Rosatom Faces Growing Competition in Central Asia
Rosatom Faces Growing Competition in Central Asia
Executive Summary:
- In July, Rosatom moved to cut its 2026 investment program by nearly half. This strains costly commitments such as Kazakhstan’s $16.5 billion Balkhash plant, 85 percent of which a Russian state loan will finance.
- Hedging against Russia, Uzbekistan courted the BRICS New Development Bank to finance its Jizzakh plant in June. Kazakhstan named China National Nuclear Corporation to lead its second plant in 2025, and Uzbekistan reportedly plans its second with Beijing.
- Beyond Central Asia, Rosatom signed deals with countries across the Middle East, Africa, and Southeast Asia, securing Moscow decades of leverage through fuel supply, maintenance, and technological cooperation.
On September 3, Atomstroyexport, a subsidiary of Russia’s Rosatom state nuclear corporation, signed an engineering, procurement, and construction contract with Kazakhstan (The Astana Times, September 3). The agreement highlights the company’s enduring influence in the region. In recent months, however, there have been indications that Rosatom might be facing financial constraints that could complicate its nuclear energy projects in Central Asia, particularly in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan (Anhor.uz, July 23).
Rosatom’s own leadership has acknowledged the strain. In July, Rosatom Director General Alexei Likhachev acknowledged that the corporation was reducing its investment program amid unfavorable economic conditions (Interfax, July 16). Likhachev also confirmed that certain projects had been abandoned or postponed and that the corporation intended to reduce operating expenditures (Anhor.uz, July 23). Rosatom Deputy Director General for Economics and Finance Ilya Rebrov had previously acknowledged that investment requests from Rosatom enterprises in 2025 exceeded available financing resources by a factor of four (KazanFirst, August 12, 2025). He added that the company’s projected investment requirements for 2025–2030 were growing considerably faster than expected operating earnings. The main problem is that Rosatom’s traditional competitive advantage—its ability to offer nuclear technology together with substantial Russian state-backed financing—is becoming expensive for Moscow to sustain amid the war against Ukraine.
Kazakhstan’s flagship project illustrates the scale of this financial burden. In May, Russia and Kazakhstan concluded intergovernmental agreements covering the construction and financing of the Balkhash Nuclear Power Plant (Nuclear Power Plant (NPP), at an estimated cost of $16.5 billion (Anadolu Ajansı, May 29). The financing structure envisages Russia providing approximately 85 percent of construction funding through a state export loan, with Kazakhstan covering the remaining 15 percent (Fergana.News, May 28). The potential challenge is that Moscow must allocate substantial capital over an extended construction period, providing financing well before it receives full repayment. The project also faces risks of cost overruns and delays.
Uzbekistan presents a different challenge because Tashkent has been reluctant to make its nuclear program entirely dependent on Russian financing. The integrated NPP under construction in Jizzakh combines two VVER-1000 reactors, Russian-designed pressurized water reactors with a capacity of about 1,000 megawatts each, with two smaller RITM-200N units, a land-based version of the compact reactors that power Russia’s nuclear icebreakers (Atom Media, September 26, 2025). Tashkent has explored financing from multiple international institutions, including the BRICS New Development Bank, rather than relying exclusively on Russian state credits.
Tashkent has not ruled out a Russian export loan. It is also discussing financing with other lenders, however (UzDaily, June 5). Given Rosatom’s traditional business model, which combines reactor construction with attractive state-backed financing, its ability to offer a fully integrated Russian package could become less appealing if the corporation increasingly depends on third-party lenders.
Cooperation with Rosatom remains comfortable for Central Asian countries. Moscow’s competitive advantage lies partly in its willingness to pursue nuclear energy agreements without imposing the political conditions often associated with Western partnerships. Russia also offers a comprehensive package of services covering reactor construction, nuclear fuel supply, personnel training, regulatory assistance, and spent-fuel management. Rosatom’s ability to tailor its proposals to different reactor capacities, deployment models, and financing arrangements further enhances its appeal to Central Asian governments. At the same time, this package creates fertile ground for Moscow to build its long-term influence with regional governments.
This flexibility is particularly attractive to regional capitals pursuing diversified foreign policies, often described as multi-alignment, which prioritize maintaining productive relationships with competing global powers rather than committing exclusively to any single geopolitical bloc. For Russia, this approach provides an opportunity to expand its long-term technological and economic presence in the region without requiring host governments to make explicit geopolitical commitments to Moscow.
Nuclear diplomacy is a key tool for Russia to maintain, and in some respects expand, its influence in Central Asia. Russia faces growing rivalry as more foreign nuclear companies seek to enter the Central Asian market. Central Asian states also fear exclusive dependence on Russia, which explains why they are open to cooperation with other players in the nuclear sphere. This shift is already visible. A Chinese company will build Uzbekistan’s second nuclear plant (Gazeta, September 8). Similarly, the state-run China National Nuclear Corporation will build Kazakhstan’s third NPP (RBC, July 31, 2025).
Rosatom has been expanding its presence in the Middle East, Africa, and Southeast Asia. Russia and Vietnam have signed an intergovernmental agreement to build Vietnam’s first NPP (Rossiyskaya Gazeta, March 23). Russia and Mongolia are currently in talks over Rosatom’s proposal to build a small NPP (TASS, October 15). In Africa, Russia and the Republic of the Congo signed an energy deal on developing nuclear energy in 2024 (Business Insider Africa, July 18, 2024). Russia and Rwanda signed a roadmap agreement to develop a small modular reactor (SMR) nuclear power project (The New Times, June 30). The agreement follows Likhachev’s statement in May that Moscow and Kigali had reached an understanding on the construction of an NPP (Russia’s Pivot to Asia, July 1).
Iran remains Rosatom’s most important partner in the Middle East. In 2025, Moscow and Tehran signed a memorandum of understanding on the construction of small NPPs in Iran (RIA Novosti, September 25, 2025). In Türkiye, Rosatom is constructing the Akkuyu NPP, valued at approximately $20 billion. The project is being delivered under a Build-Own-Operate model, with Rosatom retaining ownership and operational control. Once all four 1,200-megawatt units are online, Akkuyu is expected to supply about 10 percent of Türkiye’s electricity. The first unit is due to be commissioned this year, with the remaining units phased in through 2028. Rosatom is also building Egypt’s El Dabaa NPP. In January, Rosatom submitted proposals to the United Arab Emirates for large and small, land-based and floating NPPs (Interfax, January 29). In February, Rosatom pitched large and small reactors, including floating units, at an industrial exhibition in Riyadh, building on its 2015 cooperation agreement with Saudi Arabia (Atom Media, February 12). In 2024, Rosatom also signed a memorandum of understanding on the peaceful use of atomic energy with Iraq (Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research in Iraq, September 17, 2024).
For Moscow, the nuclear projects in Central Asia would consolidate its position in the region’s nuclear energy sector and create opportunities for long-term technological cooperation, fuel supply, and maintenance contracts, potentially strengthening Russia’s influence over the regional countries’ civilian nuclear infrastructure for decades.