Moscow Makes a New Step for Annexation of Georgian Territories

Moscow Makes a New Step for Annexation of Georgian Territories

Executive Summary:

• Russia and the de facto government of Georgia’s occupied Tskhinvali Region (South Ossetia) signed the Treaty on Deepening Allied Cooperation on May 9, essentially allowing Moscow gain more control of the region and use it as a tool of pressure on Tbilisi.
• Moscow is toughening its policy toward Georgia amid major changes in the South Caucasus, the drift of Armenia and Azerbaijan toward the West, and its ongoing war against Ukraine.
• This step demonstrates the futility of the policy of appeasement and complete loyalty that the Georgian leadership is pursuing toward Russia, in hopes of reciprocal steps from the Kremlin.

On May 9, during Russia’s toned down Victory Day celebration on Moscow’s Red Square, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Alan Gagloev, the de facto leader of Georgia’s Russian-occupied Tskhinvali region (South Ossetia), signed a “Treaty on Deepening Allied Cooperation” (TASS, May 9). This is not the first agreement signed by Moscow and the de facto government of Georgia’s occupied Abkhazia and Tskhinvali regions. In 2015, Russia signed the so-called “alliance and integration” treaties with the separatist authorities (see EDM, November 24, 2014). This latest agreement has attracted particular interest both because of its content and because of the broader context of developing relations between Georgia and Russia amid Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine. The May 9 agreement marks a new level of Russian occupation, opening the way for the final annexation of Georgian territories.

According to the new treaty, Russian citizens can hold state and municipal positions in South Ossetia, granting Moscow the right to place Russian officials directly in the de facto government (Media Center IR, May 11). The agreement requires that Moscow and South Ossetia equally recognize and protect all forms of property on their territories, and ensure equal rights of citizens to acquire, own, use, and dispose of property. In practice, Russians will be able to acquire and dispose of land and other real estate in this region under the same legal regime as the local population (Media Center IR, May 11). The parties also pledged to take additional steps toward creating a single economic space to improve citizens’ well-being and living standards (Media Center IR, May 11).

The treaty also ensures the harmonization of legislation governing economic activity, including the Civil and Tax Codes, thereby further integrating the Tskhinvali region into Russia’s economic and fiscal systems (Media Center IR, May 11). Moscow and Tskhinvali are continuing to take steps toward the gradual unification of energy infrastructure, including gas pipelines, as well as transport, communications, and telecommunications systems. Separate agreements will determine the management of shared infrastructure elements (Media Center IR, May 11). The Russian State Duma ratified the treaty on May 13, just four days after its initial signing (Russian State Duma, May 13).

Georgian Foreign Minister Maka Botchorishvili described the latest South Ossetia–Russia agreement as an example of Russia’s attempt to annex Georgia’s occupied regions. Speaking in Chișinău, Moldova, during the 135th session of the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers, Botchorishvili linked the agreement to previous international court rulings on Russia’s occupation of Georgia’s territory. “The occupation, effective control, and Russia’s responsibility for grave human rights violations have been confirmed by international courts, including judgments of the European Court of Human Rights,” she underlined (JAM News, May 15).

Teona Akubardia, deputy secretary of Georgia’s National Security Council from 2014 to 2018 and deputy chair of the Defense and Security Parliamentary Committee from 2021 to 2024, said in a May 16 interview with this author that Moscow’s so-called new agreement with Tskhinvali’s de facto regime further deepens the de facto annexation of Georgian territories without a formal declaration of annexation. Akubardia argued that “ultimately, Putin is using this calculated pressure on Georgia’s ruling Georgian Dream regime right now to neutralize Georgia’s sovereignty and force Tbilisi into subservience, effectively preventing its possible return to Western integration” (Author’s interview, May 16).

Akubardia noted that Mikhail Kalugin, director of the Fourth Department of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries at the Russian Foreign Ministry, confirmed that the South Caucasus remains a vital region where Moscow is trying to reassert its influence amid setbacks in Ukraine and growing competition from the West, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and Türkiye (Civil Georgia, May 13). Akubardia also asserted that “to survive Western sanctions, the Kremlin wants to secure the North–South Corridor to Iran, turning the total domination and usage of Georgia’s transit geography into a critical geopolitical priority” (Author’s interview, May 16).

Russia has taken another aggressive step against Georgia at a time when, paradoxically, Georgia’s ruling Georgian Dream party, led by billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, has become Moscow’s most accommodating partner in the South Caucasus (see EDM, January 12). During the May 14–15 Council of Europe meeting, Georgia refused to sign the new Enlarged Partial Agreement that will pave the way for a Special Tribunal to investigate the crime of Russian aggression against Ukraine (UNN, May 16). Georgian Foreign Minister Maka Botchorishvili explained this decision by citing the “high risks” for her country (Interpressnews, May 16). Recent diplomatic disputes have strained Russia’s relations with both Armenia and Azerbaijan (see EDM, July 7, 2025, January 15, March 25, April 21, May 12). Baku and Yerevan are negotiating with Washington and European capitals to build new transport routes that bypass Russian territory. They are making every effort to demonstrate their independence from Putin’s Russia (see EDM, February 6, 2025, February 24, April 16, April 28, May 11, May 12). In these circumstances, one might have expected Moscow to take a more restrained stance on Georgia’s most painful issue, rather than accelerating the annexation process. The Kremlin did the opposite by signing the May 9 agreement.

Paata Zakareishvili, former Georgian state minister for reconciliation and civic equality from 2012 to 2016, argued in his May 16 interview with this author that the document signed in Moscow is a significant step toward the informal and unofficial annexation of the Tskhinvali region. Zakareishvili stipulated that “Moscow does not benefit from a worsening of relations with Tbilisi. Russia needs Georgia as an ally, but the Russian Federation is simultaneously trying to retain and incorporate South Ossetia and Abkhazia as much as possible.” Zakareishvili noted that Russia’s goal is “to plant its representatives in Tskhinvali” and “make it as difficult as possible for Georgia to resolve the South Ossetia and Abkhazian issues,“ even “if the Georgian government changes.” He added that “under this agreement, any Russian can take a post in South Ossetia, even if he is not a citizen of South Ossetia and does not live there. Moscow gains leverage over South Ossetia” (Author’s interview, May 16).

David Avalishvili, from the independent outlet Nation.ge, drew attention to the difference in the Kremlin’s approaches to Abkhazia and South Ossetia. He noted that Moscow has struggled to “obtain consent from the authorities of separatist Abkhazia for the creation of Russian settlements [so-called apartments] in Abkhazia and the intervention of Russian oligarchic capital there” (see EDM, February 12, March 25, 2025, March 5). He added that “Moscow is demonstrating to Sukhumi that South Ossetia, which seeks full integration with Russia, receives more economic and financial benefits than Abkhazia, whose leadership is trying to maintain formal independence and has not declared its desire to accede to the Russian Federation” (Author’s interview, May 16).

Since 2022, when Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, more than 100 South Ossetians have died fighting in eastern Ukraine. They were originally stationed at a Russian military base near Tskhinvali (Gazeta Respublika, March 30; Kavkaz Uzel, May 8). Many residents of South Ossetia expressed dissatisfaction that Ossetians were being sent to die in distant Ukraine. The local separatist authorities, however, appear far more concerned with demonstrating loyalty to the Kremlin in hopes of a swift absorption of South Ossetia into Russia.

One outcome of Putin’s May 9 demarche is that it strengthens the arguments of Georgian politicians who demand the country’s neutrality as a possible way to avoid the final annexation of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region. Petre Mamradze, former head of the State Chancellery of Georgia and one of the leaders of the Neutral Georgia party, underscored in a May 16 interview with this author that in August 2008, Russia recognized the independence of Abkhazia and the former South Ossetian Autonomous Region and deployed military bases there. “It must be understood that Georgia will not be able to achieve international recognition of its neutrality under these conditions, even if it declares it,” Mamradze asserted, adding that “Georgia will not be accepted into either [the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)] or the European Union until these conditions change.” In his view, Georgia’s possible accession to these organizations, no matter who initiated it, “has been and remains a complete bluff” (Author’s interview, May 16).

At the same time, Mamradze stated, “Pursuing a neutral foreign policy and declaring Georgia’s goal of becoming a neutral state in the future undoubtedly reduces the risk of Russia formally annexing the former South Ossetia Autonomous Region.” He added that Russia “has de facto annexed the aforementioned regions of Georgia” and “is prepared to formally annex them”—in the case of Abkhazia, to admit Abkhazia into the union state—but only when “the Kremlin decides such a step will boost Putin’s approval ratings.” Mamradze concluded, “Currently, Putin’s advisers believe that punishing Georgia will not improve his approval ratings” (Author’s Interview, May 16). In contrast to this view, Georgia’s pro-Western forces have no doubt that the only adequate response to Putin’s aggressive steps is to restore and strengthen Georgia’s trajectory toward European institutions and Western society.