Taiwan’s Cautious Optimism on U.S. National Security Strategy

Taiwan’s Cautious Optimism on U.S. National Security Strategy

Executive Summary:

• Initial responses in Taiwan to the 2025 U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) have been divided, largely in line with stakeholders’ political persuasions.
• Those in President Lai’s administration have welcomed the document’s large number of mentions of Taiwan, the removal of language referring to a U.S. “one China Policy” and not supporting Taiwan independence, and the commitment to “denying aggression” in the first island chain.
• Opposition Kuomintang voices, as well as some aligned with the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), have voiced concern about the NSS. They worry that the strategy’s focus on the Western Hemisphere, coupled with the administration’s apparent softening in tone toward Beijing, could lead to a “strategic retreat” from Taiwan.
• U.S. emphasis on burden sharing for a Taiwan contingency puts additional pressure on Taiwan to increase its self-defense capabilities and cooperate more with Indo-Pacific allies.

On December 4, 2025, the White House released the 2025 National Security Strategy (NSS). The document mentions Taiwan eight times, the third-most of any country, after the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Russia. It also attaches great importance to the prevention of a Taiwan Strait conflict, saying that “deterring a conflict over Taiwan, ideally by preserving military overmatch, is a priority,” and calling for the capacity to deny aggression “anywhere” in the first island chain (White House, December 4, 2025). In addition to focusing on Taiwan’s strategic value, it also notes Taiwan’s economic importance, due to its “dominance of semiconductor production.”

The document contains several subtle shifts in language on Taiwan from the Biden administration’s 2022 NSS. While the earlier document said that the United States would “oppose” any unilateral changes to the status quo, the new strategy simply says that it “does not support” any changes. The new NSS also drops language from the Biden administration’s strategy on not supporting Taiwan independence and on remaining committed to a “one China policy” (White House, October 12, 2022).

Initial Taiwanese reactions to the release of the NSS ranged from cautious optimism to outright skepticism. Some interpreted the language as signaling greater U.S. strategic clarity regarding the Taiwan Strait, while others focused on linguistic shifts in the NSS to argue that it may foreshadow higher expectations for Taiwan and greater uncertainty about Washington’s long-term intentions.

Incumbent Administration Optimistic

The day after the NSS was released, President Lai Ching-te (賴清德) remarked on social media that he “greatly appreciate[d]” the prioritization of deterring a conflict over Taiwan and securing the first island chain (X/@ChingteLai, December 5, 2025). Presidential Office Spokesperson Karen Kuo (郭雅慧) described preventing an assault on Taiwan as the strategy’s most important objective, saying that “as long as Taiwan is safe, the Indo-Pacific is safe” (台灣沒事，印太就沒事) (SETN, December 6, 2025). [1]

Cabinet-level officials also reacted positively. Taiwan’s foreign minister, Lin Chia-lung (林佳龍), broadened his comments to include reference to Taiwan’s role in key supply chains. He said that President Trump’s recent signing of the Taiwan Assurance Implementation Act and his approval of arms sale packages to Taiwan demonstrate continued U.S. commitment to Taiwan (Reuters, November 18, 2025; MoFA, December 6, 2025). Taiwan’s defense minister, Wellington Koo (顧立雄), remarked that “peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific is still the United States’s greatest core interest” (印太區域和平穩定還是美國最大的核心利益), emphasizing collective deterrence as well as Taiwan’s progress in its resolve and self-defense capabilities (LTN, December 6, 2025).

This tone was echoed among Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) legislators and DPP-affiliated experts. Wang Ting-yu (王定宇), who sits on the Legislative Yuan’s Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee, said that Taiwan “is seen as an important core interest” (視為重要的核心利益) of the United States, and noted that Taiwan’s importance to the United States “is very clearly stated” (描述的非常清楚) in the NSS (SETN, December 6, 2025). Su Tzu-yun (蘇紫雲), director of the Defense Strategy and Resources Division (國防戰略與資源研究所) at the government-affiliated think tank Institute for National Defense and Security Research (INDSR; 國防安全研究院) said that the NSS affirms U.S. strategic clarity and represents a fourth “period of strategic opportunity” (戰略機遇期) in Taiwan’s recent history. [2] Su noted that references in the NSS to “collective defense” and commitments to “denying aggression” in the first island chain should lead to a decrease in “skepticism of the United States” (疑美論) (LTN, December 7, 2025).

Other Figures Respond With Caution

The NSS makes clear that the burden of preventing conflict in the Taiwan Strait is not the unilateral responsibility of the United States. It says that U.S. allies “must step up and spend—and more importantly do—much more for collective defense,” and that the U.S. will “maintain our determined rhetoric on increased defense spending” in Taiwan.

This has caused some anxiety, even among politicians connected to the DPP administration. General Lee Hsiang-yu (李翔宙), who served as National Security Bureau director under President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) and ambassador to Denmark under President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文), interpreted the NSS as demanding that Taiwan develop “absolute deterrence” (絕對性嚇阻) (UDN, December 7, 2025). He also warned that Taiwan must avoid being a victim of great power competition.

On the other side of Taiwan’s political spectrum, the Kuomintang (KMT) leadership and local officials have been uncharacteristically quiet, giving no official response on the NSS. One legislator, Lee Yen-hsiu (李彥秀), acknowledged the language in the NSS but criticized delays in U.S. arms deliveries, urging Washington to pressure manufacturers to adhere to delivery timelines (Radio Taiwan International, December 7, 2025).

Some perspectives from the pro-PRC wing of the KMT overlapped with Beijing’s response to the NSS, particularly regarding the PRC’s interpretation of U.S. intentions in the Western Hemisphere (China Brief, December 17, 2025). Former KMT Legislator and media pundit Tsai Cheng-yuan (蔡正元) emphasized the NSS’s ambition to “reassert and enforce the Monroe Doctrine to restore American preeminence in the Western Hemisphere,” stating that the NSS represented a “strategic retreat” (戰略撤退) and that the United States was “hollowing out its Indo-Pacific strategy” (將印太戰略掏空化). This sentiment was reiterated by another former KMT legislator, Joanna Chien Lei (雷倩), who sees Trump as intending to rely on Taiwan and Japan to contain the PRC. Tsai also argued that the U.S. government is softening its view of the PRC from “enemy number one” (頭號敵人) to “a friend that they are not on good terms with” (不太好的朋友) (Storm Media Group, December 8, 2025).

Conclusion

Different stakeholders in Taiwan have reacted in different ways to the new U.S. National Security Strategy. Many are reassured of continued U.S. attention and support, especially those in the DPP administration. At the same time, the NSS has sharpened debates over burden sharing and Taiwan’s decision-making agency within the overall U.S. strategy. It has not resolved longstanding ambiguities surrounding U.S. commitments to Taiwan, but instead has reframed them in ways that have been interpreted either as opportunities or as challenges. Going forward, Taiwan will likely continue its ongoing military modernization and seek greater cooperation with Japan in recognition that it will not be able to rely solely on the United States in a future Taiwan contingency.

Notes

[1] The specific wording “台灣沒事，印太就沒事” is in reference to “台灣有事就是日本有事” (Any contingency for Taiwan is a contingency for Japan), first articulated by former Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe in 2021 after leaving office. (The original Japanese is “台湾有事は日本有事.”) Recently, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi referenced the concept in response to a question in parliament that a PRC attack on Taiwan could constitute an “existential crisis” for Japan, allowing for Japan to resort to self-defense.

[2] The other three “periods of strategic opportunity,” according to Su, were President George W. Bush’s arms sale package to Taiwan in 2001 and his commitment to defend Taiwan; the Taiwan Travel Act, passed under the first Trump administration; and President Biden’s four public commitments to defending Taiwan (LTN, December 7, 2025).