Shamima Begum and The New Era of Stateless Jihadism

Shamima Begum and The New Era of Stateless Jihadism

Shamima Begum has been the talking point of the international media and has dominated the headlines after her British citizenship was stripped, the most public example of an Islamic-State (IS)-bride-turned-stateless-jihadist.  With IS losing its last enclave in Baghouz, Syria, the group’s members, like Begum, are left with no choice but to either remain under attack, or surrender to the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Begum was one of those who fled the battlefield and has failed to secure a way back to her home country. The new phenomenon of the stateless jihadist suggests that IS’ cycle of violence has only paused, and will continue in the near future.

The Repetitive Cycle of Extremism

Jihadists’ ideology is based on violence, intrusion and perpetration. Similar to cycles of abuse, the reversal of the insurgency’s territorial expansion following the numerous atrocities committed by the jihadists has functioned as a turning point and tossed many into a state of remorse. Western jihadists may try to explain their actions by blaming other factors—for example, saying they were lied to by the propaganda videos or were brainwashed—but remorse is ultimately a tactic of defense. They will adopt a manipulative strategy to win sympathy and to make it appear as though the perpetrator has changed. However, this phase is often momentary, as some former jihadists return to the fight once they gain the ability to do so.

A prominent example is the case of Shamima Begum (also known as Umm Jarah), a British woman who, at the age of 15, left the United Kingdom to join the Islamic State with two other two school girls (Aawsat, February 25). In 2015, she stole her eldest sister’s passport and traveled to Syria via Turkey in order to marry Ago Riedijk, 27, who was a Dutch convert to Islam. Their marriage was arranged 10 days after she arrived in the group’s then-stronghold, Raqqa. She had three children, two of whom died before she was moved to al Hawla refugee camp in Syria. At the camp, her new born baby also died (Emaratalyoum, March 6). After fleeing Baghouz with her husband, Begum was moved to al-Hawal camp in eastern Syria. From here, she now pleads to return to the United Kingdom.

Begum describes herself as a housewife within IS. However, there is not a simple definition of such a role within the group (Aawsat, February 26). Simplifying the role of IS women—as Begum attempts to do in describing herself as a “peaceful housewife”—borrows from IS’ wide-ranging propaganda aimed at women. This influence campaign attempts to portray these women’s commitment to the movement as being born out of a selfless love, by emphasizing the huge lengths that these girls have gone to for IS and their husbands. It is part of a strategy which seeks to portray the female jihadists as being ultimately altruistic, with the goal of gaining sympathy and public support in the West that could secure their survival (Kapitalis July 25, 2018; Annahar, February 6, 2018).

Alternating between victimization and denial, Begum’s tone moves from remorse to arrogance.  She alters her rhetoric according to the situation, choosing when she wants to be seen as a mother whose baby is “[her] biggest priority—as [she] left because of him” in order to invoke sympathy (Almasryalyoum, February 18). This is clear during her media appearances, in which she engages emotionally with the audience, describing herself as a mother of two children who died due to a lack of medical care. However, she becomes dismissive when she compares the Manchester terrorist attack in 2017 to the bombing of IS in Baghouz.

Begum’s ploy for sympathy is similar to the case of Hoda Muthana, the IS bride from Alabama. Muthana also joined the group, but now says she regrets the decision. Like the United Kingdom, the United States has not allowed her to return home (Erem News, February 21). Also like Begum, Muthana has stated that her child’s welfare is one of the main reasons she wishes to return to the United States. She holds her child in all of her media appearances (Rudaw, February 22).

Stateless Jihadists Turned Public Sensations

With the citizenship of many Western IS jihadists being revoked, and their return home being barred by their governments, “stateless jihadists” are on the rise. Uncertainty over their legal status has turned IS members like Begum and Muthana into a new form of stateless female militant. They aim to engage with the public by speaking to the media, portraying themselves as victims who have been unjustly treated by authorities, with the ultimate goal of gradually winning the public’s approval and returning to the West.

The existence of the stateless jihadists, under the fragile control of the SDF, should raise alarms. With Baghouz having fallen to the SDF, and IS territorially defeated, what will happen to these stateless jihadists? Women in IS are occupying new roles, as shown by the female suicide bomber who recently detonated her explosives belt near the SDF council (Syria.TV, January 29). There is the possibility that many radicalized former IS members will escape to neighboring countries through the region’s porous borders. In new areas, they can mobilize under fake identities and names and gradually organize sleeper cells in order to plan future attacks and harbor their narrative. This will constitute a national and international threat.

Conclusion

IS benefits in many ways from the rising phenomenon of stateless jihadists. Their visibility allows IS to begin changing from a territorial entity into an ideological movement, with sympathetic Western women acting as its representatives.  It is in equal measure both effective and dangerous, as it could appeal to young, impressionable Muslims in the West who may already be feeling isolated and rejected from their communities. With these stateless jihadists having no one to answer to, except to their extreme ideology, it would be easier for them to organize into small groups, and gradually begin a new form of stateless jihadism.