Mufti Noor Wali Mehsud: The New Ideologue-Warrior Leader of TTP

Mufti Noor Wali Mehsud: The New Ideologue-Warrior Leader of TTP

News of the death of Mullah Fazalullah, the most wanted man in Pakistan and Emir of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), in a U.S. drone strike in Afghanistan brought a sigh of relief to many in Pakistan (The Hindu, June 15). Up until his death, the notorious terrorist served as the leader of TTP, the group responsible for the most deaths in terrorist attacks in Pakistan since 2013. Confronted by multiple counter-terrorism operations—Zarb-e-Azb led by the military and Rad ul Fasad led by security forces— Mullah Fazalullah managed to slip through the fingers of Pakistani security forces and continued the momentum of terrorist strikes in Pakistan’s urban and rural areas, some of which inflicted massive death tolls (APS School Peshawar, 2014; BBC Asia, December 16, 2014).

Despite being both a capable and ruthless Emir, Fazalullah (a.k.a. Fazal-e-Hayat) had become a source of discord among TTP top commanders. He was a Swati (from a settled district of Swat) not a Mehsud, a tribe that provides the bulk of militants in TTP’s ranks and played a pivotal role in its formation in August 2007. The first two Emirs of TTP, Baitullah and Hakeemullah, were also Mehsud—both were killed in U.S. drone strikes; in 2009 and 2013, respectively—and a significant number of TTP’s commanders and Central Shura members were also from the Mehsud tribe. The selection of Fazalullah as TTP’s Emir after the death of Hakeemullah in fact sowed the seeds of contention among the TTP top commanders. Some even decided to part ways with TPP as a result of Fazalullah’s section, moving on to establish their own Islamist groups. The period since 2013 had been troublesome for TTP, with the group facing an array of operations by Pakistani security forces, U.S. drone strikes, splintering and factional fighting and the loss of its safe havens in Pakistan’s tribal areas.

After Fazalullah’s death, it was again crucial for TTP’s Central Shura not only to select an able and experienced commander, but also to avoid the kind of factional infighting that broke out after the killing of Hakeemullah Mehsud in 2013, inflicting a serious blow to TTP’s command structure.

Who Is TTP’s New Emir?

The selection of Mufti Noor Wali Mehsud (a.k.a. Abu Mansoor Asim) has heralded a new era for TTP (Dawn, June 23). A veteran jihadist with at least two decades of experience, Noor Wali Mehsud appears to be an apt choice. In addition to being Mehsud (Zafarkhel sub tribe), a number of other factors make Noor Wali Mehsud an ideal candidate for the position of Emir. He is well educated and studied at a range of madrasahs promoting jihad in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Furthermore, he is an avid reader and writer, and he has written four books on jihad and related issues. Unlike Emirs Baitullah, Hakeemullah and Fazalullah, who could be best categorized as militant jihadists, Noor Wali has a reputation of being a jihadist ideologue and a warrior. He is battle-hardened as well as ideologically sound. In his most recent 689-page book, Inqilab-e-Mehsud, South Waziristan: Firangi Raj se Amreeki Samraj Tak (Mehsud Revolution, South Waziristan: From British Raj to American Imperialism), published in September 2017, he documents all the battles that Pakistani Taliban forces have fought against Pakistani and Afghan security forces. Moreover, he provides a detailed account of the assassination of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in December 2007, an act of terrorism perpetrated by a TTP cell.

Born in June 1978 in the Sararogha sub-division of the South Waziristan district of the tribal area, Noor Wali received his early education at a madrasah in his village Maktab—the local madrasah is attached to the mosque. Later, he was sent to the madrasah Jamia Imdadia, and then he went on to study at Jamia Farooq-e-Azam, a madrasah in Faisalabad, an industrial town 100 kilometers from Lahore. He also studied at Jamia Nusratul Uloom in Gujranwala district, and Jamia Ahsan ul Uloom in the southern port city of Karachi (News International, June 27). Established during the Afghan War (1979-89) period, these religious seminaries are known for interpreting ultra-orthodox teachings of Deobandi sect of Islam and have provided thousands of foot soldiers for jihad in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

After studying at multiple Deobandi madrasahs, Mehsud started his jihadist career with the Afghan Taliban. He participated in pitched battles fought between Afghan Taliban and their archrival, the Northern Alliance forces, in battles over Mazar-e-Shariff in 1998. With the commencement of the Global War on Terror after the 9/11 attacks, Mehsud joined the militia raised by ultra-radical Islamist cleric Mirajuddin—the cleric later became a member of the national assembly of Pakistan—and fought alongside the Afghan Taliban in Afghanistan. After the fall of Kabul to U.S. and Northern Alliance forces in December 2001, he played a pivotal role in providing safe havens to on-the-run al-Qaeda commanders and foot soldiers in the tribal areas of Pakistan, a key issue leading the Pakistani military to enter the tribal areas in 2003 (Express Tribune, June 23). Mehsud already maintained the good relations with the al-Qaeda leadership he had established during his training period at al-Qaeda-run training camps and later while fighting alongside al-Qaeda militants in Taliban-ruled Afghanistan.

A Mufti and Mujahid

Most Islamist militants are madrasah dropouts. This, however, was not the case with Noor Wali Mehsud. Mehsud joined jihadist movements after completing his madrasah education. Even after becoming a militant commander, he continued to read and write about jihad, making him a rare combination of theorist and practitioner. Apart from his widely read book, Inqilab-e-Mehsud, he also authored Majmua tal Masail man Fiqah al-Jihad (A Collection of Rulings Concerning the Law of Jihad), Ahkaam al-Ghanaiam Walasari (Rulings Regarding Plunder), and Maidan ul Masail man Fiqah al-Jihad (Grounds for Ruling for the Law of Jihad). His writing centers mostly on jihadist thought and ideology while discussing the sanctity of religious issues faced by Mujahedeen during jihad.

TTP under Mehsud will likely appear as a theocratic order, unlike most Islamist terrorist organizations relying on religious Ulema (clerics) for their fatwas (religious decrees) and rulings. His religious grounding will allow him to serve this role, giving him more latitude to further flex TTP’s muscle. This unique dynamic may have interesting implications for how Mehsud sets the agenda for TTP command and policy vis-à-vis the execution of terrorist attacks.

As a veteran jihadist commander, Mehsud remained part of the dialogue with al-Qaeda, other foreign jihadists in the tribal areas and the TTP leadership. This includes negotiations that took place in 2009, in which a formal alliance was to be formed between the Arab Mujahedeen and local jihadist forces. The group was to be named Itehad al-Mujahedeen. However, the deal fell apart after the death of then-TPP leader Baitullah Mehsud in a U.S. drone strike in August 2009. Noor Wali later wrote about his frustration with the failure to bring the alliance to fruition.

Mehsud was the first jihadist commander who claimed responsibility for assassinating former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in Rawalpindi in December 2007, smashing all the conspiracy theories about who was behind her death. He also claimed that TTP had repeatedly planned to target her, claiming a previous suicide attack on her. That attack was executed in Karachi during one of her rallies, resulting in around 200 deaths (al-Jazeera, October 22, 2007). [1]

TTP’s Future

In his own book, Mehsud accepts that TTP’s activities are in decline due to the factional fighting that ensued after the death of Hakeemullah Mehsud in 2013. Under Noor Wali Mehsud, TTP appears to be taking a new direction and it is expected that he will reinvigorate TTP’s terrorist activities in Pakistani cities. Mehsud is from TTP’s most important unit, “Halqa-e-Mehsud” (the Mehsud Circle), and he enjoys the confidence of battle hardened militants of the Mehsud tribes. Since the commencement of military operation in 2009 and later in 2014 (Operation Zarb-e-Azb), a large number of internally displaced people (IDPs) have taken residence in Pakistan’s urban centers. Mehsud will definitely take advantage of this demographic shift, as some of the militants have also relocated to the cities posing as IDPs. A recent hike in terrorist attacks during the campaign for the upcoming election can be read as support for the claim that TTP’s activity will increase under Mehsud. At least 50 threat alerts related to the upcoming election have been issued by Pakistan’s National Counter Terrorism Authority since Mehsud assumed charge of TTP’s leadership. [2]

Conclusion

Noor Wali Mehsud’s ascension to the top spot in TTP’s leadership is a significant development in Pakistan’s ever-shifting militant landscape. From the militant perspective, the selection of Noor Wali Mehsud as the new Emir of TTP is an apt choice. From counter terrorism angle, it is certainly alarming. Mehsud has both the capability and the drive to reinvigorate the previously declining TTP operations in Pakistan, and it is highly likely that he will attempt to do so in the near future. His broad credentials—both as a jihadist thinker and militant commander—are of serious concern. Counter-terrorism policymakers in Pakistan and Afghanistan would need to seek assistance from their U.S. counterparts to devise a strategy for eradicating the threats; otherwise, it would invite disastrous consequences.

NOTES

[1] For details please see Noor Wali Mehsud, Inqilab-e-Mehsud, South Waziristan: Firangi Raj se Amreeki Samraj Tak

[2] Author’s interview with Islamabad based journalist Azaz Syed, July 10, 2018