Georgian Dream Uses Unrest During Local Elections as Excuse to Ban Opposition Parties

Georgian Dream Uses Unrest During Local Elections as Excuse to Ban Opposition Parties

Executive Summary:

• Georgian Dream won all 64 municipalities in the October 4 local elections amid boycotts from two leading opposition parties, record-low turnout, and limited election monitoring, further consolidating its control in the last constitutionally mandated election until 2028.
• On October 20, the opposition party Gakharia for Georgia rejoined parliament after a year-long boycott, nominally ending Georgian Dream’s one-party rule and hinting at possible Georgian Dream-opposition compromise, though protests and further turbulence may continue.
• October 4 protests, including a march on the presidential palace, framed by UNM as a “peaceful overthrow” despite ending in violence and arrests, gave Georgian Dream justification to ask the Constitutional Court to ban three key opposition parties.
• Georgian Dream’s bid to ban major opposition parties will likely ignite new waves of protests, while emerging movements such as Levan Tsutskiridze’s “Freedom Square” signal shifting opposition dynamics after the unsuccessful attempt to topple the government on October 4. 

Unrest during the October 4 local elections has given Georgian Dream an excuse to “tighten the screws” on opponents, including the most proactive groups of civil activists, as well as the United National Movement (UNM) and its affiliates. On October 28, Georgian Dream announced it is asking the Constitutional Court to ban three significant opposition parties: UNM, Ahali/Coalition for Change, and Lelo-Strong Georgia (Civil Georgia, October 28). In May of this year, the legislative package approved by the Georgian Dream-dominated parliament streamlined their ability to prohibit opposition parties by giving the Constitutional Court the ability to ban a party if its “goals and composition match those of a party that has already been banned” (OC Media, May 14). Georgian Dream cautioned they may ban smaller opposition parties, including Droa, Girchi – More Freedom, Strategy Aghmashenebeli, European Georgia, the Federalists, and the Republicans. According to Parliament Speaker Shalva Papuashvili, Georgian Dream will not as of yet implement a law announced earlier in October that allows the government to strip individuals associated with “unconstitutional” parties of rights to run in elections or hold public office (Civil Georgia; Resonance, October 16, Civil Georgia, October 28). Banning three of the largest opposition parties is likely to open a new wave of protests, as they have hundreds of thousands of voters. In response, UNM has called on the opposition forces at risk of being banned to unite (Rezonansi, October 29).

The October 4 Georgian local elections were the last elections under the Georgian constitution until 2028. Boycotts from the two leading opposition parties—United National Movement (UNM) and the three-party Coalition for Changes—resulted in a lower voter turnout (40.93 percent) compared to the other local elections under Georgian Dream rule in 2021 (52.16 percent), 2017 (45.86 percent), and 2014 (43.34 percent) (Election Administration of Georgia, accessed October 21; X/@CoalitionGEO, accessed October 27). These two parties urged their supporters to refrain from voting, deeming the elections illegitimate under Georgian Dream’s increasingly autocratic governance (see EDM, October 6). Some voters from other opposition parties also abstained in protest of Georgian Dream. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe/Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights and other local observers, including the conventional election monitoring non-governmental organizations (NGOs), did not observe the elections. 

On October 15, the Central Election Commission (CEC) announced the finalized results of the elections, confirming Georgian Dream’s victory in proportional (party-list) and mayoral races across all 64 municipalities of the country. In Tbilisi, where the opposition hoped to defeat Georgian Dream, the incumbent Mayor Kakha Kaladze was reelected for a third term with 71.627 percent of the votes, with just 31.2 percent turnout. Georgian Dream also won an overwhelming majority in the Tbilisi city assembly. Nationwide, support for the ruling party stood at 81.68 percent, though the boycott yielded a much smaller turnout. The 12 opposition parties gained only a small percentage of the votes, much fewer when compared to previous local elections (Georgian Election Administration, accessed October 22). 

Two prominent opposition parties, “Lelo–Strong Georgia” and “Gakharia for Georgia,” which established a pre-election memorandum for collaboration to consolidate their efforts, displayed significantly diminished electoral outcomes. They chose not to participate in the boycott initiated by other opposition parties, aiming instead to prevent Georgian Dream from securing an effortless victory, but it seems that not all their voters approved of this move. 

In the 2024 parliamentary elections, Lelo–Strong Georgia garnered 80,000 votes; in the local 2025 elections, it only secured 30,000 votes. Gakharia for Georgia received 70,000 votes in the 2024 parliamentary elections but only gained 9,650 votes in the 2025 local elections. Experts have estimated that collectively, these parties lost approximately 110,000 votes, indicating a decline of around 73 percent (CEC, October 4; New Press, October 5). The election process was monitored by 81 observers—down from 1,000 in 2021—from 28 international and 27 local organizations (Radio Tavisupleba, October 3). Most of the local observers claimed that the elections were held in free, fair, competitive, and transparent conditions; the opposition questions the objectivity of these claims (1tv.ge, October 5; Georgian Election Administration, accessed October 22). 

Lelo–Strong Georgia and Gakharia for Georgia nominated Irakli Kupradze, Lelo’s secretary general, for the position of Tbilisi mayor (1tv.ge; Imedinews, September 23). He garnered only 12.45 percent of the votes. The opposition’s loss may have been intensified by its unfulfilled commitment to select mayoral candidates for Tbilisi and other cities from non-partisan yet respected individuals. Some voters believe that Lelo–Strong Georgia and Gakharia for Georgia did not provide voters with a more appealing alternative for addressing local issues, instead overly focusing on Georgian Dream’s pro-Russian stance. 

Before the elections, Georgian President Mikheil Kavelashvili pardoned Lelo party leaders Mamuka Khazaradze and Badri Japaridze, who were serving sentences for refusing to appear before the parliamentary commission investigating the activities of the UNM (Civil Georgia, September 5). This gesture slightly reduced criticism of Georgian Dream’s creation of unequal electoral conditions. 

Disagreements within the opposition over participation in the elections created serious problems for their unity. They argued that even relatively large and radical street protests would not force the authorities to backtrack (Interpressnews, June 15, September 12; Ekho Kavkaza, October 3). Part of the opposition attempted to overthrow the Georgia Dream government on October 4 (see EDM, October 6). The relative radicalism of the October 4 protests may have played into the hands of Georgian Dream, giving the ruling party an excuse to clear the political field of opponents.

Just before the elections, members of UNM leadership issued a call for the “peaceful overthrow of the government.” This drew on the example of the 2003 Rose Revolution, in which UNM and its founder, former Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili, who is currently serving a prison term, played a leading role. On September 11, Georgia’s State Security Service arrested the chair of UNM’s political council, Levan Khabeishvili, who was particularly active in calls to “peacefully overthrow” the government, publicly promising to pay $200,000 to police officers to share classified information, refuse to disperse protesters, and side with demonstrators during the planned “peaceful revolution” on October 4 (Civil Georgia, September 11). Protestors cited Georgian Dream’s breach of the constitution, including departing from Georgia’s European trajectory and shifting toward Russia (see Strategic Snapshot, September 10). Former President Salome Zourabichvili continues to articulate this message both within Georgia and internationally (Tabula.ge, September 19; Interpressnews, September 29).  

On October 4, Zourabichvili participated in a rally designed to “peacefully overthrow” Georgian Dream that ended with protesters attempting to seize the presidential palace (Civil Georgia, October 20). Police used force to disperse the demonstration and arrest organizers on the organization committee, named the “People’s Assembly,” which was composed of opera singer Paata Burchuladze, head of the newly established public movement “Rustaveli Avenue,” and members or close affiliates of UNM. Following this unsuccessful attempt to oust Georgian Dream on October 4, Zourabichvili has distanced herself from the protest, asserting that the protest was staged by the regime to “discredit the 310 days [of] peaceful protest of the Georgian people” (X/@Zourabichvili_S, October 4). UNM leadership called her attitude “highly speculative.” Pro-governmental media has suggested that Zourabichvili intended to enter the presidential residence and proclaim herself as the legitimate president if the demonstrators were successful (Rezonansi, October 6; 1tv.ge October 9). Georgian Dream officials also claim that the October 4 unrest was a “coup … masterminded, funded, and engineered from abroad” (Civil Georgia, October 20). Lelo–Strong Georgia and Gakharia for Georgia condemned the attempt to seize power by force, calling it a “political gamble that struck a heavy blow to the peaceful protest” (Civil Georgia, October 20). 

UNM Chairwoman Tinatin Bokuchava recognized the “varied expectations between the rally organizers and other parties,” and confirmed that the UNM’s political council initially supported the rally. According to Bokuchava, the rally’s purpose was to undermine local elections, which UNM labeled as a “Russian special operation.” UNM leaders did not hide their desire that October 4 mark the end of Georgian Dream’s rule, but on peaceful terms (2020news.ge September 12; Paraleli.ge, September 26; Ambebi.ge; TV-pirveli October 4). Some evidence, including proactive calls for action from Saakashvili, suggests that UNM provided organizational assistance for the October 4 unrest (Radio Tavisupleba, October 5; Interpressnews, October 13). 

After the failure of the October 4 “peaceful overthrow,” opposition pundits have accused Georgian Dream, backed by Russia, of luring protesters into a trap and inciting radical actions (TV-Pirveli, October 12; Interpressnews, October 13; KvirisPalitra, October 18). Georgian Dream blames the West. Speaker of Parliament Shalva Papuashvili asserted, “Brussels is behind the street protests in Tbilisi,” and called upon the leadership of the European Union to denounce the protestors’ October 4 march on the presidential residence (Business Media, October 6; Exclusivenews, October 7; 1tv.ge, October 9; Newsgeorgia.ge, October 13). The European Union has blamed the violence on both Georgian Dream and the opposition, while criticizing the local elections for not being free and fair (Diplomatic Service of the European Union, October 5; Civil Georgia, October 6). As of October 19, the police detained more than 60 people involved in the march on the presidential residence (Civil Georgia, October 20). Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze pledged that the government will demonstrate “zero compassion” toward those he describes as “foreign agents” who attended the October 4 rally (Civil Georgia, October 13; 1tv.ge; Business Media, October 17). 

The October 4 protests have encouraged the rise of new political figures. Victor Kipiani, the leader of the Geocase analytical center—a former associate and now opponent of Georgian Dream founder Bidzina Ivanishvili, who the domestic opposition and the West consider the informal leader of Georgia—declared a plan to transform his organization into a political party (Kvirispalitra, October 13). An alliance is blooming between the political parties that appeared on the wave of protests, such as “Freedom Square,” and civil organizations that participated in the protest (2020news.ge, October 13).  

On October 20, the opposition party Gakharia for Georgia decided to end its year-long boycott and participate in the parliament, which it previously deemed illegitimate. The party will also assume offices in local government (Interpressnews, September 1, October 20; PrimeTime.ge, October 20). The Georgian parliament will transition to a nominally multiparty system, and concerns regarding the legitimacy of a single-party system, which the opposition has effectively leveraged until now, are likely to be reduced (see EDM, October 22). It is quite possible that Gakharia for Georgia’s decision to enter parliament was the reason why Georgian Dream removed it from the list of parties to be banned (On.ge, October 8; Tabula.ge, October 15).

Georgian Dream hopes to gain international legitimacy following its success in local elections to facilitate political engagement with the West. Its attempts to mend severely strained relations with Western partners have not yielded success to date, as Georgian Dream has not demonstrated interest in allowing genuine debate with political opponents. If the situation in the country deteriorates, however, this may change. Following significant losses in local elections and the unsuccessful October 4 “peaceful overthrow,” opposition parties may eventually pursue a compromise with Georgian Dream, as demonstrated in Gakharia for Georgia’s decision to return to government. Another scenario, however, is possible—the continuation of protests and further turbulence between Georgian Dream and its political opposition.