Missionary at Home, Jihadist Abroad: A Profile of Tunisia’s Abu Iyad the Amir of Ansar al-Shari‘ah
Missionary at Home, Jihadist Abroad: A Profile of Tunisia’s Abu Iyad the Amir of Ansar al-Shari‘ah
A month ago, thousands of Salafis from various organizations demonstrated in downtown Tunis in support of the Qur‘an. Tens of individuals among them also brazenly climbed the famous clock tower and waved the black flag of Islam. Yet, among these Salafi organizations in Tunisia, there is one more radical than the others: Ansar al-Shari‘ah in Tunisia (AST), which is led by Abu Iyad al-Tunisi, a self proclaimed Salafi-jihadi with a checkered past linked to jihadi activities abroad. Although AST’s postings on its Facebook page emphasize non-violent protest, and despite the group’s involvement with aid caravans that have helped communities affected by poor weather this past winter, the background of Abu Iyad may cause some to reassess his ultimate goals.
Background
Abu Iyad, whose real name is Sayf Allah ‘Umar bin Hussayn (a.k.a. Saifullah Ben Hassine), has been linked to jihadi groups going back to at least 1994. He sought asylum in the United Kingdom after fleeing from Tunisia in 1989 to Morocco, following a two-year prison sentence for being involved with a militant student movement in 1987. When Abu Iyad moved to the UK he became enmeshed in the so-called “Londonistan” jihadi counterculture. [1] According to Lorenzo Vidino, an expert on Islamism in Europe, Abu Iyad connected with Abu Doha (Amar Makhlulif), an Algerian who represented the Algerian jihadi group Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC; now al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghrib or AQIM), in London in 1998 and they became close confidants. As a result, Abu Iyad sent a number of Tunisians to Algeria to train with the GSPC. In early January 2001, Italian authorities received information that both Abu Doha and Abu Iyad dispatched a group of Afghan-trained jihadis to attack the US Embassy in Rome. The plot was broken up by Italian police before it was actualized. [2] At the time, although Abu Doha was still in the UK, Abu Iyad had already moved to Afghanistan in 2000 to live in what he perceived as a pure Islamic society under the Taliban.
While in Afghanistan, Abu Iyad was the head of the “Jalabad House,” which was the guesthouse where the Tunisian foreign fighters lived and received military and ideological training. Sometime in 2000 after moving to Afghanistan, Abu Iyad, along with Tarek Maaroufi, founded the Tunisian Combatant Group (TCG), which was listed as a terrorist organization affiliated with al-Qaeda in October 2002 by the United Nations. The TCG functioned mainly as a recruiter for foreign fighters and a false document facilitator. Maaroufi would later be arrested and charged by Belgian authorities with providing assistance to the assassins of Ahmad Shah Mas‘ud, former leader of the Northern Alliance and a Western ally in Afghanistan, two days before the 9/11 attacks by giving them stolen passports and fake visas. Following the invasion of Afghanistan by the United States, Abu Iyad, along with other TCG associates, organized “the Jalalabad group,” volunteering to defend Usama bin Ladin and other embattled al-Qaeda fighters at Tora Bora. [3]
Not much is known about Abu Iyad’s whereabouts or actions following the fall of the Taliban regime and the battle at Tora Bora until he was arrested passing through Turkey in 2003 (possibly trying to return to Europe). After being extradited to Tunisia, he was subsequently charged with “membership in a terrorist organization operating abroad in peacetime,” “incitement to hatred” and “terrorism” and tried in six separate court cases, four before the Tunis Military Court and two before the Tunis Court of First Instance. He was convicted in all six trials and was sentenced to a total of 68 years in prison. Abu Iyad was eventually released from prison in March 2011 following the fall of the Ben Ali regime when the new caretaker government gave amnesty to thousands of prisoners. He would later found AST in late April 2011.
Post-Prison Release
In a March interview with the Tunisian daily Shorouk News, Abu Iyad explains his group’s mission: “We are at the stage of our project based on da’wah, to reconcile with our religion, to destroy all that was built by the rule of Bourguiba and Ben Ali’s rule in the minds of the people that religion is backwardness and is underdeveloped if one adheres to the Sunnah (way of the Muslim prophet Muhammad). Our project is to restore confidence that shari‘ah is the guarantor of the good life for the people. This stage is a prelude to the establishment of an Islamic State and is not subject to the limits of ‘Sykes-Picot’” (ash-Sharouk al-Tunisiyyah, March 17, 2012).
Though Abu Iyad explains that his group is only interested in pursuing da’wah activities, his group has been at the center of many provocations over the past year. It was at the forefront of the backlash against Nessma TV and its owner following the showing of the film Persepolis, which contains a scene where God is depicted in human form—an act of blasphemy for religious Sunni Muslims. AST participated on October 14 in the Salafi “Day of Rage” against Nessma. Abu Iyad accused the station of waging a “heretical” and “malicious” campaign against Islam [4]. Most troubling to many elements in Tunisian society is that AST and Abu Iyad are actively against participation in the democratic process. Prior to the elections this past October, AST passed out pamphlets with a fatwa from a leading jihadi ideologue Shaykh Abu Mundhir al-Shinqiti, condemning such participation as contrary to the precepts of Islam. [5] Abu Iyad further reiterated this stance in his recent interview with Shorouk, making clear the group has no plans to be part of the new system.
Abu Iyad also supports the religious student movement thawra al-taliba (revolution of the students), which was established in a variety of Tunisian universities following the beginning of the controversial sit-in at Manouba College of Arts this past November over the niqab ban (ash-Sharouk al-Tunisiyyah, March 17, 2012). Abu Iyad believes the niqab ban is so unjust that he juxtaposes the position of Manouba College by pointing to Oxford and the “finest schools” in New York giving the freedom of students to wear the niqab (ash-Sharouk al-Tunisiyyah, March 17, 2012). Emphasizing that even non-Muslim majority societies have an issue with it.
In addition, members of the student movement [6] along with some members of AST [7] were at Manouba College on March 7, the day when Yassine El Brigui scaled the building at the front of the university and replaced the Tunisian flag with the black flag of Islam (Tunisia Live, March 7, 2012).
Although Abu Iyad and AST have been a part of some of the more controversial events of the past 15 months, his group has also provided valuable social services. This past February, extremely cold temperatures and snow hit the interior of Tunisia. Moreover, when it began to warm up, due to the abundance of snow, its melt lead to massive floods. In response, AST has sent three caravans of aid to Haydrah, Jendouba, and Sijnan. Abu Iyad emphasized to his followers the wajib (obligation) of providing aid to those in need as an Islamic duty and that these services were an aspect of jihad fi sabil Allah (in the cause of God), which would hopefully lead eventually to the creation of an Islamic state or Caliphate. [8] These soft power efforts are the ones that Abu Iyad wants Tunisians to keep in mind so that AST can cultivate new followers through exposing individuals to its ideas with which they would otherwise disagree.
Al-Qaeida, Jihad Abroad and Ideology
Even though AST purportedly promotes non-violence, Abu Iyad’s past record of violent activity suggests that it is possible the group may change tactics if its non-violent da’wah (missionary) activities fail to bear fruit. In a recent interview with the Tunisian daily Le Temps, Abu Iyad reiterated though that Tunisia is not a land of jihad, noting that his group does not carry weapons (Le Temps, March 30, 2012).
This has not stopped Abu Iyad from promoting jihad abroad, though. This past January, Abu Iyad explained that jihad was still legitimate in Iraq even though the United States had withdrawn. Instead the emphasis should now be on fighting Iran because now “the Persians and Shi’ites rule Iraq” (al-Haqa‘iq al-Tunisiyyah, January 2012). Further in the same al-Haqa‘iq al-Tunisiyyah interview, Abu Iyad indirectly confirmed that he “incited” youth to join al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghrib (AQIM) in Algeria and the Sahara. When asked by the journalist whether he was “inciting” men to join AQIM, Abu Iyad responded by stating slyly yet not denying anything: “I will keep my answer to myself.” This would suggest that Abu Iyad’s old links to the Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA) and the GSPC have been at the very least re-established. Additionally, Abu Iyad claimed in late March that “we [Tunisia and/or AST] have a large group of young people that want to go out to jihad in Syria” (As-Sabah, March 26, 2012). It should be remembered that during the height of the Iraq war, Tunisia was a key staging area where fighters from Europe and North Africans West of Libya would go prior to making their trip to Syria and then later into Iraq [9]. These networks may be re-constituted for the jihad in Syria.
Although Abu Iyad may be sending individuals to fight in insurgencies abroad tied to al-Qa‘ida, he denies that he or AST is tied directly to al-Qaeda organizationally. He explains, “our [AST’s] relationship with [al-Qaeda is one] shared in the same manhaj (methodology), which is an obligatory relationship.” Therefore, it is a relationship of affinity for the same worldview. While promoting a global jihadi worldview, Abu Iyad is afraid of the influence of prison muraja‘at (revisions), explicitly mentioning Tariq al-Zumar of Gama’a al-Islamiyya of Egypt and Muhammad al-Fizazi of Morocco and formerly of the “Londonistan” scene. Abu Iyad hopes that the youth are not deceived by their former stances and not succumbing to the petro-funded (Saudi) muraja‘at (al-Haqa‘iq al-Tunisiyyah, January 2012).
Conclusion
During a number of interviews, Abu Iyad emphasized an AST saying: “hear from us not about us,” alluding to rumors or fabrications about its intentions. Indeed, Abu Iyad and AST hope to accomplish this and gain wider publicity through a dialogue with the Islamist party Ennahda (Reuters, April 2, 2012). While granting legal status to Abu Iyad and AST could hinder Tunisia’s transition to a true civil state since they view democracy as contrary to Islam, neglecting its grievances could also further radicalize members and lead to violence. This means that as long as they continue to demonstrate and provide aid without inciting extremist behavior they should be legally allowed, but one should be cognizant of ASTs leaders’ past since it may portend to a more confrontational future. In light of Abu Iyad’s strident advocacy toward jihad abroad, if the past is any indicator in other countries, when an individual calls for jihad abroad, it is likely that such sentiments will spill over to the home front.
Notes
1. For more on Abu Iyad’s background see this interview with his wife: https://www.cageprisoners.com/our-work/interviews/item/162-interview-with-the-family-of-sayfallah-ben-hassine.
2. Lorenzo Vidino, Al Qaeda in Europe: The New Battleground of International Jihad, Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2005.
3. WikiLeaks’ Guantánamo Files Database, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/pdf/ts/us9ts-000174dp.pdf.
4. See Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia’s (AST) Facebook page entries in mid-October, https://www.facebook.com/Molta9a.Ansar.Alchari3a.
5. Posted on AST’s Facebook page, https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=278588928841402&set=a.211666092200353.60781.211220622244900&type=1&theater.
6. To view the student groups take on the events see their Facebook page on March 6-7, https://www.facebook.com/Talaba.Revolution.
7. Pictures of members of AST at Manuba the day of the so-called “flag descration,” https://www.facebook.com/media/set/?set=a.366717560028538.92919.211220622244900&type=1.
8. To view Abu Iyad’s speech to his followers see: https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?v=170423803073258.
9. See the Combatting Terrorism Center’s report on foreign fighters in Iraq, https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/al-qaidas-foreign-fighters-in-iraq-a-first-look-at-the-sinjar-records.
