Privatization of War in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo

Privatization of War in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo

Executive Summary:

• The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is increasingly relying on foreign contractors and mercenary networks to bolster the operational capacity of its armed forces, particularly in countering the advancing March 23 Movement (M23) rebels.
• Active private military companies (PMCs) in the DRC include Russia’s Africa Corps, Agemira RDC, and Congo Protection. These organizations deploy international personnel to provide combat assistance, training, and critical logistical and intelligence support.
• Outsourcing core security functions to profit-driven private actors provides short-term military gains but introduces significant risks, including potential human rights abuses, diminished state control, and heightened competition over strategic resources.

In early February, the March 23 Movement (M23) launched attacks on Kisangani Airport in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), identifying it as a key staging ground for government operations against rebel-held areas. Kisangani holds strategic importance as a major command hub for the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC), and its airport has reportedly functioned as a drone command center supporting long-range strikes against M23 positions (Le Devoir, February 17, 2026). 

Foreign private “partners” are reported to have played a role in repelling the assault. This episode displays an evolving dynamic in the conflict, in which critical military infrastructure and privatized security support are increasingly intertwined. As the FARDC struggles to contain rebel advances around Goma and other strategic areas, the government has increasingly turned to foreign contractors and mercenary networks to reinforce its operational capacity (Modern Diplomacy, May 03, 2025). 

Background

The presence of foreign mercenaries and private military contractors (PMCs) in African conflicts is not a new phenomenon. During the decolonization period of the 1960s, former colonial powers frequently relied on mercenary groups to preserve influence across the continent. Notable examples include the Algerian War of independence against France (1954-62), the 1961 assassination of Congolese independence leader Patrice Lumumba, and the protracted civil wars in Nigeria (1967-70) and Angola (1975-2002), where hundreds of foreign mercenaries were deployed in support of competing factions (Singh and Singh, January 1, 2021). [1]

These early interventions established a model that continues to shape security dynamics across the continent. African governments and corporate actors increasingly rely on private military companies to perform a wide range of functions, from direct combat support to protecting strategic natural resources. PMCs offer a high degree of operational flexibility, enabling them to circumvent bureaucratic constraints and adapt to volatile and high-risk environments. 

Mercenary groups have continued to play an outsized role across the continent, embedding themselves in a range of contemporary conflicts. Libya alone has hosted an estimated 20,000 foreign fighters and mercenaries amid its prolonged instability, while in 2022, approximately 2,000 hired personnel supported the armed forces of the Central African Republic (Genocide Watch, December 16, 2024). Similar patterns are evident elsewhere, with mercenary activity documented in Mali, Mozambique, Sudan, and Burkina Faso. By April 2023, Mali alone hosted approximately 1,645 foreign contractors, underscoring the growing entrenchment of privatized military actors across multiple African conflict zones (ACLED, August 2, 2023). 

Russia’s Wagner Group—rebranded as the Africa Corps—has become the most prominent of these actors operating in Africa. The group has assumed a significant role across multiple theaters, including providing regime security for military juntas in Sahelian states such as Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, as well as in the Central African Republic. These deployments are frequently tied to preferential access to natural resources, producing a complex set of mutually reinforcing arrangements with host governments centered around resource extraction and regime preservation (see EDM, July 16, 2025).

Other external actors have similarly sought to expand their influence on the continent using private contractors. Türkiye has positioned itself as a key security partner to several African states, including countries in the Sahel, Libya, and Somalia, where it also maintains a military base. Alongside formal military cooperation, Ankara has also leveraged private military networks to advance its strategic objectives. The Turkish PMC Sadat has reportedly deployed Turkish-trained and financed Syrian fighters to the Sahel, primarily tasked with securing Turkish economic interests, including mining assets (Africa Defense Forum, July 30, 2024). 

The DRC reflects this broader trend. Despite its vast mineral wealth, the country has been plagued by recurrent instability since independence, consistently attracting a range of mercenary actors whose interests are closely tied to the country’s resources.

Current Foreign Involvement

As fighting between the M23 and the Congolese armed forces intensifies, Kinshasa has turned to an ever-expanding roster of private military actors to bolster its campaign. In Goma—the capital of North Kivu—foreign mercenaries, many of whom are drawn from Eastern Europe, are already active. The Africa Corps may also be seeking to establish a presence in eastern DRC. In March 2024, unconfirmed media reports claimed that Russia and the DRC had signed a military deal for mercenaries to counter the rising M23 insurgency in the eastern Congo (RANE Statfor, March 8, 2024; Modern War Institute, February 26, 2025). Africa Corps maintains that its personnel are deployed in an advisory capacity, but its footprint suggests broader expansion across the continent, with estimates placing the total force at roughly 5,000 personnel (Global Source Partners, May 28, 2024).

Romanian personnel were additionally contracted to support the Congolese forces in operations against the M23 (Africa Defense Forum, February 25, 2025). The Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs described these individuals as private employees of the DRC government on a training mission, a characterization widely interpreted as an effort to distance the Romanian state from direct involvement in the conflict (BBC, January 30, 2025). M23’s successful capture of Goma in January 2025 led to the surrender of several Romanian contractors, some of whom disclosed prior training with the French Foreign Legion. Beyond these elements, additional private actors have established a presence in the DRC. Agemira RDC—founded by a French-Congolese national—has recruited personnel from across Eastern Europe, including Bulgaria, Belarus, and Georgia, as well as Algerian, French, and Congolese nationals. The group’s activities have reportedly included rebuilding military infrastructure, restoring airfields damaged by M23 operations, securing military assets and strategic sites, and providing intelligence and logistical support to FARDC units (The Africa Report, August 03, 2023).

Conclusion

According to UN reporting, additional foreign paramilitary personnel—particularly from Latin America, El Salvador, and Algeria—are actively supporting Congolese forces against M23. Kinshasa has not disclosed the identities of the companies employing these personnel or the terms of their contracts, underscoring the opacity surrounding PMC involvement in the conflict. UN experts indicate that some former contractors, previously deployed in Goma under a PMC contract terminated in July 2025, were later recruited directly by the government to operate CH-4 unmanned aerial systems. Other foreign actors are reportedly responsible for managing Indian-made D4 counter-drone defense systems acquired by the Congolese armed forces in 2025, reflecting the expanding technical and operational roles played by external actors (Le Devoir, February 17, 2026). 

Agemira RDC has reportedly partnered with Congo Protection to support Congolese security forces. This support manifests primarily through training and advisory roles, while occasionally engaging in combat operations against the M23. Congo Protection—led by a Romanian former French Foreign Legion officer—has recruited a contingent of former Romanian soldiers and police personnel for deployment to eastern DRC, with numbers reportedly reaching up to 1,000 at their peak. In addition to battlefield involvement, these contractors have advised Congolese authorities on military procurement and logistics (IJ4EU, August 29, 2024). Their activities, however, underscore broader concerns regarding the conduct of private military companies in fragile environments, where weak governance and persistent instability create opportunities for profit-driven engagement. Under the guise of supporting state security forces, such actors are widely viewed as leveraging conflict dynamics and relationships with political elites to advance their own financial interests.

The DRC’s growing reliance on private military actors reflects a broader shift toward outsourcing core security functions. Foreign PMCs reshape the conflict with the M23 rebels into one defined by privatized force and competition over strategic resources. Driven by setbacks from the Congolese armed forces, this approach offers short-term gains but carries significant risks, including human rights abuses and weakened state control. As instability persists and demand for critical minerals grows, the privatization of security is likely to deepen.

Notes: 

[1] Singh, Ashutosh & Singh, Anurag. (2021). Mercenaries in Africa legality and geopolitics. African J. of Economic and Sustainable Development. 1. 1. 10.1504/AJESD.2021.10039869.