From MUJWA to Macina: Amadou Kouffa’s Fulani-Led Jihad in Mali

From MUJWA to Macina: Amadou Kouffa’s Fulani-Led Jihad in Mali

Jacob Zenn

One of the newest groups to emerge in the Sahelian jihadist landscape since 2015 is the Macina Liberation Front (FLM). Its leader, Amadou Kouffa, however, is unlike other leaders in the region. He does not crave publicity or appear in “jihadist videos” to discuss the FLM’s mission. Rather, he remains a behind-the-scenes persona. His lack of videos and statements, nevertheless, should not disguise his or the FLM’s potential jihadist influence in Mali, especially among Fulanis.

The FLM has been involved in the two most recent high-profile attacks in the Sahel: the attack on the Radisson Blu in Bamako in November 2015; and the attack on Splendid Hotel and Cappuccino Café in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, in January 2016. According to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) claims, two of the attackers in Bamako were brothers who had the nisba of al-Fulani, as well as one of the Ouagadaogou attackers (Sidwaya [Ouagadougou], January 16, 2016; Jeune Afrique, January 19, 2016). The Fulani ethnic group appears to have become a key component of AQIM recruitment and have been involved in major AQIM attacks, which is in part attributable to Kouffa’s and the FLM’s alliance with AQIM.

In summation, Kouffa can help spread AQIM’s area of operations further south in the Sahel by appealing to West Africa’s most transnational ethnic group: the Fulanis.

Kouffa as Ag Ghaly’s Protégé

As a Fulani, Kouffa’s primary role in the Sahelian jihadist landscape is to lead Fulani radicals under the banner of the FLM; he has not done this alone. He is a protégé of the ethnic Tuareg Ansar Dine leader, Iyad Ag Ghaly, and may have been cultivated by Ag Ghaly specifically for the purpose of leading Fulani jihadists. Kouffa’s transition from imam to jihadist followed a similar path as Ag Ghaly, involving foreign travel, adoption of salafism, shunning of Mali’s traditional Sufism, and – as political instability enveloped in Mali in 2012 – jihadism.

Kouffa, who estimated to be between 40 and 50 years old, hails from the small town of Niafunke in Central Mali, near Mopti (malinet.com, January 23, 2015). In the 1990s, conservative Islamist organizations came from the Gulf region to Mali to build mosques and offer religious-based funding and services (maliactu.net, August 21, 2015). Kouffa received an opportunity to travel to the Gulf and reportedly either Afghanistan or Pakistan. Upon his return to Mali, he was a “born-again” salafi preacher and amassed a following among Fulani kin. He was popular not only through his sermons in the mosque, but also via his charisma in radio broadcasts on Islam delivered in Fulani language (Telegraph [UK], September 23, 2015).

Kouffa’s greatest turning point came about when the civil war in Mali broke out 2012-2013. With the fall of Muammar Qaddafi’s regime in Libya, the Tuareg rebel group – National Movement for Liberation of Azawad – seized control of northern Mali. It was expelled, however, by AQIM and the more “local” jihadist groups that occupied major towns in northern Mali. Because AQIM was a traditionally Arab- and North Africa-focused militant group, it created and then allowed a separation with Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA) (WINEP [Washington DC], February 5, 2013).

MUJWA was largely comprised of Mauritanians, Malians, and other sub-Saharan West Africans. To cater to the ethnic and linguistic demographics of Mali and to attempt to govern those populations, it developed a narrative of historical grievance based upon the fall of the Fulani Jihadist states in West Africa at the onset of colonialism leading to the powerless of the Muslims in the region today. Later, as founder of the FLM, Kouffa promoted a similar narrative founded upon dissafection, but now arguing that the exclusion of Fulanis from political power and prestige in Malia is because of the decline of the emirate of “Macina”, which was based in a part of present-day Central Mali.

It appears that Ag Ghaly, a Tuareg himself, was a liaison between AQIM’s central command of Abdelmalek Droukdel and MUJWA, and later the FLM.

Kouffa’s Gambit in Konna

A number of MUJWA leaders were longtime AQIM members, including Hamadou Kheiry and Oumar Ould Hamaha. Kouffa, on the other hand, was known to Ag Ghaly but was not familiar to AQIM. Therefore, how did Kouffa become one of the MUJWA commanders in early 2013?

A likely reason stems from the arrival of MUJWA militants in the town of Konna in Central Mali; they entered an area where Kouffa was among the most influential salafists. A second reason is Ag Ghaly’s trust for Kouffa in the position of a local MUJWA leader. However, Kouffa appears to have blundered militarily as a MUJWA commander.

AQIM leader Droukdel urged MUJWA and other militants in Mali to gradually impose sharia law on the population as he considered Malians “ignorant” of Islam (AP, February 15, 2013). Gradually, according to Droukdel, the militants would avoid alienating the population like AQAP did when it controlled parts of Yemen in 2011. However, MUJWA leaders like Kouffa banned soccer and music, cut off the hands of alleged criminals, and forced restrictions on all aspects of women’s lives, thus quickly transforming the initial welcoming of MUJWA rule in northern Mali to disdain.

Kouffa, who declared himself as the “Sultan of Konna,” issued a statement reflective of MUJWA rule in Mali. When in Konna he said:

“There are no more prefects, sub-prefects, mayors, taxes and duties, and no more national identity cards… women will stay at home, only come out when veiled, and there are no more laws other than the sharia, and it is the imam of Konna who will be responsible for its implementation” (maliactu.net, July 16, 2015).

Kouffa’s decision to send troops southwards from Konna towards Bamako, Mali’s capital in the south of the country, in January 2013 ultimately led to MUJWA’s downfall. This offensive was unlikely to be successful and ended up serving as a trigger for French forces to finally intervene in the conflict in northern Mali. Within weeks, French forces pushed back the offensive in Konna and sent Kouffa and MUJWA, AQIM, and Ansar Dine in retreat. The jihadists lost all of the territories they controlled and their so-called “Islamic State of Azawad” came to an end.

It is unclear whether Kouffa actually led the offensive in Konna against the wiser and more patient instincts of Droukdel. Despite the loss, Kouffa earned a reputation for courage, charisma, and commitment to jihad in the face of more powerful enemy French forces (maliactu.net, September 21, 2015). Whether resulting from his beliefs or the reports of some Boko Haram or Ansaru members in his ranks in Konna, Kouffa earned a nickname among some Malian officials as the new “Abubakar Shekau,” referring to the Boko Haram (and now “Islamic State in West Africa”) leader, who is known for his erratic behavior and unwavering takfirism (Jeune Afrique [Paris], August 23).

Break with MUJWA and Staying with Al-Qaeda

Between the loss of the “Islamic State of Azawad” in 2013, until 2015, the FLM – like AQIM (especially its Sahara Branch) and Ansar Dine – were in retreat. But in 2015, AQIM and AQIM-allied attacks drastically picked up in Mali. The FLM, known for its motorcycle-riding militants, have been a key factor in attacks on UN and Malian army personnel, in conjunction with targeted attacks on hotels in Bamako and Ougadougou.

Amid the growing rivalry between al-Qaeda and Islamic State, including in northwest Africa, FLM has been a key force enhancer for AQIM. Although some of Kouffa’s former comrades in MUJWA, such as Hamadou Kheiry and Shekau (who may have been a comrade, since he too was reported to be in Mali in 2012), have since announced their allegiance to Islamic State, Kouffa has remained faithfully in the AQIM camp. Meanwhile, MUJWA has been apparently weakened by AQIM’s attacks on defectors to MUJWA; a number of militants followed Kheiry and MUJWA leader, Walid Al-Sahraoui, to Islamic State (Al-Akhbar [Nouakchott], May 13, 2015). Thus, Kouffa is now a key militant for AQIM as his followers help partner organizations compete against the Islamic State.

In addition, FLM has proven surprisingly effective on the battlefield. It carried out nearly 15 attacks in 2015 (Terrorism Monitor, November 13, 2015). Meanwhile, in January 2016 alone, it has kidnapped and beheaded a village leader in Douentza, wounded a genderarme in a shooting in Mopti, and killed a customs officer in Djenne (L’independent [Bamako], February 12, 2016). These attacks may not have been “spectacular” but they still establish a range for Jihadism in Central and Southern Mali beyond that AQIM had before collaboration with Kouffa.

Conclusion

Amadou Kouffa is not the most well-known nor most effective leader in terms of military prowess or propaganda influence. However, neither of those characteristics are required of him. He serves as a trusted bridge between AQIM’s own Arab-North Africanism and the West African “local” roots that it needs to expand in sub-Saharan African to beat the Islamic State.

In the near-term future, Kouffa can be expected to continue with his lower profile, though the relative success of AQIM in Mali may eventually elevate his prominence. Moreover, as Ansar Dine continues to upgrade its media enterprise, it is possible that the FLM and Kouffa will follow suit. Regardless, Kouffa offers to jihadism in West Africa a specific and successful act to follow; if other leaders of ethnic groups can create narratives and use local languages and kinship to further AQIM objectives, then there may be more groups like the FLM that emerge in areas not currently considered to be within AQIM’s range, such as Cote d’Ivoire, Central African Republic, or even Togo, Benin, or Ghana.

Jacob Zenn is an Associate Fellow of African and Eurasian Affairs for The Jamestown Foundation.