PLA Assessments on the Centrality of Space Power in Ukraine
PLA Assessments on the Centrality of Space Power in Ukraine
Executive Summary:
- Across People’s Liberation Army units, defense universities, and defense state-owned enterprises, Russia’s war in Ukraine has reinforced calls for the Chinese military to develop indigenous LEO satellite networks, resilient positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) architectures, and integrated space–cyber–electromagnetic countermeasures tailored to high-intensity, information-transparent conflicts.
- Researchers at military institutions describe the decisive advantage that satellite systems have provided Ukraine as “asymmetric transparency” (不对称透明), in which Ukraine is able to continuously observe Russian forces, while Russia does not have an equivalent capability.
- Experts argue that traditional counterspace approaches centered on hard-kill anti-satellite weapons are economically inefficient and politically escalatory, prompting a doctrinal shift toward soft-kill measures targeting networks, terminals, and services.
- Military analysts assess that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine marks the first large-scale conflict in which commercial satellite systems—especially low-Earth orbit (LEO) communications and commercial remote sensing systems—have functioned as core battlefield infrastructure rather than auxiliary support.
Editor’s note: This is the final installment in a four-part series on the lessons that the People’s Republic of China has learned from observing Russia’s war in Ukraine. The first three articles can be read here, here, and here.
In December 2025, Beijing submitted its largest-ever coordinated filings for satellite spectrum and orbital slots to the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). Covering 203,000 satellites, the filings indicate plans to build extensive non-geostationary satellite constellations (Science and Technology Daily, January 11). The move came shortly after the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee elevated commercial space to the status of a “strategic emerging industry” (战略性新兴产业) in its recommendations for the upcoming five-year plan. This designation will trigger a new wave of state support and private investment (Xinhua, October 28, 2025; China Brief, December 6, 2025).
Satellite constellations, like many space technologies, are dual-use. Researchers with ties to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) are studying how such satellite systems have reshaped the battlefield during Russia’s invasion of Ukraine (RAND, March 24, 2025; China Brief, April 11, 2025). Chinese military and defense-technology writers have treated the war as a stress test of modern space-enabled warfare, especially the fusion of military space assets with commercial satellites. Across dozens of Chinese-language analyses, a consistent picture emerges. Satellites are no longer a niche enabler sitting behind air, land, and maritime operations. They are increasingly framed as the “foundation” (底座) of combat power, supporting command and control (C2), precision strike, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), battlefield connectivity, and even the public information environment.
These experts have interpreted Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as the clearest demonstration to date of three interlocking realities. First, commercial satellite communications—especially low-Earth orbit (LEO) constellations like Starlink, operated by U.S. firm SpaceX—can function as resilient wartime infrastructure (He and Zhang, 2022). [1] Second, U.S.-led intelligence support, combined with commercial remote sensing and civilian open-source intelligence, can create “asymmetric transparency” (不对称透明), an uneven visibility regime in which one side becomes continuously observable while the other preserves greater concealment (Zhou, 2023). [2] Third, attempts to counter space-enabled advantages are shifting from a narrow focus on “hard kill” strikes—such as kinetic anti-satellite operations—toward multi-domain suppression centered on “soft kill” (软杀伤) strikes. These span electronic warfare (EW), cyber operations, and attacks on ground segments, user terminals, and data flows (Sun et al., 2025). [3]
From ‘Information Channel’ to Strategic Resource
The literature in Chinese analyzing Russia’s war in Ukraine argues that Starlink’s wartime role has evolved from an information channel into a strategic resource. One analysis describes how Starlink “leapt” (跃升) beyond connectivity into a broader strategic lever affecting operational tempo and resilience (He and Zhang, 2022). [4] Discussion of this shift is also seen in operational writings.
Researchers associated with PLA units and launch-site organizations often emphasize that the decisive value of LEO satellite communications lies in survivability through scale: thousands of satellites, frequent replenishment, and distributed ground infrastructure make complete suppression difficult, especially when a constellation is commercially operated and globally supported. An article on Starlink by an engineer affiliated with a PLA-linked launch-site organization uses the example of Starlink’s deployment in Ukraine to warn that wartime communications cannot depend on a small number of advanced assets, and so systems must be developed to withstand persistent disruption and be capable of rapid adaptation (Peng et al., 2022). [5]
The same logic appears in analyses by technical authors who concentrate on the architecture and security posture of LEO constellations. An engineer at the Shanghai Aerospace Electronics Technology Institute (上海航天电子技术研究所) argues that Starlink’s primary security challenge lies in maintaining service under sustained electronic and cyber attack. He notes that the constellation’s “software-defined architecture” (软件定义) allows SpaceX to rapidly modify waveforms, routing, and terminal behavior. This enables rapid mitigation of jamming and cyber interference, but it expands the system’s cyberattack surface, making cybersecurity and system hardening increasingly central to space combat effectiveness (Liu et al., 2023). [6] In this view, “satellite internet” (卫星互联网) is a contested operational environment, and its resilience depends on cybersecurity as much as orbital mechanics.
Asymmetric Transparency and the Intelligence–Commercial Nexus
If LEO communications are the plumbing of the information battlespace, Chinese analysts portray data and intelligence as the system’s decisive flows. According to an article by an academic at the Shanghai University of Political Science and Law, it has been U.S. intelligence support that has given Ukraine systemic advantages in strategy, tactics, situational awareness, communications, intelligence collection, and logistics. This has placed Russian forces in a condition of persistent exposure, while Ukraine has only been “semi-transparent” (半透明) to Russian observers (Zhou, 2023). [7] Drawing a direct parallel to the PRC, the author explicitly calls for a “Chinese Starlink” (中国版星链) to strengthen wartime communications security and battlefield awareness.
The logic of “asymmetric transparency” is reinforced by work on civilian open-source intelligence (OSINT) and commercial imagery. Russia’s war in Ukraine has demonstrated how civilian OSINT can influence official practices and shape official disclosure strategies (Liu and Xu, 2024). [8] Modern wars create a multi-source transparency regime in which satellites, smartphones, and social media become mutually reinforcing sensors. In such a regime, suppressing a single sensor class rarely eliminates visibility, instead forcing adaptation and substitution.
PRC aerospace commentators point to the operational consequences of commercial satellite use. In one article, published by the Global Times, Western commercial satellite firms are described as “disrupting the game” (搅局) by injecting ISR data, imagery, and connectivity into Ukraine’s war effort, widening the coalition’s sensor and communications base without formal military force deployment (Global Times, February 7, 2023). [9] This indicates that analysts in the PRC believe that any future conflict involving a major power automatically activate an adversary’s commercial satellite ecosystem through contracts, voluntary support, or political pressure, thereby enlarging the battlespace and complicating escalation control.
A related perspective focuses on how satellite-derived intelligence becomes a component of information warfare and narrative contestation. Discussions of “satellite investigations” (卫星调查) in reporting and intelligence assessments emphasize the importance of satellite imagery beyond the battlefield, shaping international perceptions by making claims verifiable to third parties (Cheng and Shan, 2022). [10] The credibility that this form of transparency enables can help shape everything from coalition behavior and sanctions to arms transfers and even public tolerance for a war effort.
Engineering Velocity as Combat Power
A recurring inference in the Chinese technical literature on satellite systems is that wartime advantage stems from “engineering velocity” (技术迭代速度). This refers to the ability to patch, reconfigure, and redeploy engineered systems faster than an opponent can adapt. In this view, constellation survivability is primarily an engineering problem: rapid software updates, flexible network management, and robust terminal security determine whether a constellation can maintain service under hostile conditions, such as jamming, cyber intrusion, or spoofing attempts (Liu et al., 2023). [11]
This argument interacts with a broader emphasis on “system-of-systems confrontation” (体系对抗), in which combat takes place between deeply integrated joint forces. If a satellite constellation’s combat value depends on its integration with ground terminals, gateways, and user applications, then the center of the infrastructure may shift away from the satellites themselves. The operationally salient targets become terminals, control links, and any systems that manages spectrum and data. This is one reason why PLA-linked writers increasingly stress cyber-electromagnetic operations as decisive levers, as they offer a soft-kill option for paralyzing the satellite network.
From Kinetic Destruction to Service Denial
In discussions of what lessons should be learned from the deployment of Starlink during Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the most pointed Chinese analyses focus on how Russia has attempted to counter Starlink and mitigate other space-enabled advantages. Sun Xichao (孙希超), a member of PLA Unit 63670, argues that suppressing Starlink satellites through layered denial—jamming, cyber intrusion, terminal geolocation, and disruption of ground architecture—is the most effective form of countermeasure (Sun et al., 2025). [12] This aligns with the “soft kill” preferences expressed by other authors. The rationale is pragmatic: kinetic anti-satellite strikes are costly, escalatory, and technically difficult, while service denial can be easier and safer.
Other analyses focus more broadly on navigation warfare (“NAVWAR”), a subset of electronic warfare concerned with disrupting an adversary’s global navigation satellite system (GNSS). Some of these analyses highlight the same shift toward contested-spectrum operations. By emphasizing methods to detect and characterize jamming emitters from space, they implicitly treat navigation warfare and electromagnetic maneuver as persistent features of future conflicts rather than episodic disruptions (Zong et al., 2024). [13] If interference and counter-interference become routine, however, then the side that can adapt faster gains operational advantage even without destroying satellites.
For PLA planners, one salient lesson is not simply the need to develop more satellites. It is the need to build an end-to-end warfighting capability around satellites. This requires resilient terminals, agile network operations, rapid reconfiguration, and counter-countermeasures.
Crucial to navigation warfare is ensuring the operation of one’s positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) systems, while disrupting those of the adversary. Chinese researchers appear interested in how such systems fare under electronic warfare. One analysis highlights interference patterns, and outlines a range of operational consequences for forces relying on GNSS signals. Disruption of such signals can lead to a degradation of precision strike capabilities, unmanned systems failing wholesale, or command and control desynchronization (Jia et al., 2024). [14] Some experts propose countering NAVWAR techniques via space-based monitoring approaches to map jamming emitters (Zong et al., 2024). [15]
For PLA observers, the satellite layer in Ukraine is also about weapons effectiveness, and not just ISR support. In particular, weapons technology analysts focus on how satellites enable precision strike and unmanned attack chains. They note that many modern strike systems rely on composite guidance that combines GNSS with inertial navigation systems (INS) to enhance precision, on top of which are layered multiple terminal options. Some see this in operation during Russian strikes using the Iskander-M short-range ballistic missile system, and conclude that satellite-enabled PNT has become embedded as a default component of contemporary long-range fire (Zhao et al., 2022). [16] Experts from Beijing Institute of Technology and China Ordnance Science Research Institute (中国兵器科学研究院) similarly treat precision-guided munitions as part of an informatized kill chain, where satellite-enabled PNT and airborne platforms contribute directly to accuracy and tempo (Wang et al., 2024). [17] For PLA planners, the implied lesson is that the decisive factor in weapons effectiveness is not the missile or shell, but the end-to-end guidance and targeting system. As a result, contesting or protecting satellite-derived PNT will proportionally shape strike outcomes under high-intensity electromagnetic opposition.
A parallel set of writings extends this logic to unmanned strike complexes. One paper coauthored by researchers affiliated with a PLA unit, argue that Starlink tightened the “sensor-to-shooter” (传感器到射手) loop by linking unmanned systems to frontline fires and accelerating “discover–strike–assess” (侦控打评) cycles (Peng et al., 2022). [18] Officers describe how Ukraine’s unmanned surface vessel (USV) raids have depended on satellite connectivity for real-time control and video links, and explain why countermeasures have gravitated toward disrupting service availability rather than attempting to eliminate the entire constellation (Sun et al., 2025). [19] These analyses imply that satellite services, LEO satellite communications, and PNT enable precision for drones and USVs, while navigation warfare and constellation denial shape the effectiveness of those systems.
At the strategic–industrial level, experts from the Beijing Satellite Navigation Center use the war to assess how sanctions, supply chain constraints, and wartime demand could shape the development trajectory of GLONASS (Russia’s own GNSS) and the future of PRC–Russian satellite navigation cooperation (Lin et al., 2024). [20] The PLA sees two lessons here: first, that wartime performance depends on peacetime industrial resilience; and second, that global dependence can be weaponized, meaning that space power cannot be separated from economic security and technological sovereignty.
Satellites as an Allocated Combat Service
Another cross-cutting theme in the literature on Russia–Ukraine satellite warfare is a focus on an operational management problem: if satellites underpin communications, ISR, and navigation, then wartime advantage requires the ability to schedule, allocate, and dynamically prioritize space services under stress. One analysis surveys trends in U.S. military satellite communications operational planning systems, and suggests that the management layer (which governs planning, allocation, and resource optimization) is becoming as important as the hardware layer (Guan et al., 2025). [21] This aligns with earlier Chinese technical research on satellite communications resource scheduling. Experts at the National University of Defense Technology believe that future force effectiveness depends on automated scheduling, conflict resolution, and resilient service orchestration (Fu, 2019). [22] In an asymmetric transparency environment, where an adversary can observe and target high-value nodes, the ability to shift bandwidth, reroute links, and re-task sensors becomes a combat function.
Conclusion
Contained within the PLA’s reading of the use of satellites by both sides in Russia’s war in Ukraine is a diagnosis of the infrastructural character of modern warfare. Satellites—especially commercially operated systems—have become the connective tissue of battlefield coordination, intelligence fusion, and strategic messaging. The war has highlighted how quickly advantages can accrue to the side with viable networks, integrated diverse sensors feeding transparency, and adaptable software architecture. It has also shown that counterspace competition is no longer confined to destructive anti-satellite operations. Modern warfare is increasingly a continuous struggle to ensure service continuity, terminal survivability, spectrum control, and data credibility.
For PLA planners, the overarching lesson is an uncomfortable one. It is the realization that space support can no longer be treated as a specialized rear-area function, but must be viewed as a frontline contest—one that links orbital systems to industrial resilience, to commercial ecosystems, and to the politics of information. The PLA’s evolving focus on LEO constellations, asymmetric transparency, and service-denial counterspace suggests that future PLA force modernization will treat satellite-enabled warfare as a central axis of system confrontation, not an enabling footnote.
Notes
[1] He Kang [何康] and Zhang Hongzhong [张洪忠], From an Information Channel to a Strategic Resource: The Functional Leap of the Starlink Satellite Network in the Russia–Ukraine Conflict [从信息渠道到战略资源：俄乌冲突中星链卫星网络的功能跃升], Journal of Hunan University of Technology (Social Sciences Edition) [湖南工业大学学报 (社会科学版)], 27, no. 5 (2022): 77–85.
[2] Zhou Songqing [周松青], Research on the Asymmetric Transparency of U.S. Intelligence Support to Ukraine in the Russia–Ukraine Conflict [俄乌冲突中美国对乌情报支持的不对称透明研究], Journal of Intelligence [情报杂志], 43, no. 1 (2024): 28–34.
[3] Sun Xichao [孙希超], Xu Changwei [徐常伟], Jie Xi [介玺], Luo Xuan [罗选], Research on Countermeasures Against the “Starlink” System in the Russia–Ukraine Conflict [俄乌冲突中“星链”系统反制问题研究], Ship Electronic Engineering [舰船电子工程], no. 9 (2025): 19–23.
[4] He Kang and Zhang Hongzhong, supra [1].
[5] Peng Zhongxin [彭中新], Qi Zhenqiang [祁振强], Zhong Sheng [钟圣], Zhang Lu [张璐], and Li Qiting [ 李旗挺], “Analysis and Reflection on the Application of Starlink in the Russia–Ukraine Conflict” [“星链”在俄乌冲突中的运用分析与思考启示], Tactical Missile Technology [战术导弹技术], no. 6 (2022).
[6] Liu Kui [刘奎], Zhao Yuxuan [赵宇轩], Xu Guoqing [徐国庆], Huang Yuxuan [黄宇轩], Kong Weiwei [孔巍巍], “Analysis and Research on Security Protection Technologies for ‘Starlink’ Satellites” [“星链”卫星安全防护技术分析与研究], in Proceedings of the 18th Shanghai Aerospace S&T Forum and the 2023 Annual Academic Conference of the Shanghai Astronautics Society [第十八届上海航天科技论坛暨上海市宇航学会2023学术年会论文集], (Shanghai, 2023). The Shanghai Aerospace Electronics Technology Institute is a subsidiary of the Shanghai Academy of Spaceflight Technology (SAST; 上海航天技术研究院 / 航天八院).
[7] Zhou Songqing, supra [2].
[8] Liu Chuanping [刘传平] and 徐鹏 [Xu Peng], “U.S. and Western Civilian Open Source Intelligence Practices and Impact on Official Intelligence Services: Taking the Russian–Ukrainian Conflict as an Example” [“美西方民间开源情报实践及对官方情报部门的影响—以俄乌冲突为例”], Journal of Intelligence [情报杂志], 43, no. 4 (2024): 23–30.
[9] Peng Zongxin, supra [5]
[10] Cheng Ying [程瑛] and Shan Xu [山旭], “Application of Satellite Investigation in Russia–Ukraine Conflict Reporting and Information Assessment” [卫星调查在俄乌冲突报道及信息研判中的应用], China Journalist [中国记者], no. 5 (2022): 126–28.
[11] Liu et al., supra [6].
[12] Sun et al., supra [3].
[13] Zong Wenpeng [宗文鹏], Jia Xiaolin [贾小林],Wang Long [王龙],et al., Space-Based Monitoring of GNSS Interference Sources Based on Navigation Confrontation in the Russia–Ukraine Conflict [基于俄乌冲突导航对抗的GNSS干扰源天基监测研究], Shipboard Electronic Countermeasures [舰船电子对抗], 48, no. 1 (2025): 12–17.
[14] Jia Zanjie [贾赞杰], Wu Heli [于合理], Wu Zhijia [武智佳], Dai Taogao [代桃高], et al., “Research on the Application of Navigation Countermeasures in the Russia–Ukraine Conflict” [俄乌冲突导航对抗运用分析研究], GNSS World of China [全球定位系统], 49, no. 4 (2024): 28–33, 41.
[15] Zong et al., supra [13].
[16] Zhao Bendong [赵本东], Hu Xingzhi [胡星志], Lai Jianqi [赖剑奇], et al., Analysis and Implications of Aerospace Offensive and Defensive Operations in the Russia–Ukraine Conflict [俄乌冲突空天攻防作战应用分析与启示], Tactical Missile Technology [战术导弹技术], no. 4 (2022): 17–22.
[17] Wang Wei [王伟], Zhang Hongyan [张宏岩], Liu Jiaqi [刘佳琪], and Lin Shiyao [林时], Impacts of the Russia–Ukraine Conflict on the Development of Land-Combat Guided Munitions [俄乌冲突对陆战制导弹药发展的影响研究], Tactical Missile Technology [战术导弹技术], no. 1 (2024).
[18] Peng et al., supra [5].
[19] Sun et al., supra [3].
[20] Lin Yue [林悦], Han Lu [韩璐], Dou Changjiang [窦长江], Di Hongwei [邸虹维], “The Future of Sino Russian Satellite Navigation System Cooperation Viewed from the Impact of the Russian Ukrainian Conflict” [从俄乌冲突对GLONASS系统发展的影响看中俄卫星导航系统合作的未来], Proceedings of the 14th China Satellite Navigation Conference—S01 Satellite Navigation Applications [第十四届中国卫星导航年会论文集——S01卫星导航应用], (May 2024).
[21] Guan Yundi [管芸笛], Zheng Zhong [郑重], Zheng Hanyu [郑寒雨], Li Wenjie [李文吉], Yu Xumin [禹旭敏], Luan Shan [栾珊], Pu Minglong [蒲明龙], Trend Analysis of U.S. Military SATCOM Operational Planning Systems [美国军事卫星通信作战规划系统发展趋势分析], Communications Technology [通信技术], no. 7 (2025): 57–63.
[22] Fu Zhiye [付志晔], Research on Military Satellite Communication Resource Scheduling [军事卫星通信资源调度问题研究], National University of Defense Technology [国防科技大学], (Changsha: Guofang Keji Daxue, 2019).
