The Killing of Ba Ag Moussa: France, Mali and the issue of Negotiating with Jihadists
The Killing of Ba Ag Moussa: France, Mali and the issue of Negotiating with Jihadists
On November 13, the French Defense Minister Florence Parly officially announced the killing of Ba Ag Moussa, who she defined as the “military leader of the Group for Supporters of Islam and Muslims [JNIM—Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen; Groupe de soutien à l’islam et aux musulmans] and one of the most important aides to the group’s chief Iyad Ag Ghali.”
Parly added that after France focused its attention on the area of the so-called “three frontiers”—referring to the border area of Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso—and degraded the capacities of the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), Paris shifted its focus to undermining the capabilities of the local al-Qaeda affiliate, JNIM. Parly, in her statement, recalled the attacks of October 30 and November 6, before stressing that “France attacks whoever, in the name of their deadly ideology, go against the civilian population and try to destabilize the states of the region” (Twitter.com/florence_parly, November 13).
According to the spokesman for the French General Staff, Colonel Frédéric Barbry, the soldiers tried to intercept Ag Moussa, who was travelling in a pickup truck, accompanied by four other militants, approximately 140 kilometers north of Ménaka. The occupiers of the pickup, heavily armed with machine guns and other weapons, opened fire. The clash lasted about fifteen minutes, and resulted in deaths of all the men in the pickup (Le Figaro, November 13).
Personal Profile
Ba Ag Moussa (sometimes spelled Bah or Ibah Ag Moussa, a.k.a. Bamoussa Diarra or Bamoussa, and with the jihadist nom de guerre of Abu Sharia) was born in Tin-Essago, in the area of Kidal in northern Mali in the 1970s. Some sources say he was 50 years old, but in reality, the exact date on which he was born is not known. Ag Moussa received military training in Libya, like many Touareg, during Gaddafi’s years. The Malian press described him as “a historical figure in the Tuareg rebellions of the 1990s… Converted to jihadism twenty years later, he is also the most famous deserter from the Malian army” (Le Matin {Bamako}, November 17).
In the 1990s, he took part in the second Toureg rebellion, which was terminated in 1996, and later was integrated into the Malian army. However, he joined future jihadist leaders—such as Iyad Ag Ghali, the future founder of Ansar Dine and later of JNIM, and Seidane Ag Hitta—in the third Tuareg rebellion, which was initiated by Hassan Ag Fagaga in 2006 (Mali Online, November 13; see MLM, July 2017).
After the Tuareg rebels and the Malian government negotiated a new agreement under the auspices of the Algerian government, the so-called Algiers Agreement of 2006, he once again re-joined the army. He received the rank of colonel and was appointed commander of the special units responsible for combating insecurity in the region (Le Matin [Bamako], November 17).
The shockwaves created by the eruption of the Arab Spring revolution in Libya created the conditions for a new wave of destabilization in Mali (see Terrorism Monitor, April 14, 2011). In 2012, Ag Moussa deserted again, joining the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA—Mouvement National de Libération de l’Azawad), but, being considered close to Iyad Ag Ghaly, he quickly became part of the jihadist group Ansar Dine, with the nom de guerre ‘Abu Sharia.’ Over the years, his name emerged on several occasions, for instance regarding the Aguelhoc massacre and the battles of Ménaka, Tessalit, and Kidal (Mali Online, November 13). When the group merged with other jihadist formations, with part of the AQIM conglomeration forming JNIM, Ag Moussa allegedly became the new group’s leader of military operations. This was likely the main reason why France targeted him. His name came into the spotlight for the attack in Dioura, which took place on March 17, 2019, which left at least 23 dead. In July 2019, Ag Moussa was added to the U.S. sanctions list, classifying him as a global terrorist and including him in the list of people whose assets should be frozen in the United States (Essalama, July 17, 2019).
What Does his Death Mean? France’s Motives for Killing Ag Moussa Now
Ba Ag Moussa is not the first high-profile member of JNIM or, more broadly speaking, of AQIM that France has killed: in May 2020, France announced the death of Abdelmalek Droukdel, the historical leader of AQIM and, at the time of his death, al-Qaeda’s longest-serving leader across all the branches of its organization. In 2019, France also managed to kill Djamal Okacha and Abou Iyadh. Last year, France also announced the killing of Amadou Koufa, the head of Katiba Macina, but he later reappeared in a video, throwing a severe propaganda blow to France.
The killing of Ag Moussa, however, is the first significant development since two major recent events. First, the military coup d’état in Mali in August 2020, which terminated the government administration of President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta (Jeune Afrique, August 19; Afrik, August 19; Agence Malienne de Presse, August 21).
Second, the release of around 200 jihadist fighters in the wake of negotiations to release Soumaïla Cisse, a prominent Malian politician who was minister of finance from 1993 to 2000 and who ran for the presidentcy several times. He was kidnapped in March 2020, and was released alongside the French hostage Sophie Petronin and two Italian hostages, Father Pier Luigi Maccalli and Nicola Chiacchio (Agence Malienne de Presse, October 9; Il Foglio, October 9; Liberation, October 14.)
This operation was indisputably a major strategic and propaganda success for Iyad Ag Ghaly. On top of the money received as a part of the exchange, JNIM also tried to capitalize on the release by showing Ghaly welcoming the freed militants.
The killing of Ag Moussa was not an isolated operation, however. While he is the highest-ranking jihadist to be killed in this wave of attacks, France has allegedly killed more than 40 JNIM members in several raids that were carried out following the hostages’ release in October.
Malian observers wondered what the rationale is for this more assertive attitude toward JNIM: whether this approach is part of a broader strategy aimed at preparing the ground for negotiation or is, instead, the opposite, a way to sabotage any further attempt to negotiate (Le Soir de Bamako, November 26).
In February 2020, the ousted Malian President Keïta announced his availability to negotiate with jihadist leaders active in the country, an offer that piqued the interest of JNIM. The group responded in March by saying that it was interested in pursuing a dialogue (France 24, February 10).
Clearly, the elephant in the room of any possible negotiation between the Malian government and jihadist groups is France. The French position on whether jihadists could, and should, be considered as potential partners in a dialogue with the Malian government has evolved over the years.
In 2017, after JNIM claimed responsibility for the killing of the French soldier Julien Barbé the then-Foreign Affairs Minister, and former Prime Minister, Jean-Marc Ayrault, said that “There should not be the slightest doubt” that the answer to the question of “How to negotiate with the terrorists?” is “an unambiguous fight.” (Ouest-France, April 7, 2017).
When Mali announced the intention to open a dialogue with Malian jihadists, the current French Foreign Affairs Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian said, “It is not for me to enter into a debate specific to Mali. It is the responsibility of Malians to ensure that an inclusive debate takes place… Malian officials must take the appropriate initiatives so that reconciliations can take place” (Radio France Internationale, February 27). However, in November 2020, speaking to Jeune Afrique, the French President Emmanuel Macron was quite categoric in saying that “with terrorists, we do not talk. We fight” (Jeune Afrique, November 20).
President Keïta announced the intention to open up negotiation with Malian jihadists weeks after the G5 Sahel Summit in Pau took place in January 2020. As such, given the influence of Paris over Mali, it seems unlikely that this decision was announced without some sort of green light from France. In addition, the summit in Pau clearly showed that the major concern of France and local states was Islamic State and its rise in the Sahel (Jeune Afrique, January 14).
At that time, the Sahel was also one of the few areas of the world in which Islamic State and local al-Qaeda forces were actually collaborating. As such, it is likely that the Malian attempt to launch a negotiation process had a two-fold aim.
First, responding to the pressure coming from Malian civil society, which made it clear through the recommendations of the Conference of National Understanding, the National Inclusive Dialogue, and other civilian initiatives that it was broadly supportive of a national dialogue with Malian jihadists (Le Matin [Bamako], November 17). Although Keïta was ousted, even the transitional power has clearly shown its intention to negotiate with Malian jihadists. The need to pursue this dialogue is widely shared in the Malian political environment.
Second, disrupting the existing ties between al-Qaeda forces and ISGS. While this alliance was neither strategic nor structural, the Sahel was likely one of the (few) areas of the jihadist space in which the members of the two organizations were often working together.
The process initiated in February/March did indeed result in further worsening the ongoing tension existing between JNIM and IS that started emerging in mid-2019 with small-scale clashes. The collaboration between the two groups thus vanished definitively, and IS acknowledged on its social media channels a number of attacks carried out against JNIM forces.
Against this backdrop, the killing of Ag Moussa suggests that France wants to maintain its point that no dialogue is possible with jihadist groups. The killing of Droukdel in May did not immediately affect the potential for negotiations in Mali, as Droukdel—although being the formal emir of AQIM—was allegedly less involved in Malian issues. However, a number of allegations made by AQIM in a video released to announce the appointment of al-Annabi as the new head of the organization might suggest that Droukdel was more present in northern Mali than usually thought. The killing of Ag Moussa, instead, has a more direct impact on the Malian and Sahelian environment and JNIM’s immediate capabilities.
So, why did France ostensibly move from the possibilistic approach envisioned by Le Drian when news emerged of the possibility of a dialogue between Bamako and JNIM, to its near closure by Macron? Likely, domestic issues are at stake in this case. Macron launched a war against what he defined as “Islamist separatism” inside France, following the wave of terrorist attacks that occurred in the country over the past few months. As such, in a battle that is perceived to be against an ideology that is considered structurally at odds with French laïcité (secularism) and Republican values, the idea that France can—if not actively, at least without interfering in the dialogue—accept jihadists as legitimate actors in a negotiation is unacceptable. As such, rather than weakening JNIM to allow the Malian government to negotiate from a position of strength, the killing of Ag Moussa seems likely to hurt the chances of a successful negotiation, or at least discourage any dialogue from taking place. This is despite the evident preference for negotiations that Malians, at different levels, have expressed over the past several months.
Conclusions: Is JNIM Getting Ready to Fight Back?
Ba Ag Moussa was targeted for being a crucial element within the military operational chain-of-command of the organization. As such, the military capabilities of JNIM should, at least in the immediate short-term, be significantly degraded. The multiple attacks that hit Kidal, Gao, and Ménaka against military camps housing international forces on November 30 are quite relevant, as it is likely JNIM’s response to the wave of French attacks. The camps were hit by “indirect fire,” according to the French army spokesman Thomas Romiguier. Only the Minusma base in Kidal suffered damage, though there were no casualties.
JNIM claimed responsibility for the attacks through one of its affiliated media groups, al-Sabat. Although the attack did not cause any casualties and material damages were limited, the fact that the group had the capacity to coordinate three simultaneous attacks in cities hundreds of kilometers apart from each other in a relatively short period of time suggests that the killing of Ag Moussa has only partially undermined, at least, the fluidity of the military chain-of-command. The group retains remarkable operational capability (Agence Ecofin, November 30; L’Orient Le Jour, November 30; Benin Web TV, December 1).
Attacks on international forces and their barracks are nevertheless frequent in the area, but rarely do they occur with such coordination. This is likely only JNIM’s first response in what could be a series of attacks against the French presence in the region. These attacks were likely a message by JNIM, showcasing how its military’s operational capacities have not been affected by the killing of Ag Moussa.
Ag Moussa’s story was similar to that of many Malian Tuaregs—including JNIM leader Iyad Ag Ghali—having fought for the Tuareg independentist cause before moving to jihad. He was indeed a relevant player within JNIM, but the group has the strength and the depth to survive deaths in its leadership, as its increased activities in the region over the past five years demonstrate. For France, his killing was the first major operation after the Malian coup d’état and the release of hostages, and a way to show its renewed assertiveness in denying any chance of a dialogue with regional jihadist forces.
