Pragmatism, Business, Flexibility: A Profile of Tripoli Revolutionaries Brigade Leader Haithem al-Tajouri
Pragmatism, Business, Flexibility: A Profile of Tripoli Revolutionaries Brigade Leader Haithem al-Tajouri
Introduction
In recent years, the role of Libya’s local militias—which emerged immediately after the eruption of the revolution in 2011—grew exponentially. Created in many cases as revolutionary or neighborhood defense groups, their economic power and territorial presence have increased sharply over the years, particularly after 2015. In Tripoli, local militias started working together in 2014 to dislodge militias from Misrata and Zintan that were fighting for the control of the capital. Among them, the Tripoli Revolutionaries Brigade led by Haitham al-Tajouri (also spelled Haytem Tajouri/Tajuri in some Western media reports) is one of the most important. Al-Tajouri is one of the most crucial militia leaders in Libya given his economic power, military strength and territorial control.
The Rise of al-Tajouri and the TRB
Al-Tajouri leads the Tripoli Revolutionaries Brigade (TRB), also known as the First Security Division of the Central General Security Administration (CGSA). The TRB’s headquarters is in al-Shat, in the area of Abu Sittah near the Tripoli Corniche. The information on al-Tajouri’s private life—particularly before the revolution—is not particularly significant. He was born in Tajoura in 1985, and, according to Western sources, was reportedly a low-ranking police officer before the revolution (Small Arms Survey, Pg. 79, October, 2014). However, some Libyan sources suggest he worked as a taxi driver before crossing the path of Qadhafi’s family. In 2005, he met a girl while working as a bodyguard for Muammar Qadhafi and began training in the navy, becoming a second lieutenant. In 2009, he tried to marry this girl, but she happened to be the mistress of Muatassim Qadhafi, one of the Libyan dictator’s sons. Al-Tajouri was arrested and held in prison for six months on charges of drug consumption (Akhbar Libya 24 [Benghazi], Oct 20). He was freed thanks to the intervention of then-Minister of Foreign Affairs Musa Kusa, who had family links to al-Tajouri. Kusa would later flee the revolution by defecting to Great Britain.
After the outbreak of the revolution, al-Tajouri fled Libya, moving to Tunisia, before returning to Libya to join the brigade led by the controversial Irish-Libyan leader Mahdi al-Harati. However, he soon created his own group, the Martyrs of Tajoura. Al-Tajouri was able to conclude a deal with the former regime, after smuggling Qadhafi’s son Mohammed out of Libya for about 10 million dinars. He used this money to attract young fighters, strengthening his position and later becoming the leader of the TRB (Akhbar Libya 24 [Benghazi], Oct 20).
A Non-Ideological Leader
Al-Tajouri is not an ideological militia leader. He once declared himself in favor of restoring the monarchy, but never elaborated on this position (Libya Herald, August 14, 2016). On his social media pages, he often makes reference to religion, but he is not a classic Islamist leader. The same can be said for his brigade, the TRB. Despite having a number of Islamists in its ranks, the group cannot be considered an Islamist-oriented militia, unlike two other prominent militias allied with the TRB—the so-called Rada (Special Deterrence Forces) and the Nawasi Brigade. Together with the Abu Salim Central Security headed by Abdul-Ghani Al-Kikli (aka Ghneiwa), these forces represent the backbone of security in Tripoli and work in support of the GNA. According to a number of reports from Libya, one of al-Tajouri’s clear ideological characteristics is his aversion to the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in Libya (Libya Herald, August 14, 2016). Back in 2016, he allegedly wanted to arrest the Grand Mufti of Libya, Sheikh Sadek Ghariani, head of the Dar Al-Ifta and considered close to the MB (Al-Wasat, August 14, Libya Herald, August 16). However, it is likely that these problems were more the result of a clash of interests between al-Tajouri and the MB-aligned groups for the control of Tripoli, rather than a dispute based on ideological elements. In any case, these anti-MB credentials made al-Tajouri an interesting prospect for a number of external powers seeking to strengthen their presence in Tripoli, as will be explained later in this article.
One significant characteristic of al-Tajouri and his brigade is their considerable involvement in Tripoli’s local economy. The prevailing view in the city, and in some Libyan diaspora groups in Tunis, is that he used his political and security role in Tripoli to build an economic empire based on intimidation, foreign exchange fraud and extortion. He has been described as the “biggest thug” in town, who began hijacking banks in 2013. In 2017, the UN-appointed Panel of Experts on Libya released a report suggesting that al-Tajouri and a number of his business associates were granted around $20 million in fraudulent bank guarantees for imports in 2015. Others suggest that he and his men control around 90% of the local banks’ branches in Tripoli (Middle East Eye, April 10, 2017).
His focus on the economy may explain some of his political moves. He moved closer to Sarraj and the GNA once the economic situation in Libya became unsustainable and the new authorities were threatening action against his financial interests. He thus started working closely with the GNA. On February 7, 2017, the Director of the Central Security Administration, Omar al-Khadrawi, gave the First Security Division the responsibility of protecting the port of Tripoli (UN, pg. 127, June 1, 2017). The port is an essential asset for anyone doing business in Libya.
The Tripoli Battle and the Mysterious Trip to the UAE
In recent months, al-Tajouri was at the center of many developments that blanketed Libyan headlines. On November 26, Hadi Awainat—a major leader within the TRB—was killed at Mitiga airport after he arrived from Tunis, where he allegedly spent a month together with other members of the militia. Libyan sources suggest that members of the militia associated with al-Tajouri killed Awainat and that al-Tajouri’s men later prevented Public Prosecution officials from entering the hospital where the corpse was stored (Ewan Libya, Nov 27, 2018; Address Libya, Nov 27, 2018). Several cases of militia leaders being killed or wounded have been reported in November 2018, and this important development comes at a time that rumors of rising tensions between the militias working in Tripoli are widespread. In addition, Awainat is believed to have played a major role in the bloody inter-militia conflict that erupted in the Libyan capital at the end of August, and he went to Tunis a few weeks after its end.
This conflict involved the Seventh Brigade from the town of Tarhouna, supported by the forces linked to Salah Badi, and the TRB and the Nawasi (See MLM, October 4). These clashes left around 117 people dead and 581 others wounded, and lasted until the end of September, when the Tripoli Security Directorate announced the end of fighting in the Libyan capital (Libya Observer, September 26; Libya Observer, September 27). Al-Tajouri announced via Facebook he was returning to Libya from his hajj (pilgrimage) in Saudi Arabia because of the clashes (Al-Motawasat, August 27; Haithem al-Tajouri Facebook Fan Page, August 28). However, halfway into the conflict, his social media posts and public appearances grew increasingly rare. From September 10 to November 2, he only posted twice on his Facebook fan page. In that same period, the TRB fan page reduced the number of its posts (TRB Facebook Fan Page). Arab media sources later gave conflicting accounts of al-Tajouri’s presence in the UAE. Some sources simply said that al-Tajouri went to the UAE in a secret trip with Hashim Bishr, a powerful Salafi militia leader, a member of the Rada, and a security advisor to the GNA. According to these sources, the GNA was aware of this trip. Al-Tajouri and Bishr stayed voluntarily in the UAE and returned with a significant amount of money (Akhbar Libya 24 [Benghazi], Oct 20). Other sources, however, claimed that al-Tajouri and Bishr were detained in the country and released only by the end of October (Al-Akhbar, October 23).
This was not the first time that al-Tajouri went to the UAE. Back in April 2018, he allegedly spent a few weeks in the country—together with a number of other TRB men—to attend the wedding of the son of the former Libyan ambassador to the UAE. Al-Tajouri has allegedly traveled there a few more times since (Jana, April 10, 2018).
These reports follow others suggesting that al-Tajouri had a crucial role in pushing the National Oil Corporation to sign a contract with a UAE company instead of an Italian one (Al-Araby, August 20). These same sources say that before traveling to Saudi Arabia for the hajj, he also went to speak with Saudi officials who were looking to extend their outreach into Tripoli (Al-Araby, April 15). Against this backdrop, it is also worth highlighting that, in the past, media sources from the UAE accused al-Tajouri of being close to Qatar (Sky News Arabia, 9 June, 2017), while more recently others have pointed to the existence of ongoing cooperation between al-Tajouri’s men and Turkey (The Arab Weekly, Nov 21, 2018). Turkey and Qatar are arch-rivals of the UAE and Saudi Arabia in the region, and Libya is indeed one of the arenas in which this competition is strongest.
Diversifying Alliances
Although most of these allegations should be taken with a pinch of salt, they suggest that the situation in Tripoli is evolving. Saudi Arabia and the UAE are among the key supporters of Khalifa Haftar, the leader of the Libyan National Army (LNA), who is considered to be the strongman in eastern Libya. It is likely, however, that his external supporters are trying to diversify their alliances in Libya by strengthening their contacts with militias in Tripoli, as Haftar has failed to strengthen his position in the rest of the country, particularly in the capital. From this point of view, al-Tajouri is considered an interesting potential ally for a number of reasons—his territorial control, his economic power and his non-ideological profile. Other Tripoli-based militias, such as the Nawasi and Rada, have a much stronger Islamist outlook and are also strongly opposed to Haftar. Indeed, in October 2017, the Nawasi clashed with the TRB because of rumors al-Tajouri was going to talk with Haftar. The Nawasi attempted a takeover of al-Tajouri’s headquarters in the area of al-Shat (Libya Herald, Oct 2, 2017).
Past developments support the view that al-Tajouri is a very pragmatic militia leader. For instance, Italy approached him when Rome wanted to strengthen Sarraj’s position in Tripoli. As noted before, in the early stages of Sarraj’s government, al-Tajouri was not particularly supportive of the new arrangement, as he saw it as a potential threat to his position in Tripoli. However, he paid a secret visit to Rome in February 2017, when Ahmed Mateeg, the Misratan who is Sarraj’s deputy, was in the Italian capital (Il Foglio [Rome], Feb 10, 2017). After this meeting, al-Tajouri’s support for the GNA became much more significant. It is not a coincidence that in the same period he was granted control of Tripoli’s seaport, an essential tool for his business. All these dynamics persuaded him to become part of the broader GNA support network. This shows his opportunistic political approach and how business considerations drive his political choices.
Conclusion
Al-Tajouri is indisputably one of the key figures in the current fragmented Libyan political landscape. His territorial grasp on Tripoli is significant, and his group controls substantial economic and military resources. He is less ideological than other militia leaders in Libya and has shown a considerable degree of tactical flexibility, especially when dealing with foreign actors. While working to strengthen his military position in Tripoli, he is also very focused on growing his business. Al-Tajouri sees boosting his economic resources both as an aim in itself and a tool to further increase his political power. He is a keen rival of the forces linked to Ghwell and Badi—Misratans who had and have an interest in strengthening their positions in Tripoli. Given also the problems that Haftar has had in consolidating his position beyond eastern Libya, external powers like Saudi Arabia and the UAE became increasingly interested in strengthening relations with him. Given the military and economic capacities of his brigade, and his territorial control in Tripoli, al-Tajouri and his militia will remain key actors in the coming years, maintaining significant leverage in Tripoli and the surrounding areas. However, the recent rumors concerning increasing tension within his brigade and among the militias controlling Tripoli suggest that new waves of violence—among groups and people previously allied—is becoming more and more likely. Al-Tajouri’s thirst for wealth and power might push some of his current allies to try isolating him, or to promote a tactical convergence between some of them and his enemies to limit his rise.
