Vučić’s Defeat Holds Promise and Challenges for Reform

Vučić’s Defeat Holds Promise and Challenges for Reform

Executive Summary:

• Student List’s victory in Serbia’s October 25 parliamentary elections brought an end to the Serbian Progressive Party’s (SNS) fourteen-year rule under Aleksandar Vučić. Cumulative frustration with Vučić’s corrupt system has given Student List public support for major reform of the country’s political system.
• SNS has entrenched political control over nominally independent institutions, transforming them into patronage machines. Reforming this system will take more than replacing leaders at the top. It will require dismantling power networks and establishing a political system less reliant on individual personalities and informal decision-making.
• Student List’s success largely stems from its narrow anti-Vučić, anti-corruption platform, which has helped the alliance attract support from ideologically diverse segments of the population. 
• In the short term, SNS will have little political leverage, as the parliamentary majority will allow Student List to carry out reforms without needing SNS input. Over time, however, SNS will certainly seek to split Student List’s ideologically diverse alliance.

The Student List electoral coalition’s landslide victory in Serbia’s October 25 parliamentary elections brought an end to the Serbian Progressive Party’s (SNS) fourteen-year rule under former Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić. Student List received over 53 percent of the vote, allowing the coalition to form a government on its own with 140 of 250 seats in Serbia’s National Assembly (see EDM, November 4; Electoral Commission of the Republic of Serbia, accessed November 5). After two years of protest following the November 1, 2024, Novi Sad railway station canopy collapse, the coalition came to symbolize the cumulative frustration and desire for political change among Serbia’s population. Student List has public support for major reform, but it will likely face challenges, both from the effort required to seek justice for Vučić’s corrupt system and from maintaining unity while building a new one. 

State institutions will likely obstruct a smooth transition. Over its 14 years in power, SNS entrenched political control over nominally independent institutions, transforming them into patronage machines. Reports of document shredding and evidence tampering have become widespread following Vučić’s defeat. On October 30, reports emerged that operatives from Serbia’s Security and Intelligence Agency (BIA) began throwing out bags full of documents in Subotice (Danas, October 30). Serbia’s Ministry of Health, Pension, and Disability Insurance Fund, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs have similarly been seen destroying large amounts of documents (N1; Naslovi; Razglas, October 30). 

Serbia’s security services will prove especially difficult to manage. Under Vučić, Serbia increased its military and security spending by more than four times and now spends more on these services than all neighboring North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries (Nin.rs, May 13). This spending has largely gone to implementing mass surveillance technology, expanding heavy weaponry across the services, and funding loyal paramilitary and criminal groups (Amnesty International, 2024; Vreme, November 7, 2025; Bezbednost, December 2025). This system was built on loyalty to Vučić personally, rather than to the state. A portrait of Vučić still hanging inside the Criminal Police Directorate days after the elections symbolizes his informal control over a sector he has no formal power over (Sindikat Policije, October 27). 

The momentum public support provides should not be underestimated. Not all members of Serbia’s security and police sectors supported the previous system, and Student List’s victory has spurred quick action on cases previously stalled for political reasons. On October 29, Student List released preliminary demands of the security services, including the dismissals of high-profile Vučić allies, the reinstatement of those fired for political reasons, and independent oversight of their activities (Danas, October 29). In a sign of change, Serbia’s Ministry of Internal Affairs then moved to arrest Marko Kričko, head of the Criminal Police Directorate, for ordering violence against student protesters during the election campaign (BBC Serbian Service, November 1; Vreme, November 3). Commander of Serbia’s Special Anti-Terrorist Unit, Igor Žmirić, was also arrested on accusations of torturing student protesters (Danas, November 4). Despite the quick arrests, reform will proceed unevenly. Civilian and military security services became the coercive pillar of SNS’s rule. Informal power networks were established throughout the country, and dismantling them will require consistent political will (Balkan Insight, October 29). Student List has so far focused on overhauling security leadership, but further de-politicization and restructuring should be expected.  

Student List’s victory has also had quick consequences for Vučić’s political allies. On November 2, Davor Macura, owner of Serbia’s Alta Bank, and two of his associates were arrested on accusations of illicit financial gain of up to 45 billion dinars (about $430 million) (Balkan Insight, November 2). Alta Bank’s value has exploded in recent years, largely because of its state connections. For example, Serbia’s state-owned electric company, Elektroprivreda Srbija, directed Belgrade residents to pay their electricity bills into Alta Bank accounts beginning in 2023. Alta also won a tender to provide financial services for state transportation payments and to support hotel construction ahead of the 2027 EXPO in Belgrade (Vreme, July 15, 17, 2025). According to the Financial Times, Macura tried to flee Serbia for Moscow after the elections (Financial Times, November 2). Other associates close to Vučić similarly tried to fly to Russia before their plane was turned around mid-flight, including former BIA head Aleksandar Vulin, Srbijagas director Dušan Bajatović, and former SNS parliamentarian Nenad Popović (Danas, November 4, [1] [2]). Vučić, however, is signaling that he does not consider this defeat the end of his political career. 

On October 27, SNS held a Slava to mark the Feast of Saint Petka. Vučić was defiant during the Slava, taking on the role of opposition leader (X/@MiroslavParovic, October 27). He stated that his supporters would be forced to “self-organize” if the state “continued its terror” against him (Vreme, October 27). Since then, Vučić has appeared daily on social media and in loyal media outlets, painting Student List as a “revolutionary terror” organization and positioning himself as the only one capable of resistance (republika.rs, October 30; Nin.rs, November 3). SNS will remain active in Serbian politics with 103 seats in parliament. In the short term, SNS will have little political leverage, as the parliamentary majority will allow Student List to carry out reforms without needing SNS input. Over time, however, SNS will certainly seek to split Student List’s ideologically diverse alliance.

Serbia’s history demonstrates the challenges of maintaining unity within an ideologically diverse political coalition. In 2000, opposition parties to then-President of Yugoslavia Slobodan Milošević coalesced under the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) alliance. After defeating Milošević and his Socialist Party of Serbia in the September–October 2000 national elections, Vojislav Koštunica assumed the presidency while Zoran Đinđić was selected as prime minister (N1, September 24). Koštunica and Đinđić, however, had different visions for post-Milošević Serbia, and their constant disagreements—especially over Milošević’s extradition to The Hague—greatly hindered democratic development (Blic.rs, November 17, 2024). Koštunica’s decision to split from DOS in 2001 and Đinđić’s assassination in 2003 ended the momentum for political reform (Danas, October 9, 2022). 

Student List’s platform is similar to DOS’s in 2000. The alliance is centered on an anti-Vučić, anti-corruption platform rather than a specific political ideology (Studenti Pobeđuju, accessed November 5). Its nominees for prime minister and president therefore should be followed closely. They will be expected to articulate the coalition’s long-term plans for reform and democratic development. Potential disagreement over the content or pace of these reforms could give SNS an opening to exploit. The absence of a clear leader, however, may benefit Student List. In an interview with Radio Sloboda, one of the leading candidates for prime minister, Ilija Srdanović, emphasized that policy will be pursued through referendums and group votes, rather than being left to an individual leader (Radio Sloboda, October 27). This scheme could slow policymaking, but it would create a political system less reliant on individual personalities and informal decision-making.