Straddling the New Ba’athist Divide: Iraq’s Ghazwan al-Kubeisi
Straddling the New Ba’athist Divide: Iraq’s Ghazwan al-Kubeisi
The execution of Saddam Hussein on December 30, 2006, led to the cleaving of his Ba’ath party over the question of succession. At that time, the party which had ruled Iraq for 35 years and had hundreds of thousands in its membership was significantly degraded. However, many of its loyalists remained active after transforming their party into an underground organization. They were also heavily involved in the insurgency. Most of those Ba’athists recognized Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri, Saddam’s deputy, as the new leader of the party. The remaining collection of Ba’athists organized a conference in Syria in 2007 and elected General Muhammad Younis al-Ahmad as the successor of Saddam shortly after his execution in December 2006 (see: Terrorism Focus, January 21, 2009 and Terrorism Monitor, February 9, 2009).
Ghazwan al-Kubeisi, al-Ahmad’s second-in-command, announced on November 27 on al-Jazeera television that he had abandoned al-Ahmad’s Ba’ath faction and defected to that led by al-Douri. Al-Kubeisi was welcomed back by al-Douri and naturally condemned by al-Ahmad’s faction (al-Jazeera, November 27; Alqadsiten.net, December 2; Iraqalarab.net, November 25).
General Ghazwan Sabti Faraj al-Kubeisi was a military commander and a public official in Saddam’s Iraq. Among the posts he occupied were the deputy manager of the Directorate of Military Intelligence (Mudiriyyat al-Istikhabarat al-‘Askariyya al-‘Amma? in Arabic) and the governor of Ninawa Governorate. However, he was never a member of the highest echelon of the Ba’ath command, the Iraq Regional Command. He emerged as a top post-occupation Ba’athist leader when al-Ahmad’s group was formed (Non14.net, April 17, 2009).
Shortly after the formation of al-Ahmad’s group in 2007, it came under fire from al-Douri’s followers. The latter condemned the former as illegitimate and the 150 delegates who attended the founding al-Ahmad conference were dismissed from the al-Douri-led Ba’ath party. Although he was labeled a traitor by al-Douri’s group, al-Kubeisi has never been harsh on his rivals. He always stressed the common goals of the two evolving Ba’athist factions. For example, the two Ba’athist wings have maintained differing types of involvement in the insurgency. Al-Douri’s followers formed The Jihad and Liberation Front, a coalition of insurgent groups, and were vocal about their role in the insurgency. They have also been prolific in documenting and promoting their involvement in the armed insurgency. Al-Ahmad’s group had a realistic evaluation of its own power but sophisticated tactics to get over that setback, as al-Kubeisi put it: “We asked our supporters in Iraq to join other groups as our abilities are still weak. We do not care who is leading the insurgency, whether the Islamists or the Ba’athists, the Islamist armed groups are filled with Ba’athists” (al-Arabia, August 29, 2007).
In April, al-Ahmad’s group held its first public gathering. The media were invited to cover a conference where a political front led by al-Ahmad was declared. Al-Kubeisi played the major role in this event, which was organized in an affluent district of Damascus. Five hundred delegates attended the conference where the National Democratic Front (NDF) was presented as an alliance of pan-Arab nationalists, Islamists and communists. He gave a speech stressing his party’s determination to return to power in Baghdad. Such a conference could not have been possible without the permission and overt support of the Syrian government and its authoritarian Ba’athist leader, Bashar al-Assad.
During this conference al-Kubeisi appeared again as his party’s chief tactician. He talked about the Ba’ath’s vision of the main issues facing the movement: “We do have a plan to return [to Iraq]. That is to defend the homeland and fight to liberate it” (al-Sharq al-Awsat, May 1).
The conference took place in the midst of a critical political juncture. The general election in Iraq was held the previous month in March and a coalition led by politicians who called for national reconciliation and more tolerance with Iraq’s troubled past did surprisingly well in the balloting. Shi’a political parties looked upon the Damascus–based movement with great suspicion and indicated that the electoral results were a sign that radical Ba’athists were feeling empowered. Al-Kubeisi played down any link between his group and the political process in Iraq, calling it illegitimate due to American involvement. Yet he took a pragmatic approach in his returnee strategy: “We invest any situation for our interest and the country’s interest. We work with all our power to build a new country.” But that new country, in al-Kubeisi’s perspective, seemed to be the same old Iraq that his party once ruled too ruthlessly: “We work to bring the country to what it was before the occupation. And we are unifying our forces” (al-Sharq al-Awsat, May 1).
The April conference was followed by attempts to unify the Ba’ath party’s divisions. Again al-Kubeisi played a major role: “There was a positive response, we hope that would lead to a meeting. If we met and agreed there could be a general national conference for the [Ba’ath] party.” Until that moment, al-Kubeisi had been defending his faction and refused to admit that al-Douri had more followers inside Iraq while simultaneously deflecting the gravity of the schism: “Both groups have a popular base in Iraq. Both have armed wings. There is no difference between a Ba’athist from this group or the other. Ba’athists do not conflict over leadership. The two groups are not after the leadership but the unity of the party” (Iraqvoice.com, May 1).
Leadership issues, nonetheless, seem to be the primary reasoning behind al-Kubeisi’s decision to join al-Douri, as it was the main contention that divided the party to begin with. Shortly after the efforts of unification hit a proverbial wall, al-Kubeisi made his move. One critic of al-Kubeisi came up with a conspiracy theory claiming that al-Douri is dead and al-Kubeisi’s underlying motive was to take the helm of an organization that was without a genuine leader.
Without Syrian shelter, al-Ahmad’s group would have found it very hard to sustain itself. No discernable link appeared between al-Kubeisi’s act and Syrian meddling. Yet the recent move by al-Kubeisi could indicate a decrease in support to al-Ahmad from his host. Al-Kubeisi would not have done something to chafe his Damascene supporters, as he would have virtually nowhere else to go if he were to permanently depart Syria.
The leaders of both Ba’ath wings have dire image problems. Al-Douri has never been seen in public or in a video since the fall of the regime in the spring of 2003. Skeptics indicate it would be hard to believe that he is alive and well due to ascribed medical ailments dating back years prior to the occupation, though Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri’s die-hard followers have always maintained that he was present in Iraq directing the insurgency (Altawahud.com, December 2).
On the other hand, al-Ahmad has never spoken in public either, or issued any statement although he lives outside of Iraq. Such a situation demonstrates the significance of Ghazwan al-Kubeisi’s role. His change of loyalty is a major blow to the al-Ahmad faction and was welcomed by al-Douri himself in a statement published on Ba’athist websites in late November and early December 2010. The statement attributed to al-Douri signifies both the importance of, and is indicative of the possible future role of, al-Kubeisi in a semi-resurgent Ba’ath party in Iraq (Almawsil.com, December 2).
