Mohamed Ahmed “Qahiye”: Islamic State’s Exiled Chieftain in Somalia Finds Refuge in Mozambique
Mohamed Ahmed “Qahiye”: Islamic State’s Exiled Chieftain in Somalia Finds Refuge in Mozambique
In late 2018, the Islamic State (IS) franchise in Puntland, Somalia, was convulsed by a violent power struggle that killed key allies and relatives of the group’s self-styled emir, Abdulkadir Mumin (see Militant Leadership Monitor, November 30, 2011). The internal putsch concluded with the abduction and subsequent assassination of the group’s operational chief, Mahad Moalim, and the enforced exile of senior commander Mohamed Ahmed “Qahiye” (UN Panel of Expert Reports, September 28, 2020). Beset by the swift slaughter of key allies, Qahiye reportedly fled northern Somalia in early 2020 for Ethiopia in an alleged amnesty deal endorsed by then-Puntland President Abdiweli Mohamed Ali Gaas. Qahiye then decamped to Mozambique, where he reportedly joined a broadening insurgency led by a separate IS affiliate in northeastern Mozambique (UN Panel of Experts Report, September 28, 2020).
Mohamed Qahiye’s flight from Somalia came on the heels of another high-profile killing of a second key Mumin deputy: Abdihakim Dhuqub (Puntland Mirror, April 14, 2019). Dhuqub was killed in a U.S. airstrike in April 2019 while traveling by car near the northeastern town of Xiriro (AFRICOM Press Release, April 15, 2019). Like Dhuqub, Qahiye was part of a notable cadre of al-Shabaab veterans-turned-defectors who joined Abdulkadir Mumin, a former al-Shabaab cleric, to establish the Puntland-based IS franchise in 2015. Others included Mahad Moalim (assassinated in 2018) and Abdirashid Luqmaan (a.k.a. Abdiqani Luqman), the former head of IS military operations in Puntland (UN Panel of Experts Report, November 2, 2017).
Like Mumin, both Dhuqub and Maolim belonged to the Ali Salebaan branch of the Darod clan, which has significant socio-political clout in most of Puntland. Both Dhuqub and Moalim were reportedly related to the IS emir, as either cousins or nephews (UN Panel of Experts Report, November 2, 2017; Damqo.com, November 17, 2018). Moalim led al-Shabaab’s dawa (proselytizing) efforts in Puntland and was the deputy head of finance for the organization in the Golis mountains. In this role, he organized weapon shipments and fighters from Yemen entering northeastern Somalia. Dhuqub, a former school teacher, led the formation of al-Shabaab’s precursor, al-Itihaad al-Somalia (AIAI), in the Puntland capital of Bosaso back in 2004 (UN Panel of Experts Report, July 12, 2013). His efforts were then aided by other Mumin relatives, including renowned weapons smuggler and former pirate, Isse Yullux, who also hails from the Ali Salebaan subclan. Together, this cadre of militants and financiers – united by both blood and clan-based fealty – formed a loyal core of operational leaders closely aligned with the charismatic Mumin, and backed by other field operators like Mohamed Qahiye.
The aforementioned leadership rift in 2018 resulted in the deaths of both Moalim and Dhuqub, allowing Abdirishad Luqmaan to ascend to the position of head of indoctrination and proselytizing. Luqman’s ascension forced Mohamed Qahiye into exile, first to Ethiopia in 2019, and later to Mozambique in 2020, where he reportedly joined the burgeoning IS franchise (UN Panel of Expert Report, September 28, 2020).
Qahiye’s reported arrival in Mozambique stands to benefit an already-escalating insurgency in the northeastern part of the country. This Islamist-headed rebellion is led by Ahlu-Sunnah Wa-Jama (ASWJ), a local militant group spurred into existence by a combination of economic neglect by the Mozambican government, predatory policing by local security forces, and violent clashes between young disaffected Muslims and the region’s secular administrators. These tensions erupted into armed conflict in 2017, as armed Islamist rebels (later allied with ASWJ) sought to establish Sharia law across the northern province of Cabo Delgado. Since 2017, ASWJ has hewed closer to the regional constellation of IS affiliates operating under the broader umbrella of the Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP) (see Terrorism Monitor, March 11, 2020).
This alignment is bolstered by foreign fighters reportedly from South Africa, Tanzania, Kenya, and Somalia, each cadre lending operational skill and ideological fervor to a once-localized insurgency (Club of Mozambique, September 3, 2020; RTP News, October 13, 2017; Africa Center for Strategic Studies, March 25, 2018). This foreign expertise appears most meaningful when delivered by experienced militants like Mohamed Qahiye. Back in 2017, Qahiye organized IS’ first-ever attempted assassination of a government official (UN Panel of Experts, November 2, 2017).
This attack targeted a former regional governor in Puntland during a stay at the International Village Hotel in Bosaso. The attack involved two armed assassins who negotiated entry into the hotel by luring a guard known to one of the attackers to open the gates to the compound. The armed assassins then fatally shot both guards, employing flanking maneuvers as they navigated through the hotel compound. Their plot was foiled by the unexpected presence of Puntland police officers who, unbeknownst to the two IS assassins, were at the time guarding a delegation of Emirati businessmen staying at the hotel (UN Panel of Experts, November 2, 2017). And while the attack ended in failure, the Qahiye-orchestrated operation was the first of dozens of IS-led targeted killings of local officials and businessmen in Puntland (Damqo TV, November 17, 2018).
Qahiye’s prior experience as an operational commander, first with al-Shabaab and later with IS, likely enhances the ability of his new hosts in Mozambique to plan and execute similar attacks against both military and civilian targets. While much of the ASWJ’s campaign in northeastern Mozambique initially focused on the seizure of small towns and villages, the group has since graduated to complex, coordinated attacks on district capitals, port seizures, and the capture of islands along the gas-rich northern Mozambican coastline (African Post, August 14, 2020; All Africa, March 25, 2020; CGTN Africa, September 12, 2020).
Further, ASWJ’s temporary occupation of the port town of Mocimboa da Praia in August 2020 demonstrated its expanding military competency – an advantage likely enhanced by the presence within its ranks of experienced militant operators such as Qahiye. As the group shifts toward enforced occupation and administration of its seized territories, the tactics employed to suppress dissent and enforce control will likely borrow from ASWJ’s militant affiliates in Somalia and elsewhere in the region. It is here that Qahiye’s role as a veteran militant operator may matter most. As the group expands its ability to target sophisticated and better-protected targets – including government, military, and business officials and facilities – the impact of Qahiye and others of his caliber may become more meaningful. It also highlights the looming danger of well-trained foreign fighters circulating within the broader milieu of armed Islamist militant operators across east, central and southern Africa.