Tajikistan Yet to Complete Leadership Transition and Problems are Growing

Tajikistan Yet to Complete Leadership Transition and Problems are Growing

Executive Summary:

• Tajikistan President Emomali Rahmon has signaled for almost a decade that he wants his son Rustam Emomali to succeed him. He has transferred some powers, but the longtime leader has not yet completed that process.
• Problems within Rahmon’s family, fears about Tajikistan’s stability, and its fraught relationships with neighboring countries such as Afghanistan, as well as by the role of outside powers such as the People’s Republic of China and Russia, have slowed this effort.
• The longer the process lasts, however, the more likely alternative power centers will emerge, increasing risks that leadership struggles will grow into a much larger crisis, something Rahmon’s go-slow approach seeks to avoid but may be making inevitable.

For almost a decade, Tajikistan’s President Emomali Rahmon has signaled that he wants his son, Rustam, to succeed him and has transferred some powers. The longtime leader, however, has not yet completed that process. Tajikistan remains the only post-Soviet state that has not completed at least one leadership transition since the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991 (Window on Eurasia, December 7, 2019; Most.media, February 25). The process has been slowed by problems within the Rahmon family, including both uncertainties about Rustam’s abilities and the ambitions of some of his other children. There are concerns about how a transition might affect Tajikistan’s stability, given its poverty, the return of migrant workers from Russia, and regional challenges such as unrest in Gorno-Badakhshan (see EDM, November 30, 2021). Other concerns include its fraught relationships with neighboring countries such as Afghanistan and the role of outside powers such as the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Russia (see EDM, July 12, 2021, July 18, 2024, May 20, 2025; Window on Eurasia, December 8, 2025). However difficult the handoff of power to the next generation may be, the longer this process continues, the more likely such alternative centers of power are to emerge in Dushanbe, and the more likely outside actors are to intervene. These developments could quickly transform the inevitable problems in a leadership transition into a genuine national crisis. Rahmon’s go-slow abroad has sought to avoid a leadership transition, but that may end by making the situation worse (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, October 13, 2020).

The history of post-Soviet Tajikistan helps to explain Rahmon’s caution. Before Rahmon was chosen as speaker of the parliament—the head of state—in 1992 and then became the third president of the country when that position was restored in 1994, Tajikistan went through three leaders in rapid succession. The country descended into a brutal civil war involving personal factions in Dushanbe and regional ones from throughout the country. Emomali Rahmon was installed as leader precisely because many assumed he would be weak and could be removed easily by those who had put him in office (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, October 13, 2020). He quickly proved those who thought so wrong. He not only ended the civil war in 1996 but also built a despotic regime surpassing the cruelty of his predecessors. He has maintained power by repression and a regular series of purges. The most recent of these took place in January 2026, when Rahmon removed almost all senior national security officials from office. Some were purged because they were too closely allied with foreign countries and others because they had shown themselves more prepared to work to improve the lives of Tajikistanis than Rahmon (President of Tajikistan, January 16; Most.media, February 25).

Despite his power and political prowess, Emomali Rahmon, just like other authoritarians, has never been able to control the passage of time. Having come to office at 40, he is now 73. His age has forced him to think about the future after he departs the scene and what he can do to control it. Having no ideological alignment or commitments beyond maintaining power, the current leader has looked first to his family members as potential successors. He has seven daughters and two sons. In the last decade, however, he fastened on his son Rustam as his choice for succession. He has appointed him to ever more senior positions, even though many of his siblings reportedly feel they are more qualified than Rustam, who has trouble with public speaking and is rumored to be unable to control his anger (Most.media, February 25). Rustam’s siblings, however, are hardly the only ones with presidential aspirations.

Those Rahmon has dismissed among Rustam’s likely opponents. This group also includes individuals with particular ties to regions such as the always restive Gorno-Badakhshan in the Pamirs and to foreign powers such as Russia and the PRC who have an increasingly large footprint in Tajikistan (see EDM, April 30, 2020, November 30, 2021, December 7, 2021). The PRC even has extensive territorial claims on Tajikistan (see EDM, September 30, 2020). Some opponents may try to exploit ongoing Taliban attacks along Tajikistan’s southern border, either by complaining that Dushanbe has not done enough to protect the country or by seeking to cooperate with Kabul in some way (Window on Eurasia, December 8, 2025). Others may adopt a populist program to help the impoverished population, whose difficulties are only intensifying as population growth continues at explosive levels (Most.media, February 25). The situation with migrant workers may deteriorate as remittances are declining, many are returning from the Russian Federation and seeking work, and Moscow is considering the denunciation of a dual citizenship arrangement (Window on Eurasia, December 12, 2025; see EDM, May 20, 2025). Because of Rahmon’s tight control of the media and his willingness to repress any open opposition, these potential opponents must operate quietly, biding their time. As Rahmon ages and the succession issue remains unresolved, some or all of these groups are almost certain to become more active, and their activism could easily threaten to restart struggles that would recall the civil war of the 1990s.

Potential internal opposition and the instability Tajikistan faced during Rahmon’s reign help explain why he is not rushing to complete the transition. He is apparently convinced that only he can hold the country together and keep it on his preferred track. Recent years have brought about developments that have convinced him he is right. In March 2025, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan reached a border delimitation agreement, ending a dispute that led to at least 150 clashes between 1991 and 2022 (see EDM, March 12, 2025). Central Asia appears closer than ever to a water-sharing agreement under which downstream countries pay upstream countries such as Tajikistan for water, as dialogue within the region increases (Government of Kazakhstan, February 23). Russia and the PRC are increasingly working with Dushanbe. Despite trade with Russia increasing 9.3 percent from 2024 to 2025, the PRC became Tajikistan’s largest trading partner in 2025, and it has invested more than $5.1 billion in capital since 2007 (The Times of Central Asia, July 15, 2025; Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, January 21). These ties provide Rahmon with more security assistance, but none have prompted him to change course (Most.media, February 25).

Given Rahmon’s past successes that have kept him in power for more than 30 years, no one should assume that he is wrong, at least in the short term. Rahmon could easily live another decade, and his political skills may allow him to remain in power until his death. The increasing challenges his regime faces both from within and abroad suggest that Emomali Rahmon will not be able to control the situation. In that event, the current leader is unlikely to be able to install Rustam in a country at peace with itself and its neighbors. Tajikistan’s future may turn out to be as troubled as its past, exactly the opposite of what the current president intends. Tajikistan is not the only post-Soviet republic whose leader seeks to remain in power for his lifetime while choosing a successor for after his passing (Window on Eurasia, November 19, 2019). For those reasons, if for no other, what is going on in Tajikistan bears watching as a harbinger of what may happen elsewhere as well.