The Bizarre Biography of Algerian Jihadist Meraghni “Akil” El-Hadj Ali

The Bizarre Biography of Algerian Jihadist Meraghni “Akil” El-Hadj Ali

Introduction

January 16, 2023 marked ten years since the attack at In Amenas gas facility in Algeria, which has been—and perhaps will long remain—the last major “systematic” jihadist attack that the country suffered (Jeune Afrique, January 23, 2013). While jihadists belonging to both al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (IS) have remained active in Algeria, they have not been able to replicate anything near the scale and impact of the In Amenas attack (Radio France International, January 16, 2023). The jihadist threat in Algeria is not particularly severe currently, to the extent that Algerian President Abdelmadjid Tebboune has claimed that “terrorism is over in Algeria” (Le Figaro, December 29, 2022). The latest issue of El Djeich, which is the official magazine of the Algerian army, further claimed a litany of significant counter-terrorism successes (El Djeich, No. 714, January 2023).

Against this backdrop, 2023 in Algeria started with the January 3 public confession of Meraghni El-Hadj Ali, or “Akil,” an alleged Islamic State in the West Africa Province (ISWAP) member. On Algerian public television, he discussed his connections with IS and his journey as a jihadist in Syria to ISWAP’s territories in Nigeria and the Lake Chad region. This gained significant attention in Algeria and stirred debate in the media and newspapers about militancy, the risks of online recruitment, and the existence of external actors that want to strike Algeria to thwart its rise as a major regional power (El Moudjahid, January 3; Ennahar Online, January 3; La Nouvelle République Algérie, January 4; Le Carrefour D’Algèrie, January 4; L’Expression, Algèrie, January 5).

From the Syrian Jihad to ISWAP

Akil was born in 1986 in El Oued, a province located in eastern Algeria between the Atlas Mountains and the Sahara Desert, near the border with Tunisia. According to his testimony, he entered Syria illegally in 2013 by traveling through Istanbul and Antakya, Turkey and then joined Ahrar al-Sham (L’Expression, Algèrie, January 5). Specifically, he became part of the “Nusrat Al-Mazloum (Supporters of the Oppressed),” which operated under the orders of the emir Abu Sofiane al-Jabalawi, and trained for about one month in the village of al-Kabir (El Moudjahid, January 3). However, according to his confession, he soon became uneasy with the leaders of the movement, who he accused of being “deceitful and materialistic” by considering jihad a business and caring more about their properties in Turkey than guiding young people to wage their jihad (L’Expression, Algèrie, January 5).

Akil started pretending to be sick in order to leave Syria and managed to receive permission to go for treatment in Turkey. Akil had all necessary documents to remain in Turkey, and stayed there for three months, working in a restaurant. He was planning to move to Europe, but instead returned to Algeria, where the security services arrested him in September 2013. He was charged with joining a terrorist organization abroad and sentenced to three years in jail (El Moudjahid, January 3).

Once out of jail, Akil claimed he tried to live a normal life but soon fell victim to online recruitment when a “Tunisian contact” he met online persuaded him to join IS in what Algerian observers described as “a blatant example of the significant threat that the web poses to the security and stability of the society” (La Nouvelle République Algérie, January 4). Akil then recounted that at the beginning of September 2022, he recorded a video to pledge allegiance to ISWAP’s leader in Nigeria and the Lake Chad region. In the video, he also discussed how he explained to the ISWAP leaders what his plans were; Akil wanted to create a new group under ISWAP that was aimed at “targeting oil sites in the south [of Algeria] and senior state officials.” He also stated that his group had the idea to establish a safe contact area with the ISWAP members in the area of Tassili N’Ajjer in southeast Algeria (Independent Arabia, January 6).

After this video, he then started preparing for operations by going to Algiers and contacting a person named Hamza Safsaf, who in the past had helped him smuggle a wanted individual across the borders with Libya (Ennahar Online, January 3). Safsaf offered Akil the opportunity to carry out a terrorist attack in Algiers that would target eminent personalities to gain “maximum media coverage.” However, Algerian security forces were monitoring his Facebook posts and intervened, capturing him (Atalayar, January 5). At the end of the footage, Akil expressed his regrets and requested to be forgiven or, at least, to have a “commutation of his sentence.” He urged youngsters not to follow “this path which can only end in prison, death or bewilderment,” also urging “terrorists who have been involved with armed groups to drop armed action and surrender to the security services.”

Proving IS’s Weakness in Algeria?

Akil’s video confession is peculiar and partially bizarre because it seems like a staged attempt to not only show the efficacy of the security services, but also to serve as a warning for Algerians, and especially youngsters, who might be attracted by jihadist recruiters online. The most interesting aspect of the confession is that Akil claimed he joined ISWAP. According to the information available, Akil had no previous experiences with IS in Algeria.

In the years in which IS tried to establish a presence in Algeria, Akil was in prison most of the time. The actual Islamic State experience in Algeria has been limited, complicated, and above-all short-lived, due to the ruthless response from the authorities. This is because of the “eradication” mentality that has characterized the approach of the Algerian military since the 1990s to crack down on jihadist groups, including first and foremost the Armed Islamic Group (GIA). Thus, as soon as IS made its appearance in Algeria, the security forces reacted swiftly and destroyed its cells immediately (Jeune Afrique, September 24, 2014).

In addition, in December 2014, Algerian special forces killed Abdelmalek Gouri near Boumerdes, which is 50 kilometers east of Algiers (aljazeera, December 23, 2014). Gouri was a veteran of Algeria’s civil war and leader of Jund al-Khilafa, or “Soldiers of the Caliphate” group, which declared its allegiance to the IS in September 2014. Therefore, Algerian security officials focused heavily on IS’s Algeria Province because they feared it could gain traction. This strategy was successful, as IS militants found it difficult to operate in Algeria.

After this first crackdown, between 2014 and 2017, the Algerian security services also dismantled around 40 cells that were recruiting jihadists to join IS in Iraq and Syria (Le Jeune Independent, March 18, 2017). Following the assassination of the French hostage Hervé Gourdel in September 2014, there was not another IS-claimed incident for three years. In February 26, 2017, however, a Bab El Kantara police station in Constantine, eastern Algeria was hit by a suicide bomber, injuring two police officers (Le Point, March 2, 2017). However, the impact of the suicide bombing was minimal, and the group failed to strengthen its presence in Algeria. In these months, Akil was already out of prison, but it is unclear when he started becoming interested in IS activities through the Tunisian recruiter he met online.

As such, the idea that an Algerian like Akil would affiliate with ISWAP to conduct activities inside Algeria is unusual. On the one hand, it suggests that IS in Algeria is so weak that prospective members or recruits must join groups operating somewhere else like Nigeria. However, from this point of view, it is even stranger that Akil joined ISWAP and not, for instance, Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), which is based in the Sahel and theoretically should be the group that, for geographic outreach and historical evolution, would have Algeria among its targets and Algerians among its members.

Conclusion

The public confession of Akil has stirred a debate in Algerian media regarding online jihadist recruitment and the dangers linked to these activities. However, this confession also has a number of peculiar and in many aspects bizarre claims. Akil, after his first disappointing jihadist experience in Syria and the three years spent in jail in Algeria, fell victim again, joined IS, and pledged allegiance to ISWAP in September 2022. He was arrested after security forces intercepted his activities on Facebook. If true, his allegiance to ISWAP and ambition to operate in Algeria remain bizarre, but at best is a testament to the weakness of the IS network in Algeria and strength of the IS network in Nigeria.