The Next Doku Umarov? The Rise of Chechen Commander Abdul Hakim al-Shishani

The Next Doku Umarov? The Rise of Chechen Commander Abdul Hakim al-Shishani

In summer 2017, leaders of the three main factions of the Syrian opposition with fighters from the Caucasus, Muslim al-Shishani, Abdul Hakim al-Shishani and Salahuddin al-Shishani, released a joint video message, where they reaffirmed neutrality in the confrontation between the Syrian rebel groups Akhrar al-Sham and al-Qaeda-linked Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (Smart News, August 5, 2017). Despite his limited coverage in the media compared to that of Islamic State (IS)-linked North Caucasian foreign fighters, Abdul Hakim al-Shishani is among the most influential field commanders in Syria from the North Caucasus. His group, which is called Ajnad al-Kavkaz and consists mostly of Chechens, has been concentrated on the fight against al-Assad’s forces in Latakia and Idlib provinces.

Background

Rustam Azhiev (a.k.a. Abdul Hakim al-Shishani), approximately 33 years old, was born in the village of Prigorodnoye in the Grozny district of Russia’s Chechnya. [1] Owing to its proximity to the suburban areas of the Chechen capital Grozny, Prigorodnoye was the site of intensive battles during both of the two recent Russian-Chechen wars. His younger brother, Anzor Azhiev, is the famous Poland-based mixed martial arts fighter. Like his brother, prior to his militancy, Rustam was actively involved in martial arts. However, the Second Chechen War interrupted his sports career. In early 2000, he and some of his school friends joined the Chechen rebels to fight against the Russian military (The Intercept, September 3, 2016). During the war, he fought side by side with Rustam Basayev (a.k.a. “Gharib”) and Djambulat Sadayev (a.k.a. “Borets”), in the Prigorodnoye Jamaat. The group was led by Shamsuddin Salvatov, who previously trained in the famous Emir Khatab’s camps (Novaya Gazeta, May 16, 2016; Rosiiskaya Gazeta February 25, 2005).

The Prigorodnoye Jamaat represented the new generation of the Chechen insurgency. After Doku Umarov declared the Imarat Kavkaz (Caucasus Emirate) in 2007, Abdul Hakim was promoted as Amir of the central sector of the Velayet Nokhchicho in Chechnya, replacing his recently killed brother-in-arms, Rustam Basayev (Chechens in Syria, January 4, 2016). This faction operated in Grozny and surrounding areas. As its leader, Abdul Hakim plotted numerous hit-and-run attacks against local law enforcement, typically in urban areas. In 2009, while preparing for an unsuccessful assault, Abdul Hakim severely damaged his eyesight and lost three fingers on his left hand due to an accidental explosion, after which he fled to Turkey for medical treatment (The Intercept, September 3, 2016). He reportedly remained in Turkey until the beginning of Syrian conflict.

Militancy in Syria

The exact date Abdul Hakim joined the Syrian insurgency is unknown. However, he was documented in Syria in 2013 after an unsuccessful attempt to return home. Initially, Abdul Hakim led a predominantly Chechen group called Jammat al-Khilafa al-Qawqazia, which was formed in 2013 (Nohchicho, February 17, 2017). Later, in late 2014, the group merged with Jamaat Jund al-Qawqaz, which consisted of Syrian Circassians from the Golan Heights. Eventually, in 2015, the group was renamed Ajnad al-Kavkaz (Syria Comment, November 23, 2014). The group is led by ethnic Chechens, but, as Abdul Hakim noted in one of his interviews, his group is multiethnic. In addition to Chechen foreign fighters, other members of the group have other North Caucasian, Central Asian, Syrian Circassian and Arab origins (Nohchicho, February 17, 2017). Apart from Abdul Hakim, several veterans of the Second Chechen War—such as the military Emir, Khamzat al-Shishani—are members of Ajnad al-Kavkaz. However, in 2017, one of the leading commanders of Ajnad al-Kavkaz, Abu Bakr al-Shishani, an experienced militant from the Chechen insurgency, left the group and formed his own group called Jammat Seiful Sham (Chechens in Syria, March 3, 2017).

For several years, Abdul Hakim has been commanding Ajnad al-Kavkaz, which has focused its activity in Syria’s Latakia and Idlib provinces. In concert with Jabhat al-Nusra and other groups, Abdul Hakim’s Ajnad al-Kavkaz was actively involved in the large-scale offensive in Idlib province in 2015, including in the capture of strategic sites such as the al-Mastumah military base, Kafr Najad and Muqabala (Chechens in Syria May 12, 2015; Chechens in Syria May 22, 2015; Chechens in Syria June 3, 2015). Abdul Hakim also led his group in the offensive in eastern Aleppo and Hamma provinces in 2016 (al-Masdar News October 8, 2016).  In order to avoid friction with the local population, Abdul Hakim prefers to not interfere in Syrian domestic issues and has limited his communication with the residents of rebel-held provinces.

Abdul Hakim maintains a strong profile in his militant circles. He managed to stay out of the confrontation between North Caucasian foreign fighters that unfolded after IS declared a Caliphate (see Eurasia Daily Monitor, June 18, 2015). Maintaining a neutral position helped Abdul Hakim reinforce his credibility among his peers. Moreover, unlike other Caucasian field commanders—especially Chechen—Abdul Hakim does not hesitate to communicate with media and openly express his views on the Syrian conflict and situation in North Caucasus.

Outlook

Although he has remained more out of the spotlight than some of his fellow North Caucasian foreign fighters in Syria, Abdul Hakim is precisely the type of militant that North Caucasian communities should be concerned about when considering the threat presented by foreign fighters returning home from a post-Caliphate Iraq and Syria. Indeed, in many ways, Abdul Hakim has the potential to fill the militant leadership vacuum in North Caucasian insurgency left in the wake of Doku Umarov’s death. Over the span of almost two decades, Abdul Hakim has gained significant military experience—during the Second Chechen War, in the North Caucasus during Imarat Kavkaz and during the Syrian conflict. And through this diversity of experience, he has shown his ability to conduct operations in both a large-scale armed conflict and a guerrilla-style insurgency. Further, Abdul Hakim is still young for the amount of experience he has amassed—which, were he to return home, could influence the younger generation to join any movement he might lead.

Unlike many of his compatriots, Abdul Hakim has navigated through the cleavages between various Syrian militant groups, concentrating on military operations over inter-group politics. This has largely protected his credibility among the Chechen Islamists. Abdul Hakim has more liberal views than other hardline Salafist warlords from the Caucasus. He has also questioned the effectiveness of the assaults against the police in Chechnya. Abdul Hakim has a political agenda for the North Caucasus. He believes that past separatist movements, like the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria and Imarat Kavkaz, are out of date, and that Chechnya needs new political and militant movements working toward the liberation of Chechnya from Russia (Nohchicho, February 17, 2017). Finally, by not affiliating with IS, Abdul Hakim managed to avoid the attention of the West, thereby avoiding being officially classified as a terrorist. For instance, he is not listed as being wanted by Interpol (The Intercept, September 3, 2016).

Abdul Hakim’s experience, credibility and ambition make him a militant whose activity deserves close scrutiny. Although he continues to participate in the Syrian conflict, Abdul Hakim’s future may well bring him back to the North Caucasus. In this respect, his future likely depends on the intensity of a conflict in North Caucasus, particularly in Chechnya. His past experience in Chechnya, coupled with that gained in Syria, means that in case of a renewed Chechen insurgency, he could become the type of militant leader that the region has not seen in years.

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