Armenia and Azerbaijan Weigh in as Ruling Georgian Party Claims Controversial Victory

Executive Summary:

• The ruling Georgian Dream secured re-election for another four-year term, and ethnic Azerbaijani and Armenian populations in Georgia, who tend to support the ruling party, were blamed by opposition groups for contributing to Georgian Dream’s victory.
• Allegations are circulating about the manipulation of minority votes in the elections, with accusations that Baku encouraged ethnic Azerbaijanis in Georgia to support the ruling party. This has sparked tension and ethnic stereotyping within the political discourse.
• Critics argue that Georgian Dream’s victory indicates a shift toward Russia, which may have implications for Armenia’s foreign policy and the broader South Caucasus region, as Armenia depends on Georgia for trade and transit.

On October 26, Georgians went to the polls to vote for their next government. As expected, the ruling Georgian Dream, which the opposition argues maintains a close relationship with Russia, secured re-election for another four-year term, prompting anti-government groups and others to allege irregularities, demand the annulment of results, and call for new elections (see EDM, November 5). Bolstered by videos and photographs circulated by pro-opposition activists on social media, Georgian President Salome Zourabichvili declared that the election results were falsified, labeling it a Russian “special operation” (see EDM, October 28; Civil.ge, October 30). Georgia’s parliamentary elections have also evoked a highly critical international reaction toward the winning Georgian Dream government, which urges that a thorough investigation into any cases of reported irregularities be conducted transparently (Civil.ge, November 1).

The Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and President Ilham Aliyev, however, were quick to applaud their Georgian counterpart, Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze (Agenda, October 26; Azertag; Armenian Public Radio, October 27). Both Armenia and Azerbaijan rely on Georgia for transit and trade. With Georgia’s ethnic Armenian and Azerbaijani populations traditionally supportive of the incumbent government during elections, the opposition has accused both ethnic minorities of contributing to Georgian Dream’s victory. The results of the Georgian parliamentary elections mark a further shift toward Russia, it is claimed, while media and think tanks in Armenia differ in their interpretation of what it means for Yerevan, though all believe that it will have a similar effect.

Even though much of the international community has not gone as far as Zourabichvili in their criticism of the election results, they did hint at similar concerns. The main international observation mission from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), however, refrained from judging whether any irregularities adversely affected the election’s outcome. On the other hand, the United States has openly expressed its concerns about the results, followed by the European Parliament and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. With heightened rivalry between Russia and the West, such a response was expected (see EDM, October 28; Responsible Statecraft, October 29).

Less expected was how Georgia’s immediate neighbors of Azerbaijan and Armenia reacted and how their ethnic kin living in the country would become an issue. Before election day, the Georgian opposition, along with Armenian and dissident Azerbaijani media and activists, alleged that Baku was encouraging ethnic Azerbaijanis in Georgia to support Georgian Dream. They pointed to reports referencing a statement from Nicat Ismayilov, a political commentator from the Azerbaijani state news agency AZERTAC, that said, “Our compatriots in Georgia supported the regional policy of the Azerbaijani state and the President and supported the policy aimed at strengthening and developing Azerbaijani-Georgian relations” (AZERTAC, October 28; Mikroskop, October 29). Such claims intensified after a video surfaced on social media showing significant electoral violations, including one case of ballot box stuffing in the majority ethnic Azerbaijani Marneuli municipality of Georgia. Since then, two people have been arrested for clear election violations, and the vote was nullified afterward (Rustavi 2, October 31).

However, Georgian opposition politicians and their supporters started to imply that it was the entire ethnic Azerbaijani minority who secured Georgian Dream’s victory. Polling data from the ethnic-Azerbaijani regions favored Georgian Dream with as high as 90 percent of the vote. Results from other minority-populated regions were similar, including among ethnic Armenians. Zourabichvili criticized this as a manipulation of the ethnic minority vote, calling it immoral (Business Media, October 26). Few noted how such polling data was typical for the country and had as much to do with the opposition parties’ lack of engagement with minority communities. Both the opposition and foreign donors have largely forgotten the ethnic-minorities’ existence, focusing mainly on the capital. Despite warnings that even ethnic Georgians living outside the capital care little for geopolitics, instead concerned by their own economic well-being, among them those reliant on exports to Russia (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, October 2; BBC Azerbaijan, October 29).

Even two months before the election, one non-governmental organization (NGO) posted that high support for the incumbent government had always been the case in minority regions, even under the now-imprisoned former president, Mikheil Saakashvili (Social Justice Center, August 26). It also noted that one key interest of minority electorates was peace and stability, especially with regard to Russia (BBC Russian Service, October 27). In 2023, a survey published by the National Democratic Institute found that overall, 73 and 81 percent of respondents approved of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and EU membership, while among minority communities, it was only 32 and 59 percent, respectively (Civil.ge, February 4, 2023).

Exasperating the situation, Zourabichvili’s comment in a post-election interview with the Associated Press backfired. In the interview, she blamed the opposition’s defeat on an “Armenian carousel,” likely a generic but unfortunate term used to describe multiple voting by individuals (Eurasianet; Hraparak; Interpress, October 31). Prior to the vote, a pro-government journalist reverted to ethnic stereotypes when she questioned the loyalties of opposition leader Mamuka Khazaradze, implying that he was ethnic Armenian (Georgian News, October 15).

Outside of Georgia, Pashinyan and Aliyev’s congratulations on Georgian Dream’s victory have not gone unnoticed. Analysts and activists supporting greater Western influence in the region and removing Russia as a regional power consider Pashinyan’s congratulations a mistake (EVN Report, November 1). The Armenian government maintains its position, saying that his congratulations to Kobakhidze were “correctly assessed” (Armtimes, October 30). Simultaneously, Armenian opposition media applauded what is increasingly seen as Tbilisi turning its back on the European Union, arguing that Yerevan should do the same (Hraparak, October 27, October 28, November 2).

Some Armenian commentators maintain that a Georgian Dream victory has the potential to end Armenia’s slow shift away from Moscow (Armenian Mirror Spectator, October 30). US analysts have already said that Pashinyan’s congratulations mean that foreign policy, especially toward the West, is already more cautious following the Georgian vote (Azatutyun, November 4). “We find ourselves in a region—the South Caucasus and neighboring states—where essentially no one is inclined toward deeper relations with the West,” opined Benyamin Poghosyan, a local analyst from the new Diaspora-founded APRI think tank based in Yerevan. Poghosyan added that he “would not rule out the possibility of the Armenian government introducing changes to its foreign policy” (Civilnet, October 28). The Georgian opposition is planning further actions in what they view as continuing Georgia’s turn to the West, but the current direction Georgian Dream is taking the country, including passing the “law on foreign agents,” has halted the process of Georgian EU ascension, and many believe that there is little hope for progress in this arena (Facebook.com/danioanis, October 27; BBC Russian, October 28; UIC, October 29).

Some still warn that if Georgia took a more authoritarian path toward Russia’s orbit, landlocked Armenia would find itself in an even more precarious situation. Armenia relies on Georgia for 70 percent of its trade and hopes to diversify away from its traditional reliance on Moscow for much of its economy (JAMnews, October 29). In such a situation, normalizing relations with Türkiye would be vital to continue this path, something that still looks unlikely until the normalization process with Azerbaijan proves successful (see EDM, May 6). Other concerns arise as well. “What happened in Georgia may also happen in the next elections,” one prominent veteran journalist wrote on social media without further elaborating (Facebook.com/Tatul-Hakobyan, October 28). Already, the Armenian government continues to wrest control of local municipalities away from the opposition, which critics claim is a coercive tactic (Azatutyun, October 28). Georgian Dream’s victory marks a closer relationship and influence from Russia, and it is likely that other countries in the region, such as Armenia, will similarly gravitate toward Russia, especially if US policy toward the conflict in Ukraine changes under a second Trump presidency. That will affect the situation in the South Caucasus, but to what extent it will affect it remains unclear (Topchubashov Center, November 6; YouTube, November 8 [1], [2]).