The Most Wanted Al-Qaeda Leaders in Syria: Abu Hammam al-Shami, Sami al-Uraydi, and Abu Abd al-Karim al-Masri

The Most Wanted Al-Qaeda Leaders in Syria: Abu Hammam al-Shami, Sami al-Uraydi, and Abu Abd al-Karim al-Masri

Al-Qaeda has had a bumpy relationship with the jihadists in Syria since the beginning of the civil war. The al-Nusra Front, which was the extension of the Islamic State of Iraq into Syria, split from Islamic State (IS) and declared its allegiance to the global organization of al-Qaeda in 2013. Three years later, al-Nusra started to dissociate itself from al-Qaeda and the global jihadist movement in order to focus on Syria. In 2018, Hurras al-Din (The Guardian of Religion—HAD) was formed by al-Qaeda loyalists in Syria. In September, the U.S. State Department announced rewards for information on three prominent leaders of HAD—Faruq al-Suri, Sami al-Uraydi, and Abu Abd al-Karim al-Masri (Rewards for Justice).

Faruq al-Suri—A.K.A. Abu Hammam al-Shami

Faruq al-Suri was born in Syria in 1973. His real name is Samir Hijazi, a.k.a. Abu Hammam al-Shami. As a young jihadist, al-Shami traveled to Afghanistan in 1998, where he worked under the leadership of his fellow Syrian Abu Mus’ab al-Suri, one the most prominent strategic thinkers of the global jihadist movement. Al-Shami progressed quickly in the movement and in 2000 he was entrusted to meet al-Qaeda’s then leader Osama bin Laden and personally declare allegiance to him by shaking hands. Al-Shami was given command of the Syrian members of al-Qaeda (Aawsat, March 7, 2015).

As Abu Musa’ab al-Zarqawi was operating semi-independently from al-Qaeda to establish a jihadist organization in Iraq weeks before the U.S.-led invasion of 2003, al-Shami was sent by bin Laden on a mission to examine the situation on the ground. He met with al-Zarqawi and other jihadists. Al-Shami stayed in Iraq until he was captured and transferred back home to Syria, but he managed to return to Iraq. He is believed to have operated between Iraq and Syria until 2008, when the Syrian regime, which had turned a blind eye to the jihadists’ activities and movements between Syria and Iraq, became more strict in dealing with jihadists. Al-Shami attempted to move to Lebanon, but he was arrested there and sentenced to five years in a Lebanese prison. After his release in 2012, al-Shami returned to Syria to start the first group of the al-Nusra Front, which became al-Qaeda’s branch in Syria. While Abu Muhammad al-Julani became the leader of al-Nusra, al-Shami became the military commander of the group. Al-Shami survived several battles and air strikes, and reports of his death at the time turned out to be mistaken (Alalam TV, August 19, 2016).

Al-Shami vehemently opposed al-Julani’s decisions to abandon al-Qaeda. He was one of the first men to join HAD, and is now the leader of the organization (Arabi21, March 11, 2018).

Sami al-Uraydi

Sami al-Uraydi was born in Amman in 1973. He studied Islamic theology at the Jordanian University, where he acquired a Bachelor’s degree in the subject in order to pursue a career as a scholar. He received a PhD in 2001. When the Syrian civil war broke out, he traveled there to join his fellow jihadists (24.ae March 18, 2018).

With his academic background and Salafist credentials, al-Urydi was appointed to the position of religious leader (al-wali al-shari’i) of al-Nusra in Dara’a province in southern Syria. When the dispute between Islamic State and al-Nusra escalated, al-Urydi played a major role in making the case for al-Nusra as the legitimate jihadist group in Syria. He made arguments to support al-Nusra’s claim of being a genuine jihadist group and al-Qaeda’s branch against IS’ insistence that al-Nusra and its leader al-Julani should keep their initial form as an extension of IS and its branch in Syria. Al-Uraydi was subsequently promoted to the position of religious leader of al-Nusra in the whole of Syria (Islamist Movements, June 8, 2016).

When al-Nusra started to disassociate itself from al-Qaeda, al-Uraydi opposed the decision. He eventually split from al-Nusra to start his own organization, Ansar al-Furqan (Alrai, October 15, 2017).

In late 2017, al-Julani’s HTS arrested al-Uraydi and other jihadist defectors who wished to stay associated with al-Qaeda. The crackdown caused an angry backlash from jihadists in and outside Syria. Al-Zawahiri himself issued a statement condemning al-Julani’s action. Despite his strategy to distance his organization from al-Qaeda and global jihad, al-Julani was not willing to become an enemy of al-Qaeda. He released al-Uraydi and other arrested jihadists. They have since joined Hurras al-Din, which controls a relatively small area in northwestern Syria (Qasioun, December 12, 2017).

Abu Abd al-Karim al-Masri

Abu Abd al-Karim al-Masri is the most shadowy figure among the three men. He is believed to have been a veteran member of al-Qaeda from its 1990s days in Afghanistan, where he knew bin Laden and al-Zawahiri personally and worked under their command. He played a role in mediating between HTS and HAD after the arrests of the jihadists in late 2017. When that was solved and al-Julani allowed HAD to operate in Idlib, al-Masri became a member of HAD (Lebanon24, October 1).

In 2016, even before the split between al-Nusra and al-Qaeda became clear, al-Masri was against it. He is believed to be the author of a booklet urging jihadists to keep their focus on their confrontation with the United States. In al-Ibtikar al-Fattan Fi Istihdaf al-Amrikan (The Creative Invention in Targeting the Americans), al-Masri explains his strategy and tactics. The booklet is one of the most notorious pieces of literature produced by any jihadist group. It encourages jihadists to launch attacks in the United States or against U.S. interests in the world using children and mentally ill people. It also emphasizes improvization in the method of attacks and weapons to be used (Elmarada, August 18, 2016).

It was not until HAD emerged that the dissociation between al-Nusra and al-Qaeda became clear and to some extent credible. The verification of the split primarily came from the three men who had prominent statue within al-Qaeda and who operated in its ranks for a long time.

Conclusion

As al-Shami, with his experience and endorsement, provided the military leadership, and al-Uraydi, with his theological credentials, provided the religious authority, al-Masri gives the strategic vision, especially in the area of global jihad. The question of who is the standard bearer of global jihad has been the most important dispute between IS and al-Qaeda. With these three men in its leadership, HAD is now a fully-fledged al-Qaeda branch in Syria, with a clear focus on global jihad as well as the civil war in Syria. Even if the Islamist opposition eventually lost it strongholds in northwestern Syria to the Syrian regime or Turkey, HAD will most likely remain a threat, with its experienced leadership and wider goals. Any multi-state arrangement that might end the conflict in Syria will likely boost HAD’s narrative that enemies of Islam joined forces against jihadists. On the operational level, the group’s presence in Syria will provide it with sanctuary to plan future attacks, possibly beyond the borders of that country. If that sanctuary is lost, the current leaders of HAD have proven their ability to move effectively between different countries, defy the government and operate in various conflicts and fronts. Additionally, if HTS loses the territory it controls in northwestern Syria, al-Qaeda and its HAD, with its experience in launching insurgencies and underground organizations, will be in a better position to attract the most radical elements. HTS will likely struggle to deal with post-defeat challenges as it built its influence and focuses its energy on running areas and communities.

HAD and its three leaders seem to have found not only the answer (or the conclusion) to al-Qaeda’s past struggle for a branch in Syria, but also for the future of its presence in that country and beyond.