Hazara Militia Leader Abdul Ghani Alipoor Emerges as Counter-Weight to Taliban and Islamic State Forces in Behsud

Hazara Militia Leader Abdul Ghani Alipoor Emerges as Counter-Weight to Taliban and Islamic State Forces in Behsud

Introduction

Around midnight on March 18, an Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) helicopter was shot down in the Behsud district of Afghanistan’s central Maidan Wardak province. Nine military personnel, including the pilot, were killed in the attack. The Afghan Ministry of Defense blamed the attack on Abdul Ghani Alipoor’s “militia” and promised to avenge the attack (Tolo News, March 20). Alipoor claimed responsibility for bringing down the chopper, but subsequently denied involvement in the incident (Tolo News, April 4) Military operations were launched soon after to capture Alipoor (Khaama Press, March 22). However, he remains elusive.

Also known as “Qomandan Shamsher” (or Commander Sword), Abdul Ghani Alipoor is of ethnic Shia Hazara origin. His militia of Hazara fighters was reportedly set up to defend their community against the Taliban and Islamic State Khorasan (IS-K), the local affiliate of the global jihadist group (Tolo News, March 21). So why is the Afghan government, which is also fighting the Taliban and IS-K, opposed to Alipoor?

Growing Threat

Little is known of Alipoor’s early background. He was reportedly a commander in the Abdul Ali Mazari faction of the Hizb-e-Wahdat-e-Islami Afghanistan, which was an armed group of Hazaras that formed during the Soviet occupation of the country. When the Hamid Karzai government initiated a program for disbandment of illegal armed groups in 2004, Alipoor surrendered his weapons and worked as a driver on the Kabul-Behsud route (Tolo News, March 21). Taliban attacks on Hazaras and clashes between Hazaras and the nomadic Kochis in Behsud and Daimirdad districts reportedly prompted him to pick up arms again in 2014. The following year, he set up the Jabha-ye Moqawamat (Resistance Force), a “public uprising force” of around 150 men. This group is said to be active in Ghor, Daikundi, Ghazni and Maidan Wardak provinces, where it supports locals against Taliban abductions and attacks (Tolo News, November 27, 2018). The group has also engaged in violence against unarmed people—for instance, abducting and beating people (Pajhwok, June 23, 2020).

In November 2018, Afghan intelligence officials arrested Alipoor in Kabul for running an illegal militia, attacking security forces, engaging in extortion and blackmail and arming criminals (The Hindu, December 1, 2016). His arrest triggered demonstrations, where protestors called for his release. Violent clashes broke out between his supporters and the police in several cities, including Kabul, Bamiyan and Mazar-e-Sharif (Tolo News, November 25, 2018). The violence forced the government to free him two days later (Tolo News, November 27, 2018).

In the years since, clashes between Alipoor’s fighters and Afghan security forces have grown in frequency and intensity of violence. His militia is said to have carried out several attacks on ANDSF checkpoints in Behsud district (Ariana News, September 6, 2020). At the end of January, Alipoor’s fighters clashed with police over the appointment of new police commanders in Behsud district (Tolo News, February 3). Six weeks later, his militia shot down the military helicopter, its most audacious attack on the state to date.

Threat to Afghan Security

Alipoor has many critics in Afghanistan. Afghan journalist Sami Yousafzai describes him as “a threat to Afghanistan’s security and national unity.” He has directed violent attacks against the Kochis, a nomadic Ghilji Pashtun community that visits the Hazara-dominated areas in the central highlands during the summer months, Yousafzai said, adding that such attacks strain relations between ethnic groups and “weaken national unity.” Importantly, Alipoor has “challenged the writ of the Afghan state,” Yousafzai said. The threat Alipoor poses to state security is augmented by “his links with foreign powers like Iran,” claimed Yousafzai. [1] According to intelligence reports cited in the Afghan media, the missile that brought down the military helicopter was provided by Iran (Afghanistan Times, May 25).

In addition, according to Yousafzai, Alipoor has links with the Fatemiyoun Brigade, [2] an Iranian-backed militia of Shia Hazara fighters that Tehran deployed in the Syrian and Iraqi civil wars to promote its interests. With the war in Syria winding down, Fatemiyoun fighters have been returning home to Afghanistan in recent years, raising concern over their possible use by Iran to further its interests in Afghanistan. Such concerns surged last December, when Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammed Javad Zarif offered the Afghan government use of the Fatemiyoun to fight the IS-K in Afghanistan (Terrorism Monitor, March 26). Iran is using Fatemiyoun and Alipoor to “openly interfere in Afghan affairs,” Yousafzai said, pointing out that Alipoor has not denied links with the country. [3]

An Exaggerated Threat?

According to an Afghan security official, “Alipoor and his fighters were initially not seen as a major challenge to the writ of the state.” Though “many warlords from other ethnic groups” were active in the country, Alipoor was pursued by the security forces to demonstrate that the establishment was not targeting warlords from just one or two ethnic groups, but across the board. It was only after the recent shooting down of the military helicopter that Alipoor has become “a potential threat to national security.” [4]

According to a Hazara offical based in India, Alipoor and his fighters are “being targeted by the Pashtun-dominated political establishment.” This is “simply a continuation of the centuries-old ethnic conflict in Afghanistan,” in which all ethnic groups banded together in their persecution of Hazaras, he said. [5] By linking Alipoor to Iran and the Fatemiyoun, the Afghan establishment is painting him to be “an enemy deserving of the wrath of the establishment,” the security official said, pointing out that this provides “the easiest justification,” for state action against him. [6]

Support of Hazaras

Alipoor enjoys strong support in the Hazara community. According to the Hazara official, many Hazaras see Alipoor as a “guardian,” someone who “has stepped in to protect them against the Taliban and the IS-K.” [6] Mostly Shia in a country that is predominantly Sunni Muslim, Hazaras have been persecuted in Afghanistan for centuries. Their Asian features makes them easily identifiable and targets of attack. Hazaras suffered horrific violence at the hands of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hizb-e-Islami, the Taliban and, in more recent years, IS-K. In 1998, after taking control of Mazar-e-Sharif, the Taliban systematically massacred thousands of Hazaras living there (Al Jazeera, June 27, 2016).  While the number of attacks by the Taliban against Hazaras were reduced in the decade after it lost power in Kabul, such violence has surged again in recent years (Tolo News, December 27, 2016).

IS-K is targeting the Hazara too: in November 2015, the Sunni extremist group beheaded seven members of the community. It has carried out innumerable attacks on education centers, schools and maternity hospitals in Hazara-dominated neighborhoods of Kabul, as well (Gandhara, May 8).

Feelings of anger and apprehension are common among Hazaras over these attacks. The Ghani government has “not been able to prevent these attacks, even in tightly guarded Kabul,” the Hazara official pointed out. In these circumstances, Hazaras, especially in the “more remote villages and districts are turning to Alipoor to secure them.” Young Hazara men are joining his group in “growing numbers” as they “want to protect their family and people against the Taliban and IS-K,” he observed. [7]

Response to Alipoor’s Call to Arms

This trend can be expected to grow in the coming months. U.S. soldiers are scheduled to exit Afghanistan by September and violence in the country is widely predicted to intensify, if not completely descend into civil war. Hazaras are apprehensive that, as in previous phases of the Afghan civil war, they will again be massacred by armed groups (Salaam Times, February 9). Such apprehensions have grown in the wake of the suicide attack on May 8 at the Sayed al-Shuhada school for girls in Kabul’s Dasht-e-Barchi locality, a predominantly Hazara neighborhood.

Additionally, Hazara anger with the Afghan state has grown in recent months, especially with the Ghani government opting for military operations to capture Alipoor. It has evoked sympathy for him among the Hazaras in Behsud. [8] The operations have resulted in several civilian casualties, potentially pushing more Hazara youth to heed Alipoor’s call to arms.

Notes

[1] Author’s Interview, Kabul-based Afghan journalist, Sami Yousafzai, May 19.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Author’s Interview, Kabul-based Afghan security official, May 20.

[5] Author’s Interview, Afghan student of Hazara ethnic origin studying in India, May 25.

[6] Security official, n. 4.

[7] Hazara official, n. 5.

[8] Ibid.