Poland Considers Developing Nuclear Program

Poland Considers Developing Nuclear Program

Executive Summary:

• Polish President Karol Nawrocki has become the first senior Polish official to openly support initiating work on the development of Polish nuclear capabilities. His statement on this issue reflects an ongoing debate within Polish analytical and expert circles.
• Some representatives of Polish political circles have shifted their ambitions from merely joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) nuclear sharing program to initiating work on Poland’s own nuclear capabilities.
• This shift is related to the perceived erosion of the international order and to the ambiguities, from Warsaw’s perspective, surrounding U.S. policy on allied security guarantees vis-à-vis Russia.

On February 15, Polish President Karol Nawrocki, when asked in an interview about his position on initiating a Polish nuclear program, stated that “the path toward a Polish nuclear project, in full respect of all international regulations, is a path Poland should pursue.” Pressed further on whether “the Americans would allow it,” he replied that he “did not know, but that Poland should nevertheless move in this direction and begin preparatory work,” citing Poland’s frontline status and “imperial Russia’s obvious attitude toward Poland” (Polsat News, February 15). Nawrocki became the first senior Polish political leader to openly advocate for developing an autonomous nuclear capability. The debate on nuclear deterrence in Poland, however, had already begun in 2020.

Poland’s 2020 National Security Strategy was the first strategic document that signaled the Polish government’s intention to engage more actively in shaping the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) nuclear deterrence policy (see EDM, May 29, 2020). It implicitly referred to Poland’s participation in NATO’s Nuclear Sharing program. In 2020, the issue also gained international attention when voices emerged in Germany calling for withdrawal from NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangement, and then-U.S. Ambassador to Poland Georgette Mosbacher suggested— apparently assessing reactions—that U.S. nuclear assets could be relocated to Polish territory (Euractiv, May 20, 2020).

The deficit in nuclear deterrence had been evident in Poland long before the watershed events for regional security—the outbreak of war in Ukraine in 2014 and Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022. As early as 2009, the Russian–Belarusian Zapad military exercises included a simulated nuclear strike on Warsaw (see EDM, September 30, 2009). Since the current Deputy Chairman of Russian Security Council Dmitry Medvedev’s presidency, Russia has regularly threatened to deploy Iskander-M missiles—capable of carrying nuclear warheads—in its Kaliningrad oblast, which borders Poland. Western support for Ukraine after 2014 has contributed to an intensification of Russian nuclear coercion.

NATO’s post-2014 adaptation strategy relied primarily on strengthening conventional capabilities and refining operational procedures. The debate over extending the nuclear umbrella to the Eastern Flank states remained sporadic and was largely confined to expert circles (see, for example, CSIS, January 27, 2016). After 2022, however, the nuclear deterrence deficit on the Eastern Flank became increasingly apparent. In June 2023, following Russia’s deployment of nuclear weapons to Belarus, then-Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki publicly called on allies to include Poland in the nuclear sharing program (Gazeta Prawna, June 30, 2023).

In the absence of a substantive debate among NATO partners—particularly the United States, whose nuclear potential vis-à-vis Russia remains the most important—Polish decision-makers began exploring alternative solutions, including cooperation with France. In March 2025, then-President Andrzej Duda expressed support for French President Emmanuel Macron’s proposal to extend the French nuclear umbrella over Europe (President of Poland, March 13, 2025). During the same period, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk signaled the opening of negotiations with France on this matter (Biznes PAP, March 7, 2025). Polish analytical centers indicated that the issue was discussed during negotiations of the Polish–French treaty signed in May 2025 (PISM, May 13, 2025). Even though the treaty did not contain explicit provisions on nuclear deterrence, Macron emphasized that the mutual security assistance clause “involves all the components.” On March the 2, Tusk stated, “Poland is in talks with France and a group of closest European allies on the programme of advanced nuclear deterrence” (X/@donaldtusk, March 2). Despite high-level political consultations, it remains evident in Poland that French nuclear guarantees cannot substitute for those of the United States. More broadly, France faces significant credibility challenges as an ally, stemming from technological limitations, objective capability constraints, and doubts regarding political will.

Nawrocki’s remarks coincide with a broader debate on the proliferation of nuclear capabilities in Europe and globally. Amid the erosion of the international security architecture, similar discussions have emerged in Australia, South Korea, and Sweden (Australian Foreign Affairs, October 2018; Foundation for Strategic Research, July 18, 2025; Breaking Defense, January 27). In Germany, too, there is an ongoing debate on European nuclear capabilities (MSC, February 2026). Nawrocki’s statements, however, still received wide coverage in the international media (See, for example, Bloomberg, February 15; The Telegraph, February 16).

Subsequently, Polish Minister of National Defense Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz expressed measured support regarding the idea of developing national nuclear capabilities. He declared himself in favor of “developing our own research and development capacities” (Polskie Radio 24, February 17). After some time, Tusk reiterated the same position (X/@donaldtusk, March 3). Not all members of the Polish government, however, viewed the president’s initiative positively. Minister of Foreign Affairs and Deputy Prime Minister Radosław Sikorski described Nawrocki’s remarks as “irresponsible and harmful,” suggesting that such a debate should not be conducted publicly (Polskie Radio 24, February 19). Meanwhile, recent surveys indicate that more than 50 percent of Poles support Poland’s acquisition of nuclear capabilities (TVP.info, March 3).

The debate over Poland’s potential acquisition of nuclear capabilities has also undergone a qualitative shift within the expert community. Previously, the discussion focused primarily on extending allied nuclear guarantees to Poland (Instytut Europy Środkowej, April 30, 2024). Changes in the international order, however, have compelled Polish analysts to reassess the issue more fundamentally (Świdziński, 2026; Defence24.pl, February 16; Koziej, February 19).

The progressive erosion of the international security architecture and the persistent Russian nuclear coercion constitute the principal determinants of the renewed debate on nuclear deterrence in Poland. By 2026, the discussion no longer concerns solely participation in nuclear sharing arrangements or the extension of another state’s nuclear umbrella. The qualitative shift triggered by Nawrocki’s remarks is closely linked to U.S. President Donald Trump’s administration’s ambiguous policy toward Europe. Efforts to “Europeanize” NATO have exposed Europe’s deficiencies in deterring Russia, including in the nuclear domain.

In Poland, doubts regarding the credibility of Western European allies—particularly in the nuclear dimension—persist. The principal concern in Warsaw, however, is not merely about declaratory assurances. Rather, it is the shift in U.S. posture in the region, especially in light of diplomatic attempts to reach accommodations with Russia, that has revitalized the domestic debate on nuclear capabilities. This is particularly salient given that nuclear weapons remain a domain in which Russia retains a significant advantage vis-à-vis Poland. By contrast, in the conventional sphere, Russia currently generates fewer concerns due to the growing capabilities of the Polish Armed Forces and the substantial difficulties Moscow has encountered in its full-scale invasion of Ukraine.