The New Caliph of IS: the Winding Career of Bashar Khattab Ghazal al-Sumaida’i

The New Caliph of IS: the Winding Career of Bashar Khattab Ghazal al-Sumaida’i

Two months after a U.S. special operation on March 10 in Atmeh, Syria, al-Furqan Foundation, which disseminates Islamic State (IS) messages from the organization’s central leadership, released an announcement through the new spokesman Abu Umar al-Muhajir (Jihadology, March 10). In the twelve minute audio clip, the death of the previous leader Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurayshi was acknowledged. The name of his successor was declared as Abu al-Hassan al-Hashimi al-Qurayshi (Akhbaralaan, Syria.Tv, March 10).

IS did not show the face or reveal the birth name of the new leader “for security reasons.” [1] As a result, to outline his profile and identity, one must rely on local sources, contacts, and interviews with former jihadists and current jihadists in Syria and Iraq and the monitoring of jihadist media channels. [2] This profile intends to provide additional details regarding his identity beyond what has circulated in recent weeks (New Lines Magazine, February 16).

Who is the New Leader of IS?                                                                                         

The birth name of the new IS “caliph” is believed to be Bashar Khattab Ghazal al-Sumaida’i, who is also known as Haji Zaid, Abu Khattab al-Iraqi, or Abu al-Moez al-Iraqi. However, the name of Abubakar al-Baghdadi’s brother was also circulated as his possible birth name (Cairo24, Lebanon24, Enabbaladi, 12/03/2022). Several sources denied the latter possibility, however, noting “Their information is incorrect. The brother of al-Baghdadi has held important positions but in small areas. He is not a high-ranking official and has no important history with the group. Al-Sumaida’i is a descendant of the Quraysh, has great legal knowledge, is a veteran, and was recommended by the previous Caliph.” [3]

Al-Sumaida’i is an Iraqi belonging to the Sumaida’i tribe, which is concentrated northwest of Ramadi, Iraq, and traces its ancestry directly to the Prophet Muhammad. He was a member of the Ba’ath party, but left shortly before the outbreak of the Second Gulf War to join Ansar al-Islam (AAI) [4] in Iraqi Kurdistan. At the time then led by Mullah Krekar. [5] He distinguished himself by becoming an important member and after the split of AAI and the eventual rise of IS, al-Sumaida’i joined IS’s predecessor, Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), in 2013.

Beginning in June 2014, al-Sumaida’i quickly climbed the ranks within ISIS, becoming a prominent jihadist preacher after coming into direct contact with Abubakar al-Baghdadi. Shortly thereafter, al-Sumaida’i was appointed by al-Baghdadi deputy Abu Muslim al-Turkmani as the head of the Court of Justice and Claims of the city of Mosul. Later he was ISIS’ chief judge in Nineveh, where he specialized in murder and capital punishment cases. He issued numerous death sentences in the first year and a half of IS control over Mosul and was in close contact with Abu Muslim al-Turkmani and al-Baghdadi’s successor, whose birth name was Abdullah Qardash. [6] While in office, he made exceptions in several convictions of his close affiliates and subordinates, which became a scandal and resulted in his transfer to the Sharia Institute in al-Raqqa, Syria.

Al-Sumaida’i later moved closer to the extremist ideas of the Hazimiyya movement, which led to a split within IS and accusations of sedition against the Hazimiyya. [7] Between 2016 and 2017, the internal confrontation grew stronger, and al-Sumaida’i, while not publicly participating in Hazimiyya activities, “sided with them, not in delegitimizing al-Baghdadi, but in the need to review [al-Baghdadi’s] actions. He disagreed with him on the marginalization of the Hazimiyya movement…just as he disagreed with him on administrative issues in the fight against the SDF”. Because of this stance, “al-Baghdadi marginalized him.” [8] Later, “between 2018 and 2019 in [IS] areas in eastern Syria there were more disputes between the ideological currents, after which Haji Zaid and other members, including those belonging to the Delegate Committee, moved to areas controlled either by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) or Turkey.” [9] Al-Sumaida’i himself was among those Hazimiyya movement members who moved to Turkey.

Bridging Ideological Divides

After the death of al-Baghdadi in late October 2019, Abdullah Qardash asked al-Sumaida’i to return to Syria after two years in Turkey. He was then appointed a member of the Delegate Committee in 2020 and a member of the Sharia Council. In 2021, al-Sumaida’I was tasked with revitalizing IS and reorganizing the leadership, including working closely with Qardash, or “Caliph Abu Ibrahim” as he was known. In February 2022, several days after the death of Qardash, al-Sumaida’i was appointed leader of IS, as per the recommendation of Qardash while he was still alive. Al-Sumaida’i currently “lives and runs the organization from Syria.” [10]

Despite his extremist tendencies and proximity to Hazimiyya ideas, the choice not to openly or actively support that ideological current allowed al-Sumaida’i to regain an important role within IS at the behest of Qardash. The choice of IS to moderate its ideology through the appointment of al-Sumaida’i could be due to the fact that IS is trying to enhance ties with the population, clans, and tribes, which will help them escape counter-terrorism operations as well as physically control territory. It is likely, given his close relations with the late Qardash, that al-Sumaida’i will continue to expand the already well-practiced strategies of IS’s “war of attrition.” This involves “economic warfare”, which significantly increased under Qardash’s leadership in 2020-2021 (Jihad Analytics, December 10, 2021). Furthermore, al-Sumaida’i will be in favor of fighting al-Qaeda and other jihadist groups not aligned with IS using both IS propaganda and operations in the theaters in which they operate.

The non-disclosure of the real identity of al-Sumaida’i by IS persuaded many academics, researchers, and journalists that the group was having operational, management and media difficulties. This supported the idea that many IS provinces might hesitate or refuse to swear allegiance to the new leader. However, this was quickly disproved by the start of a strong propaganda wave on day after the ascension of al-Sumaida’i to the Caliph position on March 11. At that time, IS began disseminating numerous photo and video packages in its official media from all the provinces that are still active (currently twelve provinces, but the campaign is still ongoing; in 2019 the propaganda campaign lasted 27 days when Qardash became leader).

Conclusion

The campaign of pledging allegiance to al-Sumaida’i has been impressive so far and could be the reason for the low pace in IS claims before the announcement. The photos and videos of fighters swearing allegiance to the new leader are of very high quality and show some provinces, such as in Iraq, Syria, West Africa (Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP) and Islamic State in Greater Sahara (ISGS), and Khurasan [Afghanistan], with massive numbers of well-armed militants (Telegram, March 16). These new oaths of allegiance and the renewed organizational structure and ambition of IS under al-Sumaida’i and the beginning of Ramadan in April may lead to a notable increase in attacks by all the provinces of IS.

Notes

[1] Motivations are reiterated in issue 330 of the weekly al-Naba (Jihadology, March 17; Twitter.com/MinaalLami, March 18).

[2] All of the author’s interviews with rebels, militants and former jihadists were conducted on Messenger, Twitter, Telegram and Rocket Chat. All interviewees, except those mentioned in the following notes, strictly requested to remain anonymous.

[3] Interview with Saleh al-Hamewi, March 13, 2022. As a young Syrian political activist, he was arrested by the Syrian government and spent five years in Sednaya prison. He later joined the Syrian revolution and was the first founder of Jabhat al-Nusra, as well as the head of appointments for all sector leaders in Syria, except Aleppo and Idlib. He was responsible for the relationships, unions, and mergers of many factions in the Syrian rebel scene, and left the group after the arrival of Abu Muhammed al-Julani. Today he is a researcher.

The information provided by al-Hamewi about Bashar Khattab has been confirmed by all interviewees, including Syrian rebels and former Syrian and Iraqi jihadists (all asked to remain anonymous), as well as by the author’s sources and contacts on the ground.

[4] The U.S. government designated AAI as a foreign terrorist organization in 2004 because of its “close ties to and support of al-Qaeda.” AAI initially trained in al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan and provided a safe haven in Iraq for al-Qaeda leaders fleeing the country after the 2003 U.S. invasion. Part of the group pledged allegiance to ISIS between 2013 and 2014, but another faction within AAI continued to fight in Syria.

[5] Author’s interview with Saleh al-Hamewi.

[6] Interview with an Iraqi jihadist no longer active in IS on Telegram, who strongly requested to remain anonymous.

[7] For a detailed understanding of the extremist phenomenon within the Islamic State, see: Tore Hamming, “The Extremist Wing of the Islamic State”, Jihadica, June 9, 2016 and Tore Hamming, “Al-Hazimiyya: The ideological conflict destroying the Islamic State from within,” ICCT, May 2021.

[8] Author’s interview with Saleh al-Hamewi. The words reported by al-Hamewi were confirmed by other interviews conducted on Telegram with former jihadists, particularly Syrians.

[9] Interview with a Syrian militant who asked to remain anonymous.

[10] Information received from the author’s Syrian sources.