Russian Pundits Wary of Implications of U.S. Midterm Results for War

Russian Pundits Wary of Implications of U.S. Midterm Results for War

Executive summary:

• The results of U.S. midterm elections have unsettled Moscow, where a shift in U.S. Ukraine policy is presented as inevitable and Russian pundits urge using the window before the new Congress convenes in January.
• In the time leading up to the November 10–11 Russia–Ukraine–U.S. talks in Abu Dhabi, Moscow has eased its opposition to a European role, while encouraging Iranians opposed to a Gulf ceasefire that would lower oil prices.
• Ukrainian strikes are setting Russian refineries ablaze, and regions are cutting enlistment bonuses as casualties hit records and mobilization fears grow. This raises the chances of a deal trading sanctions relief for a verifiable end to hostilities.

Russian pundits are still evaluating the possible implications of the U.S. midterm elections for U.S. policy regarding the Kremlin’s war against Ukraine, with the balance of assessments shifting further toward the negative for Moscow. Prior to last Tuesday, mainstream Russian opinion held that the Democratic Party’s predicted takeover of the U.S. House of Representatives would have minimal impact on U.S. foreign policy and might even spur U.S. President Donald Trump to experiment with new peace initiatives (Kommersant, October 25; Nezavisimaya Gazeta, November 2; Forbes Russia, November 5). Significant changes in the U.S. stance on Russia’s war against Ukraine, which, in Russia’s worldview, is the pivotal issue, are now seen in Moscow as inevitable, and some pro-Kremlin pundits suggest that the narrow window of opportunity before the 120th U.S. Congress convenes on January 3, 2027, should be used to maximum effect (Kommersant, November 4).

The Kremlin’s official reaction has amounted to an expression of hope for the continuation of U.S. efforts to end the hostilities (Vedomosti, November 5). These expectations may turn out to be more meaningful than they appeared two weeks ago, when Russian Presidential Aide Vladimir Medinsky was named head of the Russian delegation to the round of talks with Ukraine and the United States in Abu Dhabi scheduled for November 10–11 (The Moscow Times, October 29). Medinsky is known for promoting fake narratives about the history of Russia–Ukraine relations, and another lecture on this theme would hardly deliver an end to the war (Meduza, November 6). Many announcements that an end to Russia’s war against Ukraine was near have proved empty, but Trump’s telephone conversations with various stakeholders after his meeting with Russian Special Presidential Envoy on Foreign Investment and Economic Cooperation Kirill Dmitriev may offer a glimmer of hope (Kommersant, November 7).

Europe’s growing involvement in the negotiation process offers further reasons for optimism. Before the U.S. elections, the Kremlin had adamantly rejected any European contribution to the talks in Abu Dhabi (Komsomolskaya Pravda, November 3). This position softened after U.S. Special Envoy Jared Kushner announced that Washington would consult European partners on a new European security framework (Expert, November 6). Moscow is eager to amplify disagreements among Europeans over the usefulness of direct communication with Russian President Vladimir Putin and to mock the European Union’s inability to appoint a mediator (Interfax, November 6; RBC, November 7). This familiar emphasis on Western discord is moderated by Putin’s positive assessment of his conversation with Finnish President Alexander Stubb and Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre (The Moscow Times, November 7). Finland and Norway are among Ukraine’s strongest supporters, and their firm position on deterring Russia is unlikely to be altered by Putin’s repeated references to the “root causes” of the war (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, October 28). Moscow has also noted the return of U.S. troops to Estonia after a break in their rotation, so it holds little hope for reductions in U.S. military deployments in Europe (The Insider, November 6).

U.S. decisions on the conflict with Iran could impact the course of war-making and peace-talking in Ukraine (RBC, November 6). Putin met Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian twice in October, and on November 5, he received Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Mohsen Rezaei, a former commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, in the Kremlin (Vedomosti, November 6). This attempt to encourage Iranian hard-liners reflects Russia’s concern about a ceasefire in the Gulf, which would reopen it to maritime traffic and push oil prices down (Kommersant, November 6). Russian oil and gas export revenues increased in October, but not nearly enough to offset budget payments to energy companies covering the costs of rebuilding refineries damaged by Ukrainian long-range strikes (The Moscow Times, November 6). Every day, a new Russian oil facility goes up in flames, while Trump has stopped criticizing Ukraine’s strategy of degrading Russia’s energy infrastructure, so the “diesel deal,” which was supposed to rehabilitate Russia’s oil industry, is effectively canceled (TopWar, November 5).

Burning refineries are the most visible sign of Russia’s economic crisis, but the crisis itself is shaped primarily by the mounting costs of war and accumulated underinvestment in all civilian sectors and social programs (The Bell, November 3). Russia’s “affordability” crisis is fueled not only by high inflation but also by cruel cuts in state spending on all non-security needs (Re: Russia, November 6). This squeeze on family incomes sustains a strong public preference for ending the war, reinforced by growing concern about a new wave of mobilization (Levada Center, November 5). Russians see no need for this mobilization, but casualties from relentless attacks in Donbas are setting new records, while the commercial recruitment system yields fewer and fewer new soldiers, particularly as many regions have been forced to cut signing bonuses for enlistment contracts (The Moscow Times, November 2; Vedomosti, November 6). Putin can celebrate National Unity Day with new claims of unwavering public support for his “special military operation,” but this blind denial of mass discontent with an unwinnable war creates serious hidden risks to regime stability (Kommersant, November 4).

Against the background of Russia’s war fatigue, the diplomatic glimmers of hope for a compromise, if not in Abu Dhabi, then at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Shenzhen on November 18–19 or perhaps at the Group of Twenty (G20) summit in Miami in mid-December, look brighter. Putin has shown no inclination to scale back his unacceptable demands for territorial concessions, but he may choose to respond to “humanitarian concerns,” as he did with the local ceasefire that allowed relief for and evacuation of the small Ukrainian city of Oleshky. Such blatant hypocrisy would not fool Europeans, and particularly not Ukrainians, but they may accept a deal that includes some easing of sanctions if a verifiable end to hostilities is at its core. The first step toward peace may look dubious and disgraceful, but it would still shorten the road to justice and retribution.