Tehreek-e-Laibak Ya Rasool Allah (TLYRA) movement and later its political front, Tehreek-e-Laibak Pakistan (TLP) (BBC News, February 29, 2016; Nation, September 16, 2017). The TLYRA movement held a funeral for Qadri in Rawalpindi district, which thousands attended, in March 2016.

In many ways, the rise of Rizvi was long awaited by Barelvi activists, who needed a leader in their efforts to secure their own space in an environment rife with Deobandi and Salafist violent activism.

Ideology

Rizvi is uncompromising in his strain of Barelvi extremist thought. He belongs to an ultra-orthodox offshoot of the Barelvi sect of Islam, whose teachings are blended with visiting shrines, celebrating Mawlid (observance of the Prophet’s birthday), and paying tribute to Sufi saints. [5] Rizvi has been accused of fanning intolerance against minorities in Pakistan, publicly criticizing and using abusive language toward government officials, opponents and minority sects (YouTube, November 16, 2017). Salient features of Rizvi’s ideology are:

• Khatam-e-Nabwat (the idea that the Prophet was the last in succession and no person could claim prophethood after him, and any such person or movement would be strongly resisted—such as the Ahmadi movement whose followers believe in the prophethood of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad Qadiani)
• Safeguarding Pakistan’s anti-blasphemy laws and defending against any government or international attempt to bring any changes to the related sections of the Pakistan Penal Code (i.e. 295-298). These particular sections were added to the penal code under the Islamist military regime of General Mohammad Zia ul Haq (1977-88) as part of the military junta’s Islamization policy
• Introducing Islamic injunctions in line with the movements ideals, in law and society at large
• Promoting the teachings of the Barelvi sect of Islam and countering conspiracies against the Barelvi sect by other sects in Pakistan
• Promoting the main tenets of Barelvi sect, including the protection of mosques and shrines of holy saints [6]

Becoming Influential and Violent

The rise of Rizvi is synonymous with the advent of Barelvi violence in the country. Though Rizvi did not drive his followers to violence after the funeral of Mumtaz Qadri, a month later he had led them to Islamabad and staged a sit-in protest in front of the parliament building in March 2016. The sit-in was staged to demand the imposition of Sharia law in Pakistan, the continued enforcement of anti-blasphemy laws as they exist, the execution of those convicted in blasphemy cases, the release of all TLP activists and the declaration of Mumtaz Qadri as a national martyr. The week-long sit-in sparked violent clashes between police and protestors (Express Tribune, March 28, 2016). The government had to negotiate with Rizvi keeping in mind violent acts perpetrated by TLP activists outside the parliament building in Islamabad Capital Territory.

In November 2017, Rizvi staged another sit-in in Islamabad after accusing the government of changing the wording in the declaration form (oath) for the candidates contesting in the Election Bill of 2017. Rizvi considered the change in the bill to be blasphemous and demanded the resignation of Federal Minister for Law Zahid Hamid. The dharna (sit-in) became violent when police attempted to force protesters from the main highway, which they had blocked. Around 8,000 officers with the anti-riot unit of Islamabad Capital Territory police were involved in the operation against the protestors. However, they were unsuccessful in displacing the protestors, as thousands more joined the protest to fight the police. Six people were killed (Dawn, November 26, 2017), and more than 200 people, including 50 police officers, injured in the unrest. Ultimately, the military had to be called in to restore order (News International, November 25, 2017). Despite being handicapped, Rizvi steadfastly commanded his violent followers, remaining on the scene to issue directions. Rizvi also directed his followers to stage similar sit-ins across the country. The result was random violent acts by TLYRA workers across Pakistan, cutting off the national communication and railway networks. National highways and motorways were blocked by TLYRA workers, and railway tracks were damaged (Nation, November 27, 2017). Both public and private property was significantly damaged. The 24-hour violent protests across Pakistan were instrumental in shutting down the communication network across the country (Daily Pakistan, November 26, 2017).

In Islamabad, the miserable failure of the police response contributed to the government reluctantly succumbing to the demands of Rizvi. Zahid Hamid, the federal Minister of Law and Justice, resigned as a result (Geo News, November 28, 2017). The TLP did not end its sit-in immediately, and the Pakistani military had to intervene to finally cajole the Rizvi-led violent mob—they in part did this by giving protesters money to travel home—giving rise to the perception that military authorities played some role behind the sit-in to undermine the government (Dawn, November 28, 2017).

Rizvi’s popularity continued to grow after the victory with the Islamabad sit-in, and he traveled around Punjab province delivering speeches instigating violence against minority groups and those involved in blasphemy. In May 2018, while campaigning for the 2018 general elections in his constituency in Narowal district of Punjab, Federal Minister of Interior Ahsan Iqbal was shot in the arm by a TLP activist. The assailant, Abid Hussain, was a known member of Rizvi’s TLP (al-Jazeera, May 7, 2017). The accused confessed to attempting to kill the minister, saying the minister broke with Khatamp-e-Nabwat (Dawn, May 7). The Anti-Terrorist Court in Islamabad recently issued a warrant for Rizvi’s arrest without the possibility of bail, but law enforcement authorities have not executed the warrant, possibly due to concerns that his arrest would create social unrest (Dawn, March 19).

Conclusion

The rise of Rizvi has serious implications for the security of Pakistani society. Violent extremism in Pakistan was considered a phenomenon nearly exclusively linked to the Deobandi and Salafist sects of Islam. Adherents of the two sects together comprise 15-20 percent of Pakistani society, while the Barelvis constitute more than 50 percent of Pakistan’s population of over 200 million. Rizvi, with his firebrand speeches and violent statements, could further provoke incidents of violence in Pakistan against anyone perceived to break with his ultra-orthodox beliefs. The issue of Khatam-e-Nabwat is also fanned by Rizvi, and minority communities have increasingly been faced with discrimination and, at times, violence. Recently this was manifested in the destruction of an Ahmadi sect mosque by a mob of 600 people in Punjab province’s Sialkot district on May 23, 2018 (VOA, May 23). If not taken seriously, Rizvi and the movement he represents has the potential to grow into one of the most serious issues related to violent extremism in Pakistan.

 

NOTES

[1] NACTA Report 2017, Pakistan’s National Counter Terrorism Authority Annual Report 2017

[2] The Barelvi sect incorporates many Sufi practices into their worship.

[3] Author’s interview with Muhammad Ismail Khan in Islamabad on June 3, 2018. For more detail please see Muhammad Ismail Khan, “The Assertion of Barelvi Extremism”, Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, Hudson Institute, Oct 19, 2011, https://www.hudson.org/research/9848-the-assertion-of-barelvi-extremism

[4] Author’s interview with an activist of TLYRA on May 22, 2018 in Islamabad

[5] Barelvi sect may be described as South Asian version of Sufi Islam but it is much more conservative than regular Sufism and adherents emphatically focus on issues related to blasphemy laws.

[6] Author’s interview with an Islamabad activist of Tehreek-e-Labaik Pakistan on May 20, 2018