Discourse Dimensions of the PLA’s Joint Sword 2024–B Exercises

Executive Summary:

• The Joint Sword 2024–B exercises by the People’s Liberation Army were in part a tool of political intimidation to “serve as a stern warning to the separatist acts of ‘Taiwan Independence’ forces,” namely the Lai Ching-te administration. Beijing’s rhetoric is doubling down on blaming Taiwan for its own desire to resort to military action and saber-rattling.
• Lai used his remarks on Taiwan’s National Day to advocate for reciprocal, healthy, and orderly exchanges between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. A spokesperson for the People’s Republic of China’s Taiwan Affairs Office retorted that “there is no goodwill to speak of.”
• The decision not to announce the live-fire exercises in advance, and the use of China Coast Guard (CCG) vessels to assert de facto jurisdiction continues the erosion of the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, with CCG making clear its view that it controls Taiwan’s waters.

On October 10, Taiwan’s President Lai Ching-te (賴清德) gave a speech celebrating the Republic of China’s (ROC) National Day (CNA, October 10). In the speech, which experts in Taiwan described as “pragmatic” and suggested marked “continuity” and “not an escalation” in rhetoric, Lai noted that the ROC and People’s Republic of China (PRC) are “not subordinate to each other (互不隸屬)” (Financial Times; The Washington Post, October 10).

The following Monday morning, October 14, spokesman of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Eastern Theater Command Senior Captain Li Xi (李熹) announced the dispatch of army, navy, air force, and rocket force troops to conduct joint military exercises code-named “Joint Sword-2024B (联合利剑-2024B).” [1] These exercises took place on that day in the Taiwan Strait and areas to the north, south, and east of Taiwan island (Ministry of National Defense [MND], October 14). The exercises were the third installment of a series of joint exercises around Taiwan that began in April 2023 and whose second iteration followed the inauguration of Taiwan’s President Lai Ching-te in May this year (China Brief, May 5, 2023; China Brief, July 26).

Senior Captain Li Xi stated that there were two aims for the joint exercises. One was military, to “test the joint operations capabilities of the theater command’s troops (检验战区部队联合作战实战能力).” This entailed focusing on “sea-air combat-readiness patrols, blockades on key ports and areas, assaults on maritime and ground targets, and achieving comprehensive superiority (海空战备警巡、要港要域封控、对海对陆打击、夺取综合制权).” The second aim was political. He noted that the exercises “serve as a stern warning to the separatist acts of ‘Taiwan Independence’ forces (对‘台独’分裂势力谋‘独’行径的强力震慑).” The use of military exercises as part of a broader campaign of political intimidation has increased over the three iterations of the “Joint Sword” exercises, with this latest set of exercises being the most developed to date in this regard. Across official statements, state media coverage, and commentaries in authoritative newspapers, the PRC’s coordinated messaging articulated the leadership’s views and ambitions in the aggregate, as well as occasionally detailing the rationale behind certain actions.

‘There Is No Goodwill to Speak Of’

President Lai’s speech could not have been received more differently by those inside and outside the PRC. Western governments including the United States, United Kingdom, European Union, and Japan expressed concerns at the exercises, with the US Department of Defense (DOD) describing Beijing’s response as “disproportionate” (DOD, October 14; Focus Taiwan, October 15).

In contrast, PRC Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Mao Ning (毛宁) characterized Lai’s remarks as an indication that he is “peddling various versions of the ‘Taiwan independence’ narrative” and “is hellbent on advancing ‘Taiwan independence’ and … heightening tensions in the Taiwan Strait for his selfish political interest” (MFA, October 10). Similarly, Senior Colonel Fu Zhengnan (胡正南), a researcher at the PLA’s Academy of Military Sciences, complained that Lai’s speech was “extremely deceptive and dangerous,” and constituted a “provocation” that demanded a response (China Daily, October 14). An authoritative commentary from the military’s official newspaper, the PLA Daily, used more colorful language, arguing that Lai’s speech “was full of the flavors of ‘independence’ and ‘poison’ (充斥‘独味’与‘毒味’)” (PLA Daily, October 14).

The clearest articulation of the Party’s official view on the problems that Lai’s administration represents was laid out in a People’s Daily “Zhong Sheng (钟声)” commentary, which is used to comment on major international affairs. It argued that “the real intention” behind Lai’s speech was “to advocate the ‘new two-state theory’ of ‘mutual non-subordination,’ fabricate ‘Taiwan independence’ separatist fallacies, promote separatist propositions, and incite hostility and confrontation across the Strait (鼓吹‘互不隶属’的‘新两国论’，编造‘台独’分裂谬论，宣扬分裂主张，煽动两岸敌意对抗，这就是‘台独工作者’赖清德近日发表的所谓‘双十’讲话有关两岸关系内容的真正用意)” (People’s Daily, October 14).

For the PRC, the content of Lai’s speech is of secondary concern. It is the fact of his position as Taiwan’s president, and the platform that he represents, that is anathema to Xi Jinping and the Party’s leadership. This was most clearly on show in an exchange between a CCTV journalist and Director of the Information Bureau of the Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) of the State Council Chen Binhua (陈斌华). The journalist noted that Lai’s speech “reiterated an expectation for the resumption of reciprocal, healthy, and orderly exchanges between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait and called on the mainland to take seriously and understand its goodwill (重申对两岸恢复对等、健康有序交流的期待，呼吁大陆认真理解其善意).” In response, Chen declared, “there is no goodwill to speak of (毫无善意可言)” (TAO, October 16).

Beijing Blames Taiwan for Aggression

One prominent narrative that the PRC propaganda system is pushing regarding Taiwan is that, should Beijing end up using military force against the island, Lai Ching-te and those like him will be to blame. In the words of Chen Binhua, the Lai administration is “trying to tie Taiwan to the war chariot of ‘Taiwan independence’ and drag Taiwanese people into becoming ‘Taiwan independence cannon fodder’ (企图将台湾绑上‘台独’战车，裹挟台湾民众当‘台独炮灰’),” or alternatively “push [the people of Taiwan] into the abyss of disaster (推向灾难的深渊)” as “the sacrificial victims of their secessionist designs (成为其分裂图谋的牺牲品)” (Xinhua, October 14). Chen takes the opportunity of using his platform to address Lai directly, warning him that in pursuing independence his administration “seeks its own doom and will bring about its own destruction (自寻绝路，自取灭亡).”

Certain phrases are repeated by different parts of the system to reinforce core tenets of the PRC’s messaging on Taiwan. In an October 14 interview with the Global Times, MND spokesman Senior Colonel Wu Qian (吴谦) argued that the PRC is “willing to strive for the prospect of peaceful reunification with the utmost sincerity and effort, but will never promise to renounce the use of force (我们愿以最大诚意、尽最大努力争取和平统一的前景，但决不承诺放弃使用武力)” (Global Times, October 14). Chen Binhua, the TAO spokesman, used the same phrase in his press conference several days later (TAO, October 16). Another argument that PRC officials frequently repeat is that “difference in systems is not an obstacle to unification, let alone an excuse for splitting [the country] (制度不同，不是统一的障碍，更不是分裂的借口)” (TAO, October 10). Both phrases have been used with increasing frequency in recent years. The latter phrase, for instance, likely first appeared in a 2019 speech by Xi Jinping (VOA, January 3, 2019; Mainland Affairs Council, May 29, 2019; CCTV News, May 28). What is left unsaid, however, is how the PRC’s version of “democracy” could ever coexist with that of Taiwan, where a sizable majority of people do not favor any moves toward unification (Election Study Center, National Chengchi University, July 8).

Some of the messaging echoed that of previous years, but other aspects were tied closely to the narrow aims of the Joint Sword 2024–B exercises themselves. As China Brief has noted previously, there has been an increase in the integration of the China Coast Guard (CCG) with the PLA for activities around Taiwan in recent months, in an attempt to expand the PRC’s de facto jurisdiction in the Taiwan Strait. Missions by CCG and provincial-level coast guard vessels have been conducted to demonstrate that the management of the Strait falls under PRC domestic administrative affairs and to normalize the presence of PRC law enforcement in the Strait (China Brief, September 20). In his press conference following the exercises, Chen Binhua effectively admitted that this was the case, arguing that “the Chinese Maritime Police carries out law enforcement patrols in Chinese waters in order to maintain the operational order of the relevant waters and safeguard the safety of the lives and property of Chinese fishermen, including Taiwanese fishermen, as well as their lawful and legitimate rights and interests (海峡两岸同属一个中国，台湾是中国的一部分。中国海警在中国海域开展执法巡查，是为了维护相关海域作业秩序，维护包括台湾渔民在内的中国渔民生命财产安全和合法正当权益)” (TAO, October 16). This was backed up by the CCG themselves, whose spokesperson Liu Dejun (刘德军) stated that the CCG’s actions constituted “a concrete action to lawfully enforce control over Taiwan island in accordance with the one-China principle (基于一个中国原则，是对台湾岛依法实施管控的具体实践)” (China.com, October 14).

Conclusion

The Joint Sword 2024–B military exercises, ostensibly triggered by political provocation on the part of Lai Ching-te, were as much a political event as a military one. Following the events, National Security Council Secretary-General Joseph Wu noted that the exercises were “inconsistent” with international protocols, as live-fire exercises on the open seas should be announced in advance (Taipei Times, October 15). As this indicates, along with the statements and actions of the CCG noted above, the PRC now has the capability to follow through with parts of its rhetoric and start treating Taiwan and the waters that surround it as its own domain. Unilateral actions of this kind exceed whatever remained of the previous status quo. As measured or conciliatory as President Lai might try to be, Beijing sees his administration as nothing more than “ants trying to shake a big tree in the face of the Chinese people’s will to maintain national unity and the PLA’s powerful strength (在解放军强大的力量面前，不过是蚍蜉撼树)” (PLA Daily, October 14).

Notes

[1] Ed.: An earlier version of this article inaccurately described the exercises as “drills.” The term “演练,” translated as “drill,” usually refers to a single-unit training drill that rarely goes above the brigade or division level and can last for a few days or weeks and involves multiple training subjects and training topics. The term “演习” is instead translated as “exercise” and generally involves more than one unit or service/branch and reaches up to the Theater Command level. The author thanks the sharp-eyed reader who clarified the distinction.