Türkiye Expands its Security Strategy in Libya 

Türkiye Expands its Security Strategy in Libya 

Executive Summary:

• Türkiye is broadening its Libya strategy by cultivating partnerships with rival government factions and shifting from intervention to long-term security brokerage.
• Ankara is anchoring its position in Libya and the Eastern Mediterranean through military cooperation, maritime agreements, and economic engagement.
• Türkiye’s expanding role challenges regional rivals and carries significant implications for U.S. interests, European energy security, and North African stability.

In late May, Türkiye hosted military training exercises that brought together personnel from Libya’s rival armed factions for the first time since the country’s post-2011 civil war began. The exercises saw the unprecedented participation of soldiers aligned with both the internationally recognized Government of National Unity (GNU) and the eastern-based Libyan National Army (LNA) under a single Libyan flag (RFI, May 23). The initiative signals Ankara’s evolving approach to Libya; one that goes beyond supporting a single faction and positions Türkiye as a security broker capable of engaging both of the country’s power centers. By cultivating both power centers, Ankara could gain greater leverage over any future political settlement and security architecture.

Since the overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi’s regime in 2011, Libya has remained divided between two competing governments and military establishments. The GNU, headquartered in Tripoli and recognized by the United Nations, controls much of western Libya with political and military support from the European Union. In contrast, General Khalifa Haftar’s LNA dominates eastern Libya and much of the country’s oil-rich interior, relying on support from Egypt, Russia, and the United Arab Emirates (Council on Foreign Relations, June 3). External support has enabled both factions to consolidate control over their respective territories, but neither side yet possesses sufficient capability to defeat the other (Geopolitical Intelligence Services, November 13, 2025).

Türkiye’s military intervention in Libya marked a turning point in both the country’s civil war and Ankara’s regional security strategy. After General Haftar’s 2019 offensive against Tripoli, Ankara intervened on behalf of the Government of National Accord (GNA)—Libya’s interim governing structure between 2015 and 2021—preventing the collapse of the UN-recognized government and altering the conflict’s trajectory (Al-Jazeera, June 5, 2020). Beyond preserving a friendly government in Tripoli, the intervention established Türkiye as one of Libya’s most influential external security actors. It demonstrated Ankara’s willingness to use military power to advance its geopolitical interests in the Eastern Mediterranean. Türkiye initially relied on military advisers, intelligence support, drones, and other defense assistance to halt the LNA’s advance; however, as the balance of power shifted in favor of Tripoli, Ankara institutionalized its presence through a series of defense and maritime agreements with the GNA, including the landmark 2019 Turkey-Libya Memorandum of Understanding, focused on security cooperation and Eastern Mediterranean maritime boundaries (The New Arab, September 30, 2025). 

The intervention later evolved into a permanent military footprint, shifting Ankara’s role from an external supporter to a long-term security partner (Nordic Monitor, December 25, 2025). Türkiye established a naval presence at the Port of Misrata, expanded operations from Al-Watiya Air Base after its recapture from Haftar’s forces, deployed advanced military systems—including Bayraktar TB2 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and air defense assets—and provided extensive training, logistical, and technical support to Libyan forces. 

Türkiye’s interest in Libya extends well beyond stabilizing its internal conflict. Situated at the crossroads of the Mediterranean, North Africa, and the Sahel, Libya serves as a critical gateway linking Europe and Africa. It holds some of the continent’s largest proven oil and natural gas reserves (Africa Center for Strategic Studies, May 18, 2020). For Ankara, securing a long-term foothold in Libya has therefore become central not only to its North Africa policy but also to its broader ambitions in the Eastern Mediterranean. Building on the defense agreements signed in 2019, Türkiye and the Tripoli-based government concluded a maritime Memorandum of Understanding establishing an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) that cuts across waters also claimed by Greece, Cyprus, and Egypt (United Nations, 2019). 

The maritime agreement also gave Türkiye a legal and political framework to contest competing maritime claims, while granting Turkish firms preferential access to future offshore energy projects (Middle East Forum, April 12). The region’s considerable hydrocarbon potential underpins these ambitions. The U.S. Geological Survey estimates that the Eastern Mediterranean contains approximately 107 billion barrels of undiscovered oil and 122 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, making control over maritime access increasingly consequential for regional competition (USGS, March 2010). By anchoring its military presence in Libya to expansive maritime claims, Ankara has enhanced its ability to pursue offshore energy exploration, project power across the Eastern Mediterranean, and shape Europe’s evolving energy landscape. 

Türkiye’s expanding role in Libya is driven by objectives that extend well beyond preserving the Tripoli-based government. By establishing itself as a long-term security partner, Ankara has sought to counter the influence of regional rivals—including Greece, Cyprus, Russia, the United Arab Emirates and Egypt—who maintain interests in Libya (Libya Tribune, June 10, 2025). A sustained military presence also reinforces Türkiye’s position within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) by enhancing its role on the Alliance’s increasingly contested southern flank, where terrorism, migration, and great power competition are becoming central security concerns. At the same time, Ankara has begun recalibrating its Libya strategy. Rather than remaining exclusively aligned with the UN-recognized GNU, Türkiye has gradually expanded engagement with the LNA. Relations began improving in late 2023, culminating in the reopening of Türkiye’s consulate in Benghazi in 2024 and high-level meetings between Turkish military officials and Haftar in 2025 (Turkish Minute, August 26, 2025). 

Türkiye’s military diplomacy has mirrored Libya’s political reality. In 2025, Turkish naval vessels made port calls in both Tripoli and Benghazi during the same deployment—the first such engagement involving both rival administrations. The visits included naval training activities and consultations with defense officials from eastern and western Libya, including Major General Saddam Haftar, deputy commander of the LNA, on future military cooperation under the banner of “One Libya, One Army” (DefenseNews, August 26, 2025). Together, these developments suggest Türkiye is transitioning from backing a single faction to positioning itself as a security broker capable of shaping Libya’s military and political future. 

This rapprochement gained momentum following Haftar’s April 2025 visit to Ankara, where the LNA’s Chief of Staff of Land Forces met with senior Turkish military officials to discuss expanding defense cooperation (Libya Tribune, September 26, 2025). Reports indicate the two sides have since negotiated agreements covering joint naval exercises, military training, advisory support, and the potential provision of Bayraktar TB2 unmanned aerial vehicles (Libya Tribune, September 27, 2025). By replicating the security partnerships it has built in eastern Libya, Ankara seeks to broaden support for the 2019 Türkiye–Libya maritime agreement, reinforce its long-term military presence, and strengthen the political legitimacy of its claims in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The rapprochement has produced tangible political and military outcomes. Most notably, the LNA has reportedly considered ratifying the 2019 maritime Memorandum of Understanding originally signed by the Tripoli-based GNU. This move would significantly strengthen the agreement’s political legitimacy. Military cooperation has likewise accelerated. Earlier this year, personnel from Libya’s rival military factions participated together in Türkiye’s Efes-2026 multinational exercise, marking the first time both sides trained under a single Libyan flag (DefenseNews, May 6, 2025). 

Türkiye’s engagement in Libya forms part of a broader strategy to establish a network of military and commercial footholds along Africa’s most strategically important maritime corridors. Ankara has prioritized partnerships with Libya, Somalia, and Sudan, viewing their ports as gateways to the Mediterranean, Red Sea, and Indian Ocean, respectively. By expanding its presence at facilities such as Somalia’s Mogadishu Port, Sudan’s Suakin Port, and key Libyan ports, Türkiye has sought to strengthen its influence over critical maritime trade routes while advancing its energy and security interests (Observer Researcher Foundation, March 1, 2025). A growing military footprint has reinforced this maritime strategy. Türkiye’s two principal African bases are in Somalia and Libya, giving Ankara forward operating positions on both the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean. Opened in 2017, the TURKSOM military base in Mogadishu is Türkiye’s largest overseas military installation and serves as the centerpiece of its security partnership with Somalia (Evrensel, July 29, 2025). The facility reportedly hosts more than 1,000 Turkish personnel and can train over 10,000 Somali troops, while providing logistics, operational support, and military assistance (Turkish Minute, August 6, 2025).

Türkiye has increasingly sought to differentiate itself from Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) by presenting itself as a flexible, responsive, and operationally capable security partner for African states confronting insurgencies, Islamist militant groups, and separatist movements (Africa Center for Strategic Studies, July 8, 2025). This approach has been particularly evident in the Sahel and the Horn of Africa, where Ankara has paired defense cooperation with economic engagement to deepen its regional influence. Türkiye has also aligned with Morocco’s Atlantic Initiative, which aims to give landlocked Sahelian states access to the Atlantic Ocean, signaling Ankara’s support for emerging regional connectivity projects. Beyond security cooperation, Türkiye continues to expand its economic footprint through maritime and infrastructure investments, including supplying a modern tugboat to Kenya and supporting port and infrastructure development in Tanzania and Senegal (Observer Researcher Foundation, March 1, 2025).