Post-Mortem Analysis: Izzat al-Douri and the State of Iraq’s Ba’ath Party

Post-Mortem Analysis: Izzat al-Douri and the State of Iraq’s Ba’ath Party

On October 25, the Iraqi Ba’ath party of the former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein announced the death of its leader, Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri. Almost no details were given about the circumstances surrounding the death of al-Douri, who was 78, but the announcement implied that he died of natural causes (Al Quds, October 26).

Al-Douri was the leader of the banned Iraqi Ba’ath party and a coalition of insurgent groups affiliated with it. His whereabouts had been unknown since he went into hiding after the U.S.-led invasion in 2003 and he became a wanted man by coalition forces and later the post-Hussein Iraqi governments. The United States placed a $10 million bounty on his head. He was the king of clubs in the infamous deck of cards that the U.S. forces issued at the time of the invasion for the most wanted figures in the Saddam Hussein government (Al Jazeera, October 26).

The Man Who Died Too Many Times

Al-Douri was born in the town of al-Dawr in the predominately Sunni province of Salaheddin in 1942, not far from where his former leader Saddam Hussein was born five years earlier. He was the deputy chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council and deputy commander of the Iraqi armed forces.

Since the fall of the Ba’ath government in 2003, several false reports on the death of al-Douri have emerged. That so many of these announcements were ultimately false was astonishing to many, as Hussein’s number two was believed to be the most vulnerable senior member of the toppled government, and was not expected to survive in hiding for as long as he did (Arabi21, October 21).

Al-Douri was ill and reportedly had leukemia, needing blood transfer operations regularly. He also had a recognizable voice and accent along with red hair, which should have made it difficult for him to hide (El Watan News, April 18, 2015).

Therefore, it was surprising for many that he evaded the destiny of most of the wanted leaders of the Ba’ath government, who were captured or killed during and after the invasion. Many even suspected that he was dead, considering the immense pressure that his banned party came under. One of the frequent occurrences in post-2003 Iraq were new reports and announcements of al-Douri’s death. Some of those announcements were issued by Iraqi officials. But none of them were proven.  One Arab publication counted 15 reports of al-Douri’s death (Al Araby, October 26).

Al-Douri was alive and in recent years he even appeared in video messages filmed from his hiding places. Some analysts suggested that he was living outside Iraq, hosted by an Arab government. Others contended that he was with his old enemies the Kurds in the autonomous region of Kurdistan in northern Iraq, but that was denied by the Kurdish regional government. [1]

The Iraqi government, and the U.S. forces when they were in Iraq, came under pressure due to the fact that they were seemingly unable to capture such a high-profile figure from the Hussein regime. His survival always left the door open for certain groups to exaggerate the Ba’ath party’s role in the insurgency and engage in misguided speculation about an alliance or even merger between the Ba’ath and jihadists groups.

Faith and Jihad

Al-Douri was the central figure to the issue of relations between the Ba’ath party and jihadist groups in post-2003 Iraq. Analyzing his life before and after the invasion clearly shows the difference between his idea of political violence—which belongs to the postcolonial struggle embraced by nationalist movements and governments in the Muslim world—and that of global jihadists. The latter believe in fully-fledged religious wars against non-Muslim powers, particularly the United States. Despite his emphasis on jihadism during his insurgency years, and even before 2003, his ideology rested on both pan-Arab and Iraqi nationalism. The jihad he waged against the U.S.-led coalition is different than that waged by the fundamentalist Sunni group Islamic State (IS). His aim was to restore a nation-state that was ruled by his party while IS intended to establish an ever-expanding Islamic state that considered all existing leaders in the Middle East, including al-Douri and his Ba’ath party, to be apostates.

He tried to influence IS and other insurgent groups to his cause. He notably even hailed IS when it took over Mosul and other parts of Iraq in 2014 (Al-Sharq, July 13, 2014). That move, however, should be read in the context of the desperate situation al-Douri had been in since 2003. He was under pressure from superior powers, especially the United States and Iran, who both supported the Iraqi Shia-led government. No other Sunni insurgent group managed to achieve anything close to IS’ advances in 2014. He seemed to be trying to exploit the group’s early success. But, he soon saw that IS was never going to coexist with any other group, let alone his secular Ba’ath party. IS executed senior members of the Ba’ath in occupied areas and al-Douri eventually condemned them. Al-Douri ultimately described IS as being as bad as his other enemies—the Iranian and Iraqi Shia parties—describing both sides as conspirators meaning harm to Islam and Arabs  (Independent Arabia, October 20).

Al-Douri went further in 2017, rejecting any notion that Ba’athist military officers were fighting for IS and considered such insinuations an insult to his party and the former Iraqi Army (Arabi21, May 16, 2017). Al-Douri’s claim that officers from the former Iraqi Army did not fight with IS was not accurate. IS included officers from the former army, especially when Iraqis dominated its leadership after Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi became leader in 2010. However, none of those officers were prominent figures before 2003 and none of the them were truly Ba’athist. Those who were members of the Ba’ath party had to condemn their former party’s secular pan-Arab ideology and embraced the Salafi-jihadism of IS. [2]

Notably, IS and its predecessor al-Qaeda in Iraq condemned al-Douri, his leader Saddam Hussein, and their Ba’ath party as kafir (non-believers) because of their Ba’ath party’s secular ideology. Al-Douri’s praise for IS was part of his attempt to create a bigger space for his party to operate in, but that was doomed to fail as IS would never allow any other rival group to operate under its rule.

Leading an Insurgency

Al-Douri was a well-known Sufi. When the Ba’ath party was in power, he provided support to various Sufi orders. That network of relations he had built might explain how he amazingly survived the hostile environment Iraq had become for him and his party. Al-Douri’s faith provided him with more than the refuge and the ability to operate underground effectively, it was also the base of the main Ba’ath affiliated insurgent group. On December 30, 2006 Saddam Hussein was executed and al-Douri was promptly announced to have been elevated to become the leader of the party (Al-Watan Voice, June 22, 2017).

Shortly after his promotion, he formed the Jaish Rijal al-Tariqa al-Naqshabandia (Army of the Men of the Naqshabandia—JRTN). He also formed a supposedly large coalition of insurgent groups called Jabhat al-Jihad wa al-Tahreer (The Jihad and Liberation Front—JLF), but only the JRTN proved to have a noticeable impact and presence on the ground in the following years (Al Quds, October 6, 2007).

The ideology of JRTN and JLF was a clear reflection of that of al-Douri’s himself—a combination of Islamism, pan-Arabism, and Iraqi nationalism. The insurgency was ineffective, but its continued survival, and that of its leader al-Douri, has always been significant. Several Iraqi Islamist insurgent groups, which were more powerful than the Ba’ath party after 2003, have seen their appeal and power fading for several reasons, but the JRTN has remained active.

Al-Qaeda in Iraq, which became the Islamic State after expanding to Syria, eventually grew to dominate the local Sunni insurgency. It eclipsed all other Sunni groups. One of the main features of the decline of the other Sunni insurgent groups was their lack of known and popular leadership. Despite its weakness compared to IS, the Ba’ath and its JRTN and JLF remained under the firm control of al-Douri. [3]

Addresses and Policies

The withdrawal of the U.S. forces left al-Douri with new opportunities. As local Sunni resentments were increasing against the Shia-led government in Baghdad, he started to release video messages on certain occasions that were observed during the party’s long rule. Some of those included only traditional Ba’athist rhetoric, but others showed some attempts to adapt to new realties and ceasing on new trends. During the upheaval that struck several Arab countries in the Middle East and North Africa, al-Douri appealed to Iraqi people. When Saudi Arabia took a clear anti-Iran position under the leadership of crown prince Mohammed bin Salman, al-Douri also tried to join the bandwagon, declaring that he supported the new policy (Raialyoum, April 7, 2018).

More recently, he made his most striking statement when he apologized to Kuwait and the Kuwaiti people for the Iraqi invasion and annexation of the country in 1990-1991 (Ammon News, April 14, 2019).

His statements attempted to reclaim the position Iraq assumed during the 1980s as the main force confronting Iran in defense of other Arab Gulf countries. These attempts were desperate, but many in the Arab world miss Iraq’s geopolitical role, which ended when it invaded Kuwait in 1990.

Conclusion

Since rising to lead the Ba’ath Party, al-Douri used a modest tone in his rhetoric and showed willingness to work with other parties. He made his first video appearance in 2012, where he tried to appeal to ongoing public protests in the Sunni areas of western Iraq. But those were eventually crushed by the Shia-led government and IS advances followed. He also tried to appeal to the more recent street protests, which broke out in Baghdad and the predominantly Shia areas of southern Iraq in October 2019. Neither of his attempts were successful, but the political space he was trying to exploit is noteworthy. The Sunni community in Iraq suffered dearly after the fall of Saddam Hussein’s secular, but Sunni-led government. In recent years, however, there has been an increasing trend—even in the Shia areas—of rejecting the blanket condemnation of Ba’ath rule and emphasizing its effectiveness in providing security, public order, and a safety net for the poor (Erem News, April 11, 2016).

The problem with al-Douri was not his past affiliation with the Saddam Hussein government, but his inability to rebrand the party. He could not polish the old brand and make it appealing for a new generation. But he succeeded in maintaining a distinct presence for the party in spite of immense pressure against its activities. The Ba’ath were banned and its members persecuted by both the Iraqi government and IS. Al-Douri also survived challenges from within the ranks of the party. The main challenge to his leadership came when General Muhammad Younis al-Ahmad attempted to become the leader of the party and formed a new leadership body (Al-Watan Voice, January 23, 2007).

Al-Ahmad was a member of the supreme Ba’ath leadership before 2003 and enjoyed something al-Douri could not secure—the support of a regional government. The Syrian regime provided support and refuge for al-Ahmad’s group, but after years of rivalry, al-Douri proved to clearly have more clout and a better claim to leadership of the Ba’ath (Al Jazeera, November 27, 2010).

The story of al-Douri was not a story of effectiveness, but survival. It was under the most challenging circumstances that he managed to stay alive. The Iraqi government is supported by the United States and the regional power, Iran. However, talk shows and social media conversations increasingly suggest that the possibility of a fall of the whole system of government in Iraq is not to be ruled out (Baghdad Today, December 23).

Only weeks before his death, a senior Iraqi Shia politician warned of an imminent coup led by al-Douri (Al Quds, October 4). The Ba’ath and al-Douri have been used frequently as a source of fearmongering by the government since 2003, and the Iraqi ruling class’s worst nightmare is a scenario of a return of the Ba’ath party to power. Al-Douri had been a symbol of that nightmare. His lack of charisma and wit made him unsuitable for such a dramatic takeover, but his ability to survive and keep the Ba’athist dream alive was notable. New leadership might be more suitable for such an audacious maneuver, though it remains unlikely due to the Iraqi government’s continued support from the United States and Iran.

Notes 

[1] After the 2003 invasion, the Kurds showed significantly more tolerance toward the elderly leaders of the Ba’ath government and gave them asylum. Yet that was mostly provided to those who needed protection and were not officially accused of crimes. All of those who went to Kurdistan avoided public appearances and involvement in politics. But Shia parties frequently accused the exiled Ba’athists of conspiring and coordinating acts of violence against Iraqi forces in the Arab part of Iraq.

[2] For a good treatment of the claim that Ba’athists fought for IS see Fawaz Gerges, “Baathists and ISIS Jihadists: Who converted whom?” In “ISIS a History” pp.144,169. Princeton University Press. 2016.

[3] See the JRTN ecology of al-Douri on the groups website published on October 25. https://alnakshabandia.net/army/statements-and-declarations/army-statements/4736/