Mauritania’s Security Risks and the Impact of the Arrest of Cheick Ibrahim Ould Hamoud

Mauritania’s Security Risks and the Impact of the Arrest of Cheick Ibrahim Ould Hamoud

Introduction

While Algeria is going through a period of instability, another country in the Maghreb-Sahel region is also experiencing a power transition—Mauritania (see Hot Issue, March 16). This transitional process should, despite the risks posed by jihadist groups, be smoother than Algeria’s.

On January 15,  the Mauritanian President Mohamed Ould Abdelaziz asked the members of his party, the Union for the Republic (Union pour la République—UPR), to stop seeking a constitutional change which would allow him to run for a third term as president (Jeune Afrique, January 15). The announcement opened the doors to Mohamed Ould Ghazouani, the Minister of Defense, to  declare his candidacy for presidency. He subsequently resigned from his position in the government on March 15. This sequence of events suggest that there will be a guided transition from Abelaziz’s rule to that of a close ally and fellow UPR member (Jeune Afrique, March 15). Appointed to the cabinet in November 2018, Ghazouni was the previous chief of the army and is a long-standing ally of Abdelaziz.

All the major political forces of Mauritania are now rallying behind Ghazouani’s campaign for the presidency. The UPR and the other forces of the government announced their support for him, and Ghazouani met all of them immediately after he resigned (Tawary Press Agency, March 17). Ghazouani said he was supportive of a third mandate for Abdelaziz, a rhetorical strategy aimed at dissipating doubts over potential disagreements with the president and to signal that continuity will characterize the upcoming political transition (Le360, March 17).

As change approaches, it is essential to highlight the persistence of several security risks for Mauritania. While Mauritania has been relatively immune to regional terrorism in the past few years, the recent arrest in Northern Mali of a Mauritanian jihadist militant, Cheick Ibrahim Ould Hamoud (a.k.a. Abu al-Dardaa al-Chinguetti), is a reminder of the type of risks Mauritania faces.

The Personal Profile of Cheick Ibrahim Ould Hamoud

On February 8, the French forces of Operation Barkhane announced the arrest of Ould Hamoud in Timbuktu, in Northern Mali (ANI [Nouakchott], February 8, 2019). Born in 1982 in Magta-Lahjar, a town located in the Brakna Region in southern Mauritania, Ould Hamoud has been on the authorities’ radar for the past ten years, at least. In May 2010, the Nouakchott Criminal Court sentenced Hamoud to eight years of imprisonment on charges of belonging to a terrorist organization; taking part in a group created to commit terrorist acts; and providing support to a perpetrator of a terrorist act to prevent his arrest (C.Ri.DE.M, May 17, 2010). A few months later, Hamoud was released because of the mass amnesty that President Abdelaziz signed in honor of the holy month of Ramadan in September 2010 (Sahara Media Agency, September 8, 2010).

Remarkably, Hamoud immediately rejoined the ranks of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). In February 2011, he was again captured by Mauritanian forces, this time at the border with Senegal, according to officials from the Trarza province of Mauritania. Hamoud was crossing the border with another jihadist fighter, Beiba Ould Navê, who was wearing an explosive belt that he detonated as soon as security personnel approached. Hamoud was wounded during the ensuing exchange of fire and arrested, but in July 2011 he escaped custody (C.Ri.DE.M, February 6, 2011).

Hamoud allegedly joined al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) sometime between 2007 and 2008. His first alleged operation with the group involved the kidnapping of two Austrian tourists, who were abducted in southern Tunisia in 2008 (C.Ri.DE.M, May 18, 2010). However, he never reached top leadership positions in ideology or logistics within the organization. He was a member of the al-Fourghan brigade, before entering the ranks of the Mokhtar Belmokhtar-led group al-Mourabitun. Then, after the latter rejoined AQIM by the end of 2015, Hamoud re-entered the ranks of the broader organization, and became part of the Group to Support Islam and Muslims (Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin’—JNIM) whose primary operational focus is the Sahel (Jeune Afrique, March 02, 2017)

However, while he may not be a crucial leader within the organization, his arrest was nevertheless important as he is one of the many Mauritanians who joined AQIM and its affiliates. The threat posed by these fighters is often overlooked, since Mauritania did well in countering these threats in the past few years. However, as Mauritania enters a delicate phase of its history, the presence of these fighters in the Sahel and the Sahara, who have received training and jihadist socialization over the past years, pose a number of challenges.

The Mauritanian Transition and Security Risks

In the geostrategic context of the Maghreb-Saheli region, Mauritania has never been a crucial player, given its small population and economy. However, over the past years the country’s importance has increased exponentially as Mauritania has become a recipient of foreign investment, particularly in the oil sector (Africa News, December 25, 2016). Mauritania was the first country hit by the predecessor of AQIM, the Algerian Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat—GSPC), once the group began operating outside of Algeria. GSPC members assaulted the El Mreiti military base in Lemgheity on June 4, 2005, killing 15 Mauritanian soldiers (RFI, June 6, 2005).

In the following years, the number of direct attacks in Mauritania shrank, but the country remained a significant hotspot for AQIM logistics planning and kidnapping operations (TM, January 28, 2010). That said, there are growing risks. In 2018, AQIM openly mentioned Mauritania as a target in its call for economic jihad in the region (La Nouvelle République, May 10, 2018). Besides, Ghazouani was the architect of a significant strengthening of relations between Mauritania and Western actors, namely France and NATO (The New Arab Weekly, November 4, 2018; NATO, May 29, 2018). It is likely that Mauritania, under his presidency, will continue to strengthen these ties. This dynamic might push AQIM to increase its rhetoric and operational pressure on Mauritania.

 Conclusion

Power transitions always pose risks, as new political balances stabilize. This will be the case in Mauritania. The profile of Ould Hamoud suggests that he is not a crucial ideological leader within AQIM, unlike other Mauritanian operatives, such as Mohamed Lemine Ould El-Hassen (a.k.a. Abdallah al-Chinguetti), the Mauritanian leader of AQIM’s al-Fourghan brigade (who was killed in 2013) or Hamada Ould Mohamed Kheirou (a.k.a. Abou Ghoum-Ghoum), the leader of Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MOJWA), who pledged allegiance to the Islamic State (IS) in 2015.

However, Hamoud has shown a significant degree of resilience, as he has been arrested previously yet has managed, one way or another, to return to the battlefield. Like him, several Mauritanian fighters have joined the ranks of AQIM in the past few years. Although their presence does not represent an existential threat to Mauritania, it nevertheless poses a potential risk, which must be taken more and more seriously as Mauritania enters a crucial stage of its political future.