New Rules Tighten Party Control Over Public Service Units
Executive Summary
- The Regulations on the Registration and Management of Public Service Units, published on October 26, set “comprehensively strengthening Party leadership over public service units” as a legislative purpose. They give the Party leadership system in schools, hospitals, research institutes, and other public service units a basis in administrative regulations.
- The new penalties go as far as revoking a unit’s legal person certificate. The regulations also complete the procedures for closing and merging public service units, in preparation for shutting down schools, hospitals, libraries, and other units in areas with shrinking populations.
- Party leadership is extending from Party and state organs and public service units into social organizations. Several regulations governing social organizations are on the State Council’s legislative plan and will likely be revised along the same lines.
On October 26, the State Council published the Regulations on the Registration and Management of Public Service Units (事业单位登记管理条例), which seek to enhance Party control over entities that include most public schools, public hospitals, research institutes, and state media outlets (Xinhua, October 26). [1] The first legislative purpose of the new regulations, listed in Article 1, is “comprehensively strengthening Party leadership over public service units” (全面加强事业单位党的领导). The word “Party” (党) appears 20 times in the text of the new regulations, whereas it did not appear once in the 1998 Interim Regulations (暂行条例) that they replace (Ministry of Justice, June 27, 2004). [2]
The regulations are another step in the extension of Party leadership into organizations of all kinds under General Secretary Xi Jinping. In 2019, the Fourth Plenum of the 19th Central Committee called for improving the systems through which the Party leads “enterprises and public institutions, primary-level self-governing mass organizations, and social organizations” (企事业单位、基层群众自治组织、社会组织等制度) so as to “ensure the Party plays a leading role in all kinds of organizations” (确保党在各种组织中发挥领导作用) (Xinhua, November 5, 2019). Under Xi, the Party leadership system (党的领导体制) in public service units has spread from universities to hospitals and to primary and secondary schools. The new regulations give that system a basis in administrative regulations.
Regulations Codify Party Leadership System
The new regulations bind public service units to the Party in three ways. First, they give legal backing to the existing Party leadership system. Documents from the Central Organization Department describe this system as one in which “administrative leaders take responsibility under the leadership of the Party committee” (党委领导下的行政领导人负责制) (Xinhua, September 13). Similar systems have been implemented individually in various public service units up to this point. For universities, the 1998 Higher Education Law (高等教育法) announced that university presidents would take responsibility under the leadership of the Party committee (Wikisource, accessed October 28). For hospitals, a 2018 Central Committee opinion stipulated that “public hospitals implement a system of directors taking responsibility under the leadership of the Party committee” (公立医院实行党委领导下的院长负责制) (Xinhua, June 25, 2018). And for grade schools, in 2022 a separate Central Committee opinion called for “Party organizations in primary and secondary schools to exercise comprehensive leadership over school work” (中小学校党组织全面领导学校工作) (Xinhua, January 26, 2022).
These were all internal Party documents, whereas the new regulations are issued by the state. Article 6 of the latest regulations calls for “improving the Party leadership system in public service units” (完善事业单位党的领导体制), and Article 3 broadens the definition of bodies that may found such units from “state organs” (国家机关) to “all types of organs” (各类机关). This term is used in intra-Party regulations and signals that units founded by Party organs have now been brought within the regulations’ scope.
Second, the regulations link “registration management” (登记管理) to “intra-Party oversight” (党内监督). The first item in a unit’s annual report is the state of its Party building, an important instrument of political control. Under the regulations, “registration authorities” (登记管理机关) that find problems with Party building are required to “promptly notify the relevant parties” (及时通报有关方面). Party organizations in “supervising departments” (主管部门) and “sponsoring units” (举办单位) are responsible for conducting “inspection tours” (巡视巡察) of the units under them.
Third, although the regulations have been released by the State Council, they empower a Party organ to enforce them. Registration of public service units is currently overseen by the Office of the Central Institutional Organization Commission (中央编办), which has been placed under the Central Organization Department since 2018 (Xinhua, March 21, 2018).
The regulations set no specific penalties for failures in Party building, likely because other rules already cover them. Because the leaders of public service units are managed by the Party’s organization departments and supervised by its discipline inspection departments (纪检部门), the removal of a university president or hospital director has always been a decision for the Party committee at the next level up.
Regulations Tighten Exit Rules for Units
The official rationale for the revision is that some public service units have strayed from their public-interest objectives (Xinhua, October 26). Last year, the National Audit Office found that, at the central level, 88 percent of the money involved in irregularities was concentrated in units subordinate to central departments, including both public service units and enterprises (National Audit Office, June 24, 2025). The previous regulations contained limited provisions for disciplining public service units, however, listing only three grounds for penalties, and revoking a unit’s registration required the consent of the authority that had approved its establishment. The new regulations address this challenge, expanding the list to include 13 grounds for penalties, with sanctions ranging from warnings to revocation of a unit’s legal person certificate (法人证书). Four of these grounds allow authorities to restrict a unit’s operations without a prior warning, the first two being “not operating for public-interest purposes” (不以公益为目的) and “setting up enterprises in violation of regulations” (违规举办企业). Universities, research institutes, and hospitals that run businesses therefore face considerable new risks.
The regulations also provide legal procedures for closing and merging public service units. For instance, units that are abolished or merged can now use simplified deregistration (简易注销). Where a unit that should be deregistered has failed to complete liquidation after one year, its supervising department and sponsoring unit will form a liquidation team (清算组). Legal person certificates now expire automatically. [3] Units that have conducted no business for more than a year can be penalized, up to revocation of their certificates.
The aim of these procedures is largely to consolidate public service units in areas with shrinking populations. In 2025, the total population of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) fell by 3.39 million—the fourth consecutive annual decrease (National Bureau of Statistics, February 28). The same year, the number of elementary schools fell by roughly 8,000 (Ministry of Education, July 6). The Outline of the 15th Five-Year Plan calls for “improving mechanisms for allocating educational resources in line with population change” (健全与人口变化相适应的教育资源配置机制) and “optimizing the structure and distribution of public service units in public services” (优化公共服务领域事业单位结构布局) (Xinhua, March 13). Hospitals, libraries, and other institutions in these areas will likely be restructured alongside schools.
Party Leadership Set to Extend Further
Beyond state organs and public service units, Party leadership will continue to reach into every entity in society. Social organizations (社会组织), which the Ministry of Civil Affairs defines as registered social groups (社会团体), foundations (基金会), and social service organizations (社会服务机构), are likely to be the next to be fully incorporated (Ministry of Civil Affairs, April 3, 2024).
The Party’s authority over social organizations is mainly derived from internal Party documents and personnel arrangements. It began laying institutional groundwork in 2016, when an Opinion on Reforming the Social Organization Management System (关于改革社会组织管理制度促进社会组织健康有序发展的意见), issued jointly by the General Offices of the CCP Central Committee and the State Council, called for “achieving full coverage of Party organizations and Party work” (实现党的组织和工作全覆盖) (Xinhua, August 21, 2016). The China Law Society (中国法学会) is a case in point. Its president, Chen Wenqing (陈文清), is a member of the Politburo and secretary of the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission (Xinhua, January 11, 2025). Presidents of its subordinate research societies (研究会) are selected in “adherence to political standards” (坚持政治标准), and the list of candidates is confirmed by a meeting of the society’s Party group (党组) or a president’s office meeting (会长办公会议) (China Law Society, June 30, 2020). Most of these research societies, including those for criminal law, constitutional law, and criminal procedure law, are now headed by vice-ministerial-level (副部级) cadres who replaced scholars. [4]
State legislation is following suit. Following an amendment in 2023, the Charity Law (慈善法) stipulates that “charity work adheres to the leadership of the Communist Party of China” (慈善工作坚持中国共产党的领导) (NPC, December 29, 2023). The State Council’s 2026 legislative work plan includes new Regulations on the Registration and Management of Social Service Organizations (社会服务机构登记管理条例), revisions to the Regulations on the Management of Foundations (基金会管理条例), and a draft Law on Industry Associations and Chambers of Commerce (行业协会商会法) (State Council, May 11). A 2016 draft of the social service organization regulations, released for public comment by the Ministry of Civil Affairs, already required such organizations to “establish Chinese Communist Party organizations” (设立中国共产党的组织) (China Law Translate, accessed October 28).
Conclusion
CCP leadership has extended from Party and state organs into public service units and will penetrate further into every corner of society. Party organizations have entered the decision-making bodies of schools, hospitals, research institutes, and social groups, and Party leadership is now written into the regulations that register them. The Party’s rule is thus tightly bound to the functioning of these institutions. Xi likely believes that embedding the Party in society will help sustain one-party rule over the long term. In essence, this marks a return to the conditions of the Mao Zedong era. The separation of Party and government (党政分开) pursued since the Deng Xiaoping era died long ago, and the Party has now returned even more pervasively. Little remains of the political legacy of reform and opening up.
Notes
[1] The official English translation of 事业单位 is “public institutions.” This article uses “public service units” to convey the term’s meaning more precisely. According to official figures from 2014, the PRC had 1.11 million public service units with 31.53 million authorized staff positions (Ministry of Justice, May 15, 2014).
[2] Possibly with external audiences in mind, the official English-language version omitted the requirement in Article 6 that public service units “arm their minds with Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era” (用习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想武装头脑) and the reference to “inspection tours” (巡视巡察) in Article 18 (Xinhua, October 26).
[3] Time-limited certificates and the temporary withholding of certificates both predate the new regulations. The regulations elevate these provisions from the lower-ranking Implementing Rules (实施细则) of the Office of the Central Institutional Organization Commission into administrative regulations (Beijing Municipal Government, January 24, 2014).
[4] In 2021, the presidency of the China Law Society’s Criminal Law Research Society (刑法学研究会) passed from Beijing Normal University professor Zhao Bingzhi (赵秉志) to Jia Yu (贾宇), then chief procurator of Zhejiang Province and now president of the Shanghai High People’s Court. That same year, the presidency of its Constitutional Law Research Society (宪法学研究会) passed from Renmin University of China professor Han Dayuan (韩大元) to Zheng Shuna (郑淑娜), a former deputy director of the Legislative Affairs Commission of the National People’s Congress Standing Committee. In 2022, the presidency of its Criminal Procedure Law Research Society (刑事诉讼法学研究会) passed from China University of Political Science and Law professor Bian Jianlin (卞建林) to Jing Dali (敬大力), a former chief procurator of Beijing (Supreme People’s Court, December 11, 2021, November 27, 2022; Constitutional Law Research Society, November 3, 2021).