Yemen’s Transition: Who’s Who in the Yemeni Opposition
Yemen’s Transition: Who’s Who in the Yemeni Opposition
Now that Yemen’s Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) power transfer initiative has been signed and implementation is beginning, enormous political gains are being made by the fractured coalition of Islamists, Nasserites, and cold war-era socialists known as the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP). As per the GCC initiative, former vice president, now acting president, Abd Rabo Mansur Hadi named southerner Mohammed Basindwa as prime minster.
While the JMP is enjoying the most political power the coalition has seen since its inception in 2005, tribal leaders are still defiantly posturing throughout the country’s north in spite a mostly successful military drawdown in the restive city of Taiz in the base of Yemen’s mountainous hinterland. Other tribal forces farther north are continuing to pressure the government through both force of arms and political maneuvering with the Houthi rebellion making its first attempt to include themselves in Yemen’s political establishment.
As the political old guard further entrench themselves into positions of power, Yemen’s independent youth protesters have vowed to remain in the streets until Ali Abdullah Saleh and his relatives in the country’s military leadership are put on trial for what they deem to be crimes against humanity.
The following are a number of opposition leaders with newfound power that will be on the forefront of deciding Yemen’s fate as the country’s uncertain future begins to become clearer.
Mohammed Basindwa
Newly appoint Prime Minister Mohammed Basindwa is a veteran of Yemen’s political opposition and prominent JMP leader, chairing the coalition at different periods throughout its six year history. A former aide to President Saleh, Basindwa left Yemen’s ruling General People’s Congress party (GPC) ten years ago and become an independent opposition figure (Saba News Agency, November 27, 2011).
Born in 1935 in Aden, Basindwa took part in the popular front against the British colonial presence in the 1960’s. After the hasty British retreat from Aden in 1963, Basindwa became a member of South Yemen’s socialist party upon its founding (Xinhua, November 26, 2011) during the party’s internationalist period before the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Basindwa later moved to the former Yemen Arab Republic in the north of the country to take part in the government of much beloved president Ibrahim Al-Hamdi before his assassination in 1977. He was appointed minister of information and culture in 1978 when Saleh first took power in the country’s north.
While born in Aden, Basindwa’s removal to the country’s north is unlikely to garner much support in southern Yemen after having participated in Saleh’s government and what the southern separatist movement deems to the be “Zaydi tribal occupation” of South Yemen. [1]
Yaseen Sa’eed No’man
Native southerner Yaseen Sa’eed No’man is the most prominent member of the Yemeni Socialist Party, acting as the party’s secretary-general several times. Often cited as the most sensible candidate for the presidency by many Yemenis, No’man is seen as a man with a fair mind and even hand. Many northerners cite his background as a southerner as the reason why he should be president, making Yemen’s unity easier to maintain.
Most notably, Hamid Al-Ahmar mentioned his support for No’man as president several times before his somewhat mysterious self-removal from the political debate just months after nationwide protests began in Yemen. [2]
With Mohammad Basindwa as the obvious JMP choice for what is expected to be Yemen’s upcoming presidential election, No’man has attempted to make a serious bid for the presidency despite relatively widespread support among opposition supporters.
Tawakkol Karman
Islah party member Karman’s rise to fame as a recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize was a fascinating development in the months long uprising against Ali Abdullah Saleh. After the announcement of her award, Karman began meeting with leaders in Europe and the U.S. where she stressed that Saleh’s worldwide assets must be seized in order for that revolution to be successful.
Most notably, French Foreign Minister Alan Juppe expressed that his country publically supported assets freezing immediately following a meeting with Karman. Just days later, Saleh signed the GCC Initiative after successfully tricking the international community he would sign for a total of three times over ten months.
The U.S. threatening the same behind closed doors was undoubtedly what drove Saleh to ultimately sign and Karman’s campaign for European leaders to publically support such action may have played a role in the U.S.’s decision to take a hardline approach into cajoling Saleh to sign the initiative.
During her Nobel acceptance interview in Geneva, Karman stated that she intended to make a bid for Yemen’s presidency. However, Karman is not yet the 40 years of age required by Yemen’s constitution for presidential candidates and her announcement was not taken seriously.
Hamoud al-Mikhlafi
Taiz’s most powerful tribal leader Hamoud al-Mikhlafi began bringing armed militias into Taiz to “defend protesters” last July following the May 29th raid on Taiz’s “Freedom Square” protest camp. The tribesmen began setting up checkpoints throughout the city and soon after began clashing directly with Yemen’s military and security forces.
Mikhlafi is a member of Yemen’s Islah party and cousin to Tawakkol Karman. He enjoys relatively widespread support in the city and is seen more so as a defender of the revolution rather than an agitator of internal conflict (Yemen Times, October 17th, 2011).
However, it is incorrect to perceive Mikhlafi as a typical northern tribal Sheikh. In Taiz, tribalism is less pronounced and tribes in the Taiz governorate wield far less power than the more northern counterparts. Mikhlafi is a law school graduate (The Yemen Times, October 17, 2011), although he does not practice law, and an articulate public speaker and conversationalist.
In Yemen’s flashpoint city, Taiz, violence has continued to occur between Mikhlafi’s forces and the Yemeni military, as recently as December 5th, after the signing of the GCC initiative. He has made no attempts thus far to insert himself into a position of power and continues to uphold his pledge to defend protesters now demanding the trial of Saleh and his relatives.
Abdul Malik al-Houthi and the Houthi Rebellion
After the government refocused its efforts on large urban areas where uprisings began Sa’ada has enjoyed relative calm for the first time since a series of six wars began in 2004.. The relative calm in Sa’ada has allowed the Houthis to come forward and express their willingness to take part in a post-Saleh government in Yemen.
UN Envoy to Yemen Jamal Benomar met with Houthi leader Abdul Malik al-Houthi and relayed al-Houthi’s sentiments to the press (The Yemen Times, December 26, 2011). The Houthis have been attempting to broaden their base of support to Yemenis outside of Sa’ada who have now expressed their furious disapproval with Saleh’s government.
AQAP has taken notice of the Houthi’s expansion efforts as well. Citing recent examples of violence taking place between Houthis (Zaydi fiver-Shias) and Salafis in the flashpoint city of Dammaj and other areas in Al-Jawf, AQAP has called other Yemeni Sunnis to jihad against the Houthi rebels. Last December AQAP bombed two Houthi funeral procession in an escalation of what they term “defense for the people of the Sunnah”. [3]
CCYRC and Yemen’s Independent Youth
As the uprising took shape, some Yemenis began decrying the JMP and claiming that political parties had hijacked their revolution. Pushed to the edge of the protest camp, many of the independent youth felt as though they must fight two fights—one against Saleh, the other against the JMP. The goals of the youth protesters, who want a whole new government system and Saleh to be charged with crimes, do not match the goals of the long-standing political opposition, which consists of lawmakers and other politicians that most of the country has long viewed as ineffectual and corrupt.
During the more than ten months of protests, the JMP managed to control demonstrations so that all marches took place within a security cordon set up by rebel soldiers, minimizing potential violence should protesters leave their designated campsite. In doing so, they prolonged the stalemate in Sanaa, freeing the Saleh regime from the pressure exerted by the images of dead unarmed protesters published in the international press.
Yemen’s largest protest group, the Coordinating Council for the Youth Revolution of Change (CCYRC) has always had influence over protesters but has rarely been able to turn influence into results. Publishing mostly general demands without substance, they have rarely been able to assert themselves as a viable political entity. The same applies with their efforts to continue protests and call for Saleh and his family to stand trial following the signing of the GCC initiative. The lack of critical results from the CCYRC will most likely continue as protests continue.
Notes
1. Author interview with prominent Southern Movement leader General Ali Mohammed Assadi in Aden, June 3rd, 2011.
2. Author interview with al-Ahmar, February 2011.
3. Jihadology, November 28, 2010, New statement from al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula: “Statement on the Operations of Defense for the People of the Sunnah” https://jihadology.net/2010/11/28/new-statement-from-al-qaidah-in-the-arabian-peninsula-statement-on-the-operations-of-defense-for-the-people-of-the-sunnah/.
