Türkiye Promotes Eurasian Transit Development
Türkiye Promotes Eurasian Transit Development
Executive Summary:
- Türkiye and Armenia signed an agreement on May 4 to restore the Ani Bridge, another step in their normalization process. This development is part of moves to expand regional connectivity projects amid transport disruptions caused by the Iran conflict.
- Ankara is promoting the Middle Corridor as a strategic Europe–Asia transit alternative to routes through Russia and Iran, leveraging cooperation with the South Caucasus and Central Asia in its development.
- Regional instability and Iran’s capacity to disrupt maritime traffic—despite momentum in developing the Middle Corridor—continue to threaten trade security, reinforcing Türkiye’s ambition to become a pivotal logistics hub.
On May 4, Türkiye and Armenia signed a memorandum of understanding to restore the medieval Ani Bridge to accelerate the two countries’ normalization process ahead of Armenia’s June 7 parliamentary elections (Anadolu Ajansı, May 4). While the agreement reflects a broader effort to normalize ties between Ankara and Yerevan and boost bilateral trade, it also underscores Ankara’s willingness to diversify its economic portfolio and explore new markets (Al-Monitor, October 12, 2025). Türkiye’s commitment to boosting trade partnerships with regional states and beyond is not coincidental, given the current geopolitical turmoil in the Middle East amid the U.S.–Iran conflict. As a major ramification of the war, the blockade of the Hormuz Strait is dramatically reshaping the region’s strategic geography, disrupting supply chains and exacerbating the global energy deficit. The conflict with Iran has blocked combined shipping from Central Asia through that country to the Persian Gulf and further to global markets by sea (Caucasian Knot, April 7).
Global actors and leading logistics companies are seeking alternative routes and safe hubs to keep moving their cargo in a timely manner. Türkiye is moving quickly to capitalize on this shift, presenting itself as a relatively secure hub for trade, transport, and energy, turning connectivity into an instrument of strategic autonomy and regional influence (SWP Berlin, May 5). Ankara’s ambitions align with the main priorities of the Middle Corridor transit route linking the People’s Republic of China to Europe via Central Asia and the Caspian Sea, while offering a viable alternative to the Northern Corridor through Russia. Heavy reliance on the Middle Corridor route enables Ankara to maneuver with its neighboring countries in a highly volatile region, embedding itself deeply in regional networks through infrastructure, energy cooperation, and long-term economic frameworks (SWP Berlin, May 5).
The Middle Corridor is emerging as the most viable trade route between Europe and Asia, which Ankara promotes as a strategic alternative to the Strait of Hormuz amid escalating U.S.–Iran tensions (Anadolu Ajansı, March 5; Al-Monitor, May 17). Nearly all regional states, particularly the Gulf countries, are acutely vulnerable to disruptions in energy supplies and will inevitably seek secure transit pathways to sustain the surge in fossil fuel exports. Türkiye actively collaborates with Azerbaijan and Central Asian nations on joint efforts to boost the Middle Corridor’s role across various platforms, particularly within the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) (see EDM, October 23, 2025, April 16, May 19). On April 2, at the meeting of government heads and vice presidents of the OTS member states in Baku, Turkish Vice President Cevdet Yilmaz highlighted the robust infrastructure of the Turkic states (Trend.az, February 3). While the Middle Corridor route regained momentum, Türkiye and other OTS members put enormous effort into using it as additional leverage in their bilateral relations with the West and to attract more foreign investment. Connectivity has become a vital issue for the European Union since 2022, as it has significantly deepened ties with the South Caucasus and Central Asia in an effort to further isolate Russia from major trade and energy routes. The same position was reiterated during EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas’s most recent trip to Baku on May 5 (EuroNews, May 5).
Despite Türkiye’s strong commitment to advancing the Middle Corridor, the route remains exposed to risks stemming from the ongoing conflict in Iran. Joint U.S.–Israeli missile strikes have degraded Iran’s naval bases and diminished its potential in the Caspian basin, but Tehran retains the capacity to disrupt shipping in both the Strait of Hormuz and the Caspian Sea, leveraging these vulnerabilities to further destabilize international energy markets (EuroNews, April 20).
To counter these risks and further strengthen the Middle Corridor’s significance and cargo capacity, Ankara has shown support for the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), which connects Azerbaijan to its Nakhchivan exclave through Armenia’s Syunik province (APA, January 15). This project, envisioned as an additional artery with a technical capacity of 15 million tons annually, depends on political support and U.S. investment for its realization (Coordinating Council of the Republic of Azerbaijan on Transit Freight, August 8, 2025).
Türkiye’s support of the development of the Middle Corridor, TRIPP, and other alternative trade routes appears rational against the backdrop of regional volatility and a shifting logistics landscape. At the same time, Ankara signals to Western partners that it is among the few regional states combining domestic stability with economic and transit capacity, positioning itself as a critical gateway to energy-rich Central Asia. Türkiye’s regional alliance format with Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Central Asian nations is designed to reinforce its role as a middle power. Sustained support for Türkiye and its partners in developing infrastructure and trade routes s strengthens connectivity while strategically isolating Russia amid its ongoing war against Ukraine (Türkiye Analyst, January 17, 2022).