Al-Bara al-Shishani: Chechen Leader of Liwa al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar in Syria
Al-Bara al-Shishani: Chechen Leader of Liwa al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar in Syria
There are numerous jihadist groups in Syria, some of which host or are comprised of foreign fighters from Russia and Central Asia among their ranks. Many fighters from Russia and Central Asia chose the Syrian Civil War as their theater of operations around 2012, and began to be seen in larger numbers around 2015. The turning point was in 2014, when Russia decided to intervene on the side of Bashar al-Assad’s regime.
One of the groups to emerge in Syria during those years is known today as Liwa al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar (LMA), or “Brigade of Emigrants and Supporters.” LMA is integrated militarily into Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s (HTS) Liwa Said ibn Zayd (Said ibn Zayd Brigade). [1] The current emir of LMA is Abdullah al-Daghestani, who is often depicted in photos guarding checkpoints in ribat (fortresses), while the military emir is al-Bara al-Shishani. In most cases, very little is known about these leaders, who are always shown in photos with their faces blurred.
However, through monitoring their online channels and conducting direct interviews of those who know al-Shishani, it has been possible to draw a profile of his key attributes as a jihadist leader of Russian-origin in Syria.
Who is al-Bara al-Shishani?
Al-Bara al-Shishani [2] is a Chechen jihadist commander and veteran of the Second Chechen War. He joined the armed struggle against Russia in 2007 “to defend my land, as my religion Islam obliged me to do…” Within the Russian–Chechen conflict, al-Shishani quickly rose through the ranks due to his charisma and military abilities.
Al-Shishani recounts in his media channels how he gained respect and recognition by leading numerous ambushes on the Russian army. In addition, al-Shishani is an avid student of military tactics and strategy, which has lead him to frequently operate as a trainer; he often quotes Napoleon Bonaparte, Alexander the Great, and Sun Tzu in his channels. [3] In 2012, al-Shishani left Chechnya for an “undercover mission,” which ended in 2013 when he joined other Chechen fighters to fight in Syria against Bashar al-Assad’s government on the Kassab front in the Latakia Governorate.
Meanwhile, Chechens, as well as Dagestani and Georgian Muslims—who had fought in the Chechen and Georgian wars against Russia—founded the “Muhajireen Battalion” under the command of Abu Omar al-Shishani in 2012 (Enab Baladi, July 15, 2016). In March 2013, the Muhajireen Battalion merged with two Syrian jihadist groups, Jaish Muhammad and Kata’ib Khattab, to form Jaish Muhajireen wal-Ansar (JMA). It was at this time that al-Bara al-Shishani joined JMA. In an online statement released at the end of November 2013, Abu Omar al-Shishani finally pledged allegiance to Abubakr al-Baghdadi and decided to join Islamic State (IS) (Zaman al-Wasl, February 16, 2014).
Al-Shishani’s Evolution After the JMA Split
JMA suffered a split, with hundreds of members siding with Abu Omar al-Shishani and joining IS, while the original group began cooperating with al-Qaeda-affiliated Jabhat al-Nusra. Those on the latter half of the break actively participated in offensives in Idlib and Aleppo against the Syrian army and its allies in 2013 and 2014 (Al-Araby, May 24, 2014). In September 2015, JMA officially allied itself with Jabhat al-Nusra (Al-Akhbar, September 24, 2015). Al-Bara al-Shishani stood out in Syria just as he had in his numerous battles in Chechnya, becoming known in particular for his ability to lead and conduct special operations behind enemy lines. Al-Shishani also demonstrated proficiency with long distance sniping operations; in some of his online posts, al-Shishani is shown in photos with modified sniper rifles, shooting at enemies from a distance of two kilometers.
This military prowess allowed al-Shishani to climb the ranks in JMA, becoming the deputy of its military leader, Mansur al-Daghestani. In 2015, al-Shishani then became famous after a video was released that showed him storming and conquering Bsanqul Hill in the Idlib Governorate with a handful of men, and later liberating the nearby town from regime forces. On January 28, 2017, JMA became a member group of HTS and the “al-Fateh al-Mubin Operations Room” under the name Liwa Said ibn Zayd. JMA also changed its name to LMA, despite maintaining independent Russian-language propaganda on the advice of al-Bara al-Shishani and the current emir, Abdullah al-Daghestani. This was due to the fact that most of the viewers of their propaganda on social networks and messaging platforms are Russian-speaking fighters and supporters. [4]
With HTS, LMA fought in all campaigns in the northwestern Syrian governates of Idlib and Hama between late 2017 and the middle of 2019. In early 2019, a video hailed al-Shishani for capturing al-Hamamiyat Hill in Idlib Governorate, despite being under bombardment from the Russian air strikes. In 2019, Mansur al-Daghestani was killed in battle. LMA fighters quickly elected al-Bara al-Shishani as the new military emir by a general vote. Al-Bara al-Shishani then decided that once he became emir, he would establish a unit called Chechen Tactical within the LMA, through which he would use his charisma and military expertise to train new members and support (via training) other groups aligned with the HTS’s operations room.
Al-Shishani has since appeared in some videos with Hawk Ayuub al-Uzbeki, who is the leader of Muhojir Tactical (The Khorasan Diary, May 2). Al-Uzbeki is also a member of the Uzbek jihadist group, Tavhid vo Jihad Uzbek, which is operating in Syria (Akhbar al-Aan, February 26). As the second most important figure in the group, [5] al-Uzbeki performed several tasks, such as overseeing the preparation of LMA’s military units, supervising training, and controlling equipment, weapons, and ammunition stocks.
Conclusion
Both in his channels and in interviews, al-Shishani has explained that LMA’s current goals are: overthrowing the regime of Bashar al-Assad, defeating its allies, such as Russia and Iran, and establishing a government that rules by sharia law. In the last year, al-Shishani has often been asked about the conflict between Russia and Ukraine and the possibility of reopening a jihadist front in the Caucasus. He has repeatedly replied that, at present, “there is no possibility of bringing jihad to the Caucasus,” but were Russia to collapse, “then we must be ready.” He also criticized Abdul Hakim al-Shishani for submitting to Zakayev [6] in the ranks of the Republic of Ichkeria (the Chechen government in exile), as well as Zakayev’s choice to fight alongside the Ukrainian army (Akhbar al-Aan, March 6). In al-Shishani’s opinion, “Ichkeria is my homeland, which needs to be liberated” but “one should not become a soldier of the armed forces of Ukraine,” asserting that “Zakayev is unreliable, a liar and has carried out actions contrary to Islam.”
More locally, within the ranks of the HTS and in the security of the territories under HTS control, the LMA is growing in quantity and quality. As military emir of the LMA, al-Shishani has repeatedly emphasized both the military competence of his fighters and the numerical increase in the group’s ranks. In Syria, LMA’s military emir has very strong ties with HTS and other groups composed of foreign fighters, in particular Uzbek, Albanian, and Uyghur fighters. These are all well-trained, well-armed, and well-established militants with widespread (and expanding) logistical networks, who have not given up their long-term goal of returning to fight in their homelands.
Although al-Shishani criticized Zakayev and Abdul Hakim al-Shishani, he did not hide his future desire to return to Chechnya and resume the armed struggle to liberate the North Caucasus. For al-Shishani, Syria is only an intermediate stage, where he lies waiting for the right opportunity; in the meantime, he trains, replenishes his ranks, and creates links and alliances. Al-Shishani’s ultimate goal, therefore, remains overthrowing Russian-rule in the Caucasus.
Notes:
[1] The name of this HTS brigade is dedicated to Sa’īd ibn Zayd, who was one of the Ten Companions of the Prophet Muhammad. He was also a cousin and brother-in-law of the Second Caliph, Umar bin al-Khattab.
[2] The information on the military emir of LMA was obtained by the author from the studying and monitoring of the emir’s channels, from an interview conducted by the author with al-Shishani in January 2023, and from interviews and private chats conducted with him between February and April 2023.
[3] Statements on his private channels on Telegram and Instagram.
[4] As communicated by the military emir of LMA in an interview conducted by the author and available on Daniele Garofalo Monitoring: https://danielegarofalo.substack.com/p/interview-with-al-bara-al-shishani. Members of the group and followers of its media are mostly Caucasian (Chechen, Dagestani, Ingush), Tatar, Tajik, Azerbaijani, Uzbek, Kazakh, and Ukrainian.
[5] The group’s leadership structure consists of a military leadership, a sharia committee, a Shura council, and a media arm. The group operates in the governorates of Latakia, Aleppo, and Idlib and consists of 400-500 fighters.
[6] Akhmed Zakayev was Minister of Culture in 1994 and Minister of Foreign Affairs in both 1997 and 2006 for the Chechen separatist government of Ichkeria. During the First Chechen War, he participated in the violent battle for Grozny and high-level negotiations with Russia in 1997. In 2000, after being wounded in battle in Grozny against the Russians, he moved abroad for treatment; after the end of the Second Chechen War, he became the first spokesman and then president of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria in exile.
