Summer Diplomacy Deepens Azerbaijan’s Integration with Central Asia
Summer Diplomacy Deepens Azerbaijan’s Integration with Central Asia
Executive Summary:
- During an August 23–24 state visit, Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan signed a Treaty on Eternal Friendship, expanded cooperation across multiple sectors, and adopted a program to increase bilateral trade to $1 billion by 2030.
- The visit followed Azerbaijan’s growing institutional integration with Central Asia, including its November 2025 admission as a full participant in the Consultative Meetings of Heads of State of Central Asia, the signing of a Treaty on Allied Relations with Kyrgyzstan, and expanded transport cooperation with Turkmenistan.
- Transport, energy, and digital links across the Caspian, including the Middle Corridor, a green energy corridor, and a fiber-optic link, are reinforcing this political convergence and integrating Azerbaijan with Central Asia.
Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev’s state visit to Uzbekistan on August 23–24 was another milestone in the rapidly expanding relationship between Baku and Tashkent. Aliyev and Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev chaired the third meeting of the Supreme Interstate Council and signed a Treaty on Eternal Friendship. The accompanying package included an action plan to implement investment and trade agreements, along with agreements and cooperation programs covering pensions, tourism, culture, justice, customs-related cooperation, and interregional ties. The program was designed to increase bilateral trade turnover to $1 billion by 2030 (President of Azerbaijan; President of Uzbekistan, August 23). The two presidents also launched joint initiatives in sectors including banking, construction materials, education, fuel infrastructure, mineral processing, horticulture, and large-scale residential and tourism developments (President of Uzbekistan, August 23).
Viewed in isolation, the visit reflects the growing institutional density of the Azerbaijani–Uzbek alliance. Viewed within the broader diplomatic sequence of summer 2026, however, it points to a larger regional development. A series of high-level meetings between Azerbaijan and Central Asian states preceded the Uzbekistan visit. These included Turkmen President Serdar Berdimuhamedov’s state visit to Azerbaijan on June 22–23, Aliyev’s state visit to Kyrgyzstan on July 31, and, later that same day, an informal meeting between Aliyev and the five Central Asian presidents in Cholpon-Ata (President of Azerbaijan, June 22, July 31 [1], [2]; see EDM, September 10). At the meeting, Aliyev noted that he had visited Central Asian countries 16 times since the beginning of 2023, while Central Asian leaders had visited Azerbaijan 26 times during the same period (President of Azerbaijan, July 31). Taken together, these exchanges indicate that Azerbaijan’s relationships with Central Asia are transitioning from a series of bilateral partnerships to a more interconnected regional framework.
The seventh Consultative Meeting of the Heads of State of Central Asia, held in Tashkent on November 16, 2025, marked a key moment in the development of regional cooperation (President of Uzbekistan, November 16, 2025). Launched in 2018, the Consultative Meetings are an informal high-level summit mechanism aimed at rebuilding regional trust, addressing longstanding disputes, and strengthening cooperation among the Central Asian states. At that meeting, the five Central Asian countries approved Azerbaijan’s accession as a full participant in the Consultative Meeting. Mirziyoyev presented the decision as a step that would “build a strong bridge between Central Asia and the South Caucasus,” while “paving the way for the formation of a unified space for cooperation” between the two regions (President of Uzbekistan, November 16, 2025).
Azerbaijan had previously participated in the Consultative Meetings as a guest of honor in Dushanbe in 2023 and Astana in 2024 (President of Azerbaijan, September 14, 2023, August 9, 2024). Its admission as a full participant elevated Azerbaijan’s role in the forum. Before his August visit to Uzbekistan, Aliyev contended that Azerbaijan’s inclusion had expanded the format previously known as “C5” into “C6,” giving regional dialogue and strategic partnership “new substance and a broader scope” (President of Azerbaijan, August 21).
The summer of 2026 illustrates how this expanded framework is beginning to acquire practical content. During Aliyev’s visit to Kyrgyzstan in July, the two countries signed a Treaty on Allied Relations and held the third meeting of their Interstate Council. Kyrgyz President Sadyr Zhaparov described the treaty as a “truly historic event” that marked “a new stage in Kyrgyz–Azerbaijani cooperation” (President of Azerbaijan, July 31). The two sides also agreed to double the capitalization of the Azerbaijan–Kyrgyzstan Development Fund from $100 million to $200 million. They identified transport, energy, investment, cybersecurity, and financial regulation as areas for expanded cooperation (President of Azerbaijan, July 31).
The Supreme Interstate Council has become a key mechanism for coordinating the expanding Azerbaijan–Uzbekistan bilateral agenda. At its third meeting on August 23, Mirziyoyev noted that “the total portfolio of joint projects has exceeded $5 billion” and that the two sides should “swiftly utilize $500 million in capital and subsequently expand this fund” (President of Azerbaijan, August 23). Aliyev positioned the relationship within a broader regional context, contending, “Central Asia and Azerbaijan today constitute a single geopolitical and geo-economic region,” and that close interaction between Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan would largely determine the region’s further positive development (President of Azerbaijan, August 23).
Azerbaijan–Turkmenistan relations have become an important part of this emerging regional framework. Berdimuhamedov’s state visit in June produced agreements on energy and industrial cooperation, as well as customs arrangements for the advanced electronic exchange of information on goods and vehicles. The two presidents also agreed to enhance transport and logistics coordination to attract freight from third countries and increase cargo flows (President of Azerbaijan, June 22). This collaboration is significant because of Turkmenistan’s location on the eastern shore of the Caspian Sea. In 2025, more than 7 million tons of transit cargo traversed Turkmenistan, representing a 28 percent year-on-year increase (State Customs Service of Turkmenistan, February 19). The Baku–Turkmenbashi connection has become part of a broader trans-Eurasian transport network through Ashgabat’s promotion of the Afghanistan–Turkmenistan–Azerbaijan–Georgia–Türkiye route and a proposed Caspian Sea–Black Sea corridor connecting Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Romania (Turkmenistan: Golden Age, June 24).
This broader political convergence is taking practical form through transport connectivity. Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are already connected to Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Türkiye via the Middle Corridor, which spans the Caspian Sea. The annual capacity of the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars (BTK) railway rose to 5 million tons after its reconstruction in 2024 (President of Azerbaijan, accessed September 10). Baku Port’s planned container capacity is set to increase from 150,000 to 260,000 twenty-foot equivalent units (TEU), while container throughput rose 20 percent year-on-year in January–July 2026 (Report, May 12, August 10).
As physical infrastructure expands, coordination along the route is also growing. At a meeting in Ashgabat in February, railway chiefs from Azerbaijan, Georgia, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan adopted a four-party protocol on digitalization, freight development, and corridor diagnostics along the Middle Corridor (Embassy of Azerbaijan in Turkmenistan, February 10). Mirziyoyev’s July visit to Georgia further underscored Azerbaijan’s role in the emerging transport architecture. During the visit, he proposed exploring the integration of the BTK railway with the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan (CKU) railway currently under construction (President of Uzbekistan, July 3; see EDM, July 15).
Azerbaijan’s emerging role as a trans-Caspian connectivity hub is extending beyond transportation into energy and digital infrastructure. Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Uzbekistan are currently developing the Central Asia–Azerbaijan Green Energy Corridor, which is intended to transmit renewable electricity across the Caspian Sea and potentially to Europe (Ministry of Energy of Azerbaijan, February 2, March 4). The Trans-Caspian fiber-optic link is creating a direct digital connection between Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan (Report, August 5).
Azerbaijan’s state visits and full participation in the Consultative Meetings extend beyond expanding the institutional framework. Developments in summer 2026 suggest that practical connections across the Caspian are reinforcing this political convergence and integrating Azerbaijan and the Central Asian states into a more interconnected regional system.