The Elusive Uyghur Insurgent Commander Haunting China in Afghanistan—Haji Furqan
The Elusive Uyghur Insurgent Commander Haunting China in Afghanistan—Haji Furqan
Uyghur Islamist extremists propagating a separatist jihad against the Chinese state have concerned the Chinese government since long before recent reports of mass internment of Uyghurs in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in the far west of China (South China Morning Post, February 26; Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the UN, November 29, 2001). [1] And although sober assessments reveal that the few Uyghur fighters who have taken refuge in parts of Afghanistan’s remote northeastern province of Badakhshan do not pose a significant threat to China, sources indicate that China is actively looking for information on their elusive commander, Haji Furqan (Afghanistan Analyst Network, March 19, 2018).
Haji Furqan – Commander of Foreign Fighters
Local Badakhshi, Chinese, and UN sources agree that Uyghur extremists as well as other foreign fighters in Afghan Badakhshan (estimates range from 160 to 400 fighters, among them 50 to 100 Uyghurs) are led by a man called Haji Furqan, likely a nom de guerre. [2]
Furqan is a very elusive figure, as he—like other foreign fighters in Badakhshan—reportedly seldom interacts with local residents, except for the local Afghan Taliban commanders with whom he allegedly coordinates closely on insurgent operations. These include in particular the Taliban’s shadow governor for Badakhshan, Qari Fasehuddin, and Mawlawi Amanuddin, who is described as Fasehuddin’s deputy and is allegedly responsible for the Taliban’s military affairs as well as coordination with foreign fighters in Badakhshan. [3]
Haji Furqan and his foreign fighters are apparently embedded with the local Afghan Taliban; there is no indication of a separate Uyghur group. [4] While U.S. Central Command has asserted its forces bombed training facilities in Afghan Badakhshan in February 2018 that were allegedly used by the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement, a purported Uyghur terrorist organization, such claims are contradicted by detailed information from various sources on the ground in Badakhshan (U.S. Forces – Afghanistan, February 8, 2018; Afghanistan Analyst Network, March 19, 2018).
Haji Furqan – Personal Background
Several sources indicated that Furqan arrived in Afghan Badakhshan in 2014 or 2015, allegedly from Pakistani Chitral. [5] It is unclear where he was before—or where he originally hails from.
Almost all sources state that Furqan is a Uyghur from Xinjiang. [6] However, a UN source noted that their reports suggest Furqan hails from Kazakhstan, but may have a Uyghur background (Kazakhstan, which borders Xinjiang, also has a minority Uyghur population). [7] A local man, who had spent time among the Taliban in Badakhshan and has met Furqan himself before he defected to the Afghan Local Police, recounted that Furqan had never stated his origin and that he would, when asked, incorrectly assert that he is from the Khostak valley in Badakhshan’s district of Jurm (the Khostak valley has long been under complete insurgent control and is—aside from the neighboring district of Warduj—reportedly the main nest for foreign fighters in Afghan Badakhshan). [8] Another UN source stated locals sometimes claim that Furqan is a Tajik; however, this is apparently a misidentification, as the source explained that locals would assert this simply based on the fact that Furqan reportedly speaks fluent Persian (the native language of Tajiks). Furqan also speaks fluent Pashto and Urdu, according to the same source. [9]
Since his arrival in Afghan Badakhshan, Furqan reportedly resides in the district of Warduj, which has been under full Taliban control since October 2015. Local sources, including the defector that saw Furqan himself, assert that Furqan is often moving inside Warduj. [10] A UN source also indicated that he is always accompanied by 10 to 15 foreign fighters acting as bodyguards. [11] Furqan sometimes reportedly visits the Khostak valley and possibly other areas in the immediate vicinity of Warduj, such as the Taliban-held district of Yamgon. Local sources claimed that Furqan had never left Badakhshan since his arrival; given that their information on Furqan is limited, this cannot be stated with certainty. [12]
This author managed to obtain exclusively the clear photograph below, purportedly of Furqan. The photograph was confirmed by a Badakhshi who briefly saw Furqan himself in Warduj during a ceasefire in mid-June 2018, as well as by other local sources who allegedly have seen other photos of Furqan that are not available but were shown to them by other locals, including the Taliban. [13] It also roughly corresponds to a low-quality photograph that, according to the defector who has seen Furqan, depicts the latter, as well as to stills from a propaganda video that allegedly show Furqan, but in which his face is blurred. [14] [15] It also matches the description of Furqan given by the defector and a UN source. According to those descriptions, Furqan has a light complexion and rather Caucasian features, and reportedly always wears a pakool (a round, rolled-up felt hat). [16] [17] Hence, there is a high confidence that the photograph below is indeed a photograph of Furqan. [18]
Haji Furqan – A Threat?
Local Badakhshi sources agreed that Furqan has not undertaken any significant activities since his arrival in Badakhshan. He and his foreign fighters are reportedly taking part in local Taliban operations. But while those foreign fighters purportedly played a crucial role in the Taliban’s takeover of Badakhshan’s districts of Warduj (October 2015) and Yamgon (November 2015), the threat posed by them and Furqan has to be qualified. [19]
While the fall and subsequent holding of Warduj and Yamgon were huge successes for the Taliban in Badakhshan, they were not a tidal change, with the Taliban not having expanded their territory from those districts since then. For example, the front between Warduj and the neighboring district of Bahorak has been—with a very few exceptions—more or less static and rather quiet since the fall of Warduj. And a few Taliban attacks on Zebak, another district neighboring Warduj, were always swiftly repelled. [20] With respect to the Uyghur fighters in Afghan Badakhshan (including Furqan), an independent assessment concluded that “Uyghur combat power is not a decisive factor on the battlefield” and that they do not pose any cross-border threat—in particular not for the utterly remote Afghan–Chinese border. In fact, as far as could be determined, there has not been a single confirmed attack conducted or planned by a Uyghur group in or from Afghanistan, or any sign that the Uyghurs in Badakhshan are able to change that. This corroborates assessments according to which Uyghur fighters are arguably hiding out in Badakhshan and not using it as a platform to launch attacks in China or elsewhere (Afghanistan Analyst Network, March 19, 2018).
This also holds true in spite of the fact that local sources attribute exceptional skills and battlefield prowess to foreign fighters, including Furqan, who—in the opinion of a well-informed source from Badakhshan—must have participated in some conflict somewhere(unconfirmed rumors mentioned Iraq and/or Syria), as he is allegedly well-versed in insurgent warfare. [21] Such allegations are not supported by tangible indications and could, therefore, neither be confirmed nor disproved. In general, there is ample evidence that Afghan sources exaggerate the capabilities of foreign fighters. Such allegations also appear to provide a welcome excuse for Afghan government officials to brush over the shortcomings of government forces.
This said, Furqan has, according to credible sources, brought some other Uyghur extremists to Afghan Badakhshan; the same sources also stated that Uyghur fighters are training Afghan insurgents there. [22] However, in view of the above, neither their number nor the effect of their training seem to have had a significant impact. [23]
Despite this, China is—according to a local source on the ground in Badakhshan and another well-placed source—actively seeking photographs and exact up-to-date locations of Furqan, as well as information on his intentions and affiliates. [24]
Hence, it seems that China’s paranoia about Uyghur extremists in Afghan Badakhshan in general and Furqan in particular will persist.
Notes
[1] Speaking a Turkic language and being predominantly Sunni Muslims, Uyghurs are ethnically, linguistically and culturally different from other Chinese. [2] Author’s interviews, several dates during 2018. The presence of some Uyghur extremists in Badakhshan was further confirmed by a propaganda video dated December 2017 that was partly shot in Badakhshan’s districts of Jurm and Warduj (a copy of the video is in the author’s possession). [3] Author’s interviews, several dates during 2018. [4] Author’s interviews, several dates during 2018. [5] Author’s interviews, several dates during 2018. [6] Author’s interviews, several dates during 2018. [7] E-mail to author, February 17, 2018. [8] Author’s interview, Qalotak, Bahorak district, Badakhshan province, August 25, 2018. [9] E-mail to author, November 8, 2018. [10] Author’s interviews, several dates during 2018. [11] E-mail to author, November 8, 2018. [12] Author’s interviews, several dates during 2018. [13] Author’s interview, October 30, 2018. [14] Author’s interview, Qalotak, Bahorak district, Badakhshan province, August 25, 2018. [15] E-mail to author, September 23, 2018. [16] Author’s interview, Qalotak, Bahorak district, Badakhshan province, August 25, 2018. [17] E-mail to author, November 8, 2018. [18] This author has also obtained photographs of other men that were said to be Furqan; however, the sources that allegedly saw Furqan themselves explicitly denied that these were photographs of Furqan (author’s interviews, August 25 and October 30, 2018). [19] Author’s interviews, several dates during 2018. [20] Author’s interviews, several dates during 2018. [21] Author’s interviews, several dates during 2018. [22] Author’s interviews, several dates during 2018. [23] Author’s interviews, several dates in 2018. [24] Author’s interviews, several dates during 2018.
