Shaykh Mukhtar Robow Ali Revisited: From Repentant Jihadist to New Enemy of the Somali Government

Shaykh Mukhtar Robow Ali Revisited: From Repentant Jihadist to New Enemy of the Somali Government

Shaykh Mukhtar Robow Ali—a.k.a Abu Mansur (Mansoor)—a former deputy leader of al-Shabaab, has fallen-out with the Somalia government, barely a year after his defection from the al-Qaeda affiliate in East Africa.

Robow, who switched his allegiance in August last year, was arrested on December 13 in the city of Baidoa, about 240 kilometers southwest of Mogadishu, following violent protests by his supporters. According to news reports, the leader was beaten and taken to the Somali capital, Mogadishu, where he is still detained (Citizen Digital, December 14).

Events before the arrest indicate the government’s growing discomfort with the former jihadist. In October, the government banned Robow from holding public office for allegedly being a security threat to Somalia. Senior government officials indicated that although Robow had abandoned the militant group, Interpol had placed restrictions on his movement. Somalia’s Internal Security Ministry accused the leader of bringing al-Shabaab militants and weapons to Baidoa, capital of the South West state. (The Standard, December 16).

A year ago, his defection was touted by the Somalia government as a breakthrough in the battle against al-Shabaab. At the time, security and intelligence officials observed that if the defection was well handled, it could help bring more militants to the government’s side and act as a good source of intelligence on al-Shabaab’s operations (Citizen Digital, November 28).

A former veteran of the war in Afghanistan and a founder of al-Shabaab, Robow had been in a good standing with the government, until he announced that he would contest the South West state’s regional presidency.

Disturbed by his move, the government moved to stop Robow from running for the post and began running its own candidate for the position. The regional electoral commission then cleared Robow to run, after which the government arrested him on December 13 (The Star, November 2).

Despite calls for his release and postponement of the elections, the South West state elections took place on December 19. The government’s candidate won the election, which is one of the elections being held in Somalia’s seven states. The aim of the elections is to spread power among the country’s multiple clans, in an attempt to end its long-running conflict. With the dispersion of power, the states are required to be independent and have the ability to elect their own representatives.

Security analysts are concerned, however, that the ban on Robow and the visible meddling in the South West state elections could ignite further violence and instability in the region. News reports suggest that Ethiopian troops in Somalia were involved in the arrest. That could mean more tensions between the people of Somalia and Ethiopia, two countries which have had an unpredictable history (Goobjoog News, December 13).

Robow’s arrest had sparked a three-day violent protest in Baidoa, which left at least 11 dead, including a local legislator. A government campaign against the leader saw Robow’s popularity rise among his Laysan sub–clan, as well as other local clans which considered him a suitable candidate. (Garowe Online, December 12); The Standard, December 14).

When Robow defected, the U.S government quietly dropped a $5 million bounty on his head. The bounty had been placed on June 7, 2012, at the peak of al-Shabaab action in the region. The decision to remove it was allegedly made in consultation with the government of President Mohammed Farmajo. According to reports, Robow’s name has also been removed from a U.S. list of persons who sponsor terrorism (Hiiraan Online, June 23, 2017).

Robow, 49, served as deputy to Adan Hashi Ayrow, a co-founder and al-Shabaab leader who was killed in a U.S airstrike in 2008 in the town of Dusamareb. After the leader’s death, Robow fell out with Ayrow’s successor, Shakyh Ahmed Abdi Godane, and was forced to go into hiding.

In 2010, he moved his forces to the Bay and Bakool region, where he kept a low profile. While he maintained his allegiance to the group, there was speculation that he had defected to the government’s side. Other reports indicated that he was considering forming his own jihadist group to be known as al-Islamia (Relief Web, October 4, 2010).

However, on August 13, 2017, he surrendered to Somali forces in the government-controlled town of Hudur in the southwestern region and was airlifted to Mogadishu under tight security. (Tuko, August 16, 2017).

With his latest arrest and detention in Mogadishu, anger has been building among his supporters. Early in December, a public works minister resigned over what he called the government’s interference in the affairs of South West state. The minister accused the Mogadishu-based government of suppressing and kidnapping the people of the state (Hiiraan Online, December 16).

Robow’s career as a jihadist started during the time of al-Itihad al-Islamiya (AIAI), an armed group formed in the 1980s which sought to establish an Islamic state in Somalia. In 1996, after returning from Khartoum University, where he studied Sharia (Islamic law), he established the group’s first militant Islamist training camp in al-Hudda in Huddur Somalia. The AIAI camps were to facilitate the recruitment of new fighters, since the group was suffering heavy losses at the hands of Ethiopian troops (See Terrorism Monitor, January 23, 2015).

In 2000, he reportedly left Somalia to train with the Taliban after being recruited by Shaykh Aden Hashi Ayrow. He returned to Somalia after the Afghan group’s fall (Community Digital News, September 2, 2014).

Robow’s rise began around 2006, when he gained prominence for leading al-Shabaab’s propaganda war against Ethiopian forces and the Somali Transitional government troops in southern Somalia. Robow then became a commander within al-Shabaab, which was formed in 2003 together with other militant leaders. Al-Shabaab’s early leaders were inspired by al-Qaeda’s terror network.

When the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) was formed in 2000, al-Shabaab became its military wing by providing the group with hundreds of young trained fighters.

Robow was appointed deputy defense minister of the ICU administration and became al-Shabaab’s spokesman when Ethiopian troops overran the ICU administration in 2007.

Soon after the death of Ayrow, Robow’s problems began with Godane taking over in 2009 as the al-Shabaab emir. The new leader replaced Robow with Shaykh Ali Mohamud Raage as the militant group’s spokesman, a development that did not sit well with the commander.

Godane—also an Afghanistan war veteran—was killed in a U.S airstrike in September 2014. Before his death, he had adopted an ambitious global jihadist strategy that transformed al-Shabaab from a local terror group into an international one.

The ambitious attempt to change al-Shabaab, however, created a huge ideological and leadership rift within the group, of which Robow was a casualty. Today, he is back in the government’s bad books, just as he had been when he was a top leader within al-Shabaab.

Conclusion

The latest arrest of Robow is igniting concerns among security experts that there could be further violence and instability in Somalia’s South West state. Robow’s defection had widely been seen as an asset for the Somali government, which is still trying to find a way to defeat al-Shabaab. Keeping him in detention would create both more support for him and a suitable environment for his return to the militant group. Therefore, his immediate release is now paramount, if the government and international supporters are to convince the world that such defections are valuable.