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Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, with Nasir al-Wuhayshi (center right)

AQAP’s Man in the South: Nasir al-Wuhayshi

Terrorism Publication Militant Leadership Monitor Middle East Volume 1 Issue 4

04.29.2010 Rafid Fadhil Ali

AQAP’s Man in the South: Nasir al-Wuhayshi

Nasir al-Wuhayshi (a.k.a Abu Basir) appeared in a video in January 2009 to announce the merger between al-Qaeda branches in Saudi Arabia and Yemen under his command. The new organization was given the name Qaedat al-Jihad in the Arabian Peninsula (al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, AQAP). Al-Wuhayshi was surrounded by three leaders of AQAP, his fellow Yemeni Qasim al-Rimi, who was reportedly killed in an airstrike in January and the Saudi’s Said al-Shihri and Muhammad al-Ofi (Yemen Observer, January 16, 2010). Each of the four men made a statement about the evolution of their group (al-Jazeera, January 29, 2009). [1] The leadership of AQAP made it clear that, in addition to targeting the near enemy in Sana’a and Riyadh, it would target Western interests and ultimately the West itself. But before the end of the year, the organization went even further, conducting the most serious terrorist operation to affect the American homeland since 9/11.

Nasir Abdul Kareem al-Wuhayshi was born 34 years ago in the town of Mukayris, which was part of the South Yemeni governorate of Abyan. The area is now part of the northern governorate of al-Bayda since Yemen was united in 1990. In a rare interview with the Yemeni journalist Abdul Elah al-Shayea, al-Wuhayshi talked about his personal history after he decamped from his native Yemen and traveled to Afghanistan in the mid-1990s:  

I stayed in the Taliban’s Afghanistan for about five years. With Allah’s grace we lived under that state… After we withdrew from Torah Bora in 2002, I left Afghanistan and went to Iran. I stayed in the areas of the Sunni community inside Iran until the rafidah arrested me. The Iranians kept me in custody for about one month and a half and then turned me over to the Yemeni government. [2] 

During those five years al-Wuhayshi was Osama bin Laden’s secretary. But this fact remained hidden until al-Wuhayshi assumed his position as the leader of al-Qaeda in Yemen. He became the head of the group (amir) while in prison in 2006. 

While the group was struggling after a series of setbacks between 2003 and 2006, al-Wuhayshi and 22 other inmates escaped from their prison in Sana’a in February 2006 (Asia Times, January 8, 2010). Although many of the runners surrendered, were captured or killed, al-Wuhayshi and his most trusted lieutenant Qasim al-Rimi (a.k.a Abu Huraira al-Sana’ani) stayed on the run and managed to rebuild the organization. The group developed significantly under al-Wuhayshi, launching a number of attacks, mainly on tourists and Yemeni forces but also on the U.S. Embassy in Sana’a, which it attacked twice in 2008 (see Terrorism Focus, March 18, 2008; Alwasatnews.com, September 18, 2008). 

As a leader of al-Qaeda’s branch in Yemen, al-Wuhayshi has been very ambitious. In 2008, the group changed its name to al-Qaeda in the South Arabian Peninsula. The escalating economic and military difficulties the Yemeni government of President Ali Abdullah Saleh was facing created the circumstances that al-Wuhayshi needed to consolidate the presence of his group; Yemen was under pressure from the Houthi rebellion in the north and the secessionist movement in the south. 

Under al-Wuhayshi, AQAP has been very adept at producing its own brand of literature and propaganda. The group started its bi-monthly magazine Sada al-Malahim (The Echo of the Battles) in late 2007. In addition to al-Wuhayshi, many leaders, scholars and activists of AQAP contribute to the online publication, which can be found on various Islamist websites. The content propagates AQAP’s views on contemporary and theological issues facing those in the convoluted jihadist landscape.  

Al-Qaeda’s New Weapon 

The failed assassination attempt on the Saudi Deputy Interior Minister Muhammad bin Nayef was executed using a bizarre a new weapon. The assassin, Muhammad al-Assiri (a.k.a Abu al-Khair) was able to pass through the security search with explosives planted inside his body. When he met with bin Nayef, in the Prince’s own house, he looked clean and clear to the guards (see Militant Leadership Monitor, February 2010).  

Al-Wuhayshi then urged his followers to use the new formula and tactic. In the eleventh issue of Sada al-Malahim, published in September-October 2009, al- Wuhayshi’s wrote an article entitled “War is deception.” It centered on lauding the assassination attempt on Bin Nayef. But al-Wuhayshi also outlined the new tactic, to be used again about two months later in a failed attack by Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, a young Nigerian student trained in Yemen, who, on Christmas Day, tried to blow up an airplane traveling between Amsterdam and Detroit just minutes before it landed. Al-Wuhayshi wrote:

You do not need to make a big effort or a huge amount of money to manufacture 10 Grams or so of these explosives. And do not waste much time looking for the raw material, they are in your mother’s kitchen. Manufacture it as a bomb to throw, a time bomb, an electric device, a picture, a paper folder or an envelope. 

More significantly, al-Wuhayshi went on to list the favorite targets for such attacks including airplanes and airports: 

Blow it up on any target of evil; intelligence headquarters, a prince, a minister, a crusader (Christian especially Western) wherever you find those. Also explode them in the airports or the airlines of the western crusade countries which participated in the war against Islam. Or target residential compounds or underground trains of those countries. You will find the way if you think and depend on Allah. And do not worry that those explosives could be discovered after you hide them properly. It is impossible to discover them. 

AQAP refuses to label the two attacks as thwarted efforts. They argue that they both succeeded on the grounds that they shocked aviation security and returned America to the atmosphere of anxiety and fear spawned by 9/11, despite the untold sums of taxpayer funds and manpower efforts that have been spent since that era to consolidate the security situation.  

The Palestinian Question 

Long before the emergence of al-Qaeda, the Palestinian question has been a central challenge within circles of Salafi-Jihadi thought in the Muslim world. They frequently had to answer fellow Muslims asking different versions of the same question: why do you not fight the Israelis in Palestine? 

Al-Wuhayshi has placed the ongoing Palestinian crisis at the centerpiece of his propaganda campaign. A video announcing the merger of the Saudi and Yemeni branches of al-Qaeda to form AQAP contained the wording, “From here we will begin and in al-Aqsa we shall meet,” referring to al-Aqsa mosque in heavily disputed Jerusalem. In the video, he stressed that Palestine has always been the cause that al-Qaeda has fought for, even when it was waging jihad on differing fronts. He echoed Abu Musa’ab al-Zarqawi’s words that while fighting in Iraq, he never took his eye off of Jerusalem (al-Quds in Arabic) and stressed that Osama bin Laden swore that America will remain unsafe until the people of Palestine are safe. But al-Wuhayshi’s vision for his group’s involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is typical of the indirect approach of the wider al-Qaeda grand strategy: 

We went to Afghanistan in order to prepare for the liberation of Palestine but, before we enter Palestine, we have to break the blockade that the Arab rulers, the betrayers, are imposing on it…. Also, the actual supporters of the Israeli occupation are America and Europe. So we have to destroy the Crusaders’ interests in the Arabian Peninsula, including Yemen, and prepare the generation that the Prophet Muhammad said would come out of Yemen to liberate al-Aqsa mosque. 

South Yemen

AQAP is more active and operative in the eastern and southern governorates, which historically made up the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (otherwise known simply as South Yemen or PDRY) until the unity of Yemen in 1990. The frustration and resentment of the population in those governorates, against what they consider a northern domination by President Saleh’s regime, provided AQAP with the population-centric raison d’être that they needed to operate against Saleh. Al-Wuhayshi, who is from the south himself, supported the struggle of the South Yemenis but condemned both Saleh and the former Marxist rulers of South Yemen, the leaders of the Yemeni Socialist Party who currently lead the secessionist movement (see Terrorism Monitor, November 19, 2009). Future developments in Yemen’s southern governorates will play a major role in the future of al-Wuhayshi’s organization. While President Saleh still has a considerable amount of support from the tribes in the north, minus those supporting the Houthi rebellion in the Sa’adah governorate, his southern support has been on the wane for some time as evidenced by the increase in north-south agitation by southern political actors.

Conclusion

After the attempt made by Abdulmuttalleb and the shooting spree of Nidal Malik Hasan, particularly the AQAP link with both, al-Wuhayshi and his group have found themselves at the center of the international conflict between America and the Salafist-Jihadists. [3] The impact of the three airstrikes in 2009 on Abyan, Arhab and Shabwa has yet to be completely understood. [4] AQAP denied that al-Wuhayshi was killed in one of them but he did not release a statement and he did not compose his usual editorial in Sada al-Malahim’s January-February 2010 issue. Al-Wuhayshi succeeded in rebuilding and reordering al-Qaeda in Yemen, benefiting from the difficulties that President Saleh’s regime faces on the economic and security fronts. He also can be credited for the successes of a major regional organization by unifying the Yemeni and Saudi branches of al-Qaeda. But this honeymoon phase is now over and Nasir al-Wuhayshi and his group are facing more direct challenges by virtue of increased American, Saudi and international support for the Yemeni government. The capacity and developments of this conflict will be of critical importance to the regional and international scene for years to come.

Notes

1. Video footage available on YouTube.

2. A derisive term denoting Shiites used by Sunni militants, in this case implying the Iranian authorities; The interview was placed on al-Shayea’s blog on May 14, 2009, Abdulela.maktoobblog.com

3. On November 5, 2009, the American Major Nidal Malik Hasan opened fire on the Fort Hood camp in Texas, killing 13 of his colleagues. Hasan, a Muslim of Palestinian descent, is believed to have had contacts with the Yemeni-based radical cleric Anwar al-Awlaki.

4. On December 17, 2009, an airstrike by the United States followed by a raid by the Yemeni ground forces was launched on a suspected al-Qaeda target in Abyan. Another airstrike hit a target in the city of Arhab in the Sana’a governorate. On December 23, 2009, yet another strike occurred on targets in Shabwa. Dozens were killed in those offensives including women and children according to both Arab and international media. (Al-Jazeera, December 18, 2009, AFP, December 23, 2009). AQAP claimed that the Christmas day attempt by Umar Farouk Abdulmuttalab was launched in response to these air strikes.

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