Russians’ Post-Election Fears Partially Materialize 

Russians’ Post-Election Fears Partially Materialize 

Executive Summary:

• Fears of a new mobilization wave following Russia’s September 18–20 State Duma elections have not materialized, but the Kremlin has introduced new taxes and raised utility prices. 
• Declining contract recruitment, heavy battlefield losses, and expanding military registration infrastructure have fueled concerns about another mobilization wave. A formal call-up remains unlikely, but tighter conscription enforcement and regional mobilization drills suggest preparations for expanded recruitment.
• The Kremlin is likely to rely on contract recruitment rather than risk another politically damaging mobilization. Regional quotas incentivize authorities to pressure vulnerable Russians into military service, allowing Moscow to replenish its forces while obscuring responsibility for and the widespread existence of forced enlistment.

Rumors that a new formal wave of mobilization would follow the September 18–20 State Duma elections saturated the Russian media space for months. These fears now seem unlikely to materialize soon (Vazhnye Istorii, June 24). Russian society has come to expect unpopular measures after elections. Russian President Vladimir Putin established a pattern over 20 years of making unwelcome decisions when society is least able to express discontent, including at the ballot box (Verstka, July 27). Putin provoked his first mass protests just a few months after the presidential elections in 2004 by choosing to reduce economic benefits for tens of millions of Russians, mostly pensioners. In 2018, he raised the retirement age after his reelection. Many Russians have accordingly expected unpopular measures to follow September’s election. In the first Duma election after the Kremlin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the primary Kremlin party, United Russia, gained a record of more than 77 percent of seats in parliament in the most tightly managed and falsified election of the Putin era (see EDM, September 21). 

Putin framed these latest elections as a referendum on Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Critics of the war have expressed worry that Putin would use the elections to justify a new wave of mobilization because of heavy Russian losses on the battlefield and the Kremlin’s desire to hasten territorial gains. Putin first announced a partial mobilization of reservists in September 2022, setting a goal to call up 300,000 for service. In October 2022, then-Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said that the target had been met (RBC, October 28, 2022). This was Russia’s first mobilization since World War II, and the Kremlin has not formally ended its legal basis (Radio Svoboda, October 31, 2022). 

According to Vazhnye Istorii, high-level Russian officials denied new mobilization wave rumors 17 times between June 1 and September 15, including Putin dismissing reports from Ukrainian intelligence that the Kremlin was considering mobilization from Ukraine as “nonsense” designed to sow panic (Telegram/@istories_media, September 15). These adamant repudiations demonstrate how politically damaging the idea of another mobilization remains. On September 28, Putin signed a decree increasing the size of the armed forces by 15,500 soldiers, which will likely be achieved through increased contract and volunteer recruitment. This is the fourth increase in the size of the Russian army in 2026, compared to just three such increases in the first four years of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine (Meduza, September 28). 

Separate unpopular measures have materialized in the three weeks since the elections. The Russian Ministry of Finance proposed a package of new taxes just four days after the vote,  despite Kremlin Spokesman Dmitry Peskov saying on September 9 that increases should not be expected in the near future (Interfax, September 9; Meduza, September 24; The Bell, September 27). Asked about this discrepancy, Peskov skirted the question, saying that it is better to get explanations about the budget from the Kremlin’s “economic bloc” (Kommersant, September 27). Utility prices also increased after the election because the Kremlin moved a planned increase from July 1 to October 1, just 11 days after the vote (Novaya Gazeta Evropa, September 23). Some other fears and reported conversations from the Kremlin, such as seizure of individuals’ deposits, stricter exit visa laws, and fees for international internet traffic, have not come to fruition but remain possibilities (Novaya Gazeta Evropa, September 23).

Fears of another wave of mobilization are driven by the high casualty rates for Russian soldiers, the dwindling supply of Russians willing to sign a contract, and several anonymous reports from Russian authorities about Kremlin considerations of the step (Meduza; Telegram/@svobodnieslova, June 24). The principal way that the Kremlin has filled its armed forces—contract recruitment—has been falling since 2025. The reported quality of many new soldiers is low, from health to age to criminal record, and many units at the front lines are understaffed.

Mobilization rumors are also grounded in the build-up of logistical and legal infrastructure that could support the process, along with reports of regional mobilization drills. After the first wave of mobilization, the Kremlin created a unified military register, which could provide a more complete picture of which reservists are eligible for mobilization, send summons more quickly and gradually, and increase general administrative efficiency compared to the reported confusion and errors of the first wave (Vazhnye Istorii, December 22). 

On February 15, the Russian Federal Chamber of Notaries sent a letter to regional chambers, though only Kaliningrad’s receipt has been confirmed, instructing them to require potential conscripts to provide their draft registration papers before they can take out a mortgage, buy property, or start a business. Conscription is Russia’s routine draft of eligible men aged 18–30 for one year of service, including during peacetime, who nominally do not serve in combat situations. It is legally separate from mobilization, but conscripts are often pressured into signing contracts for combat service, and there are reports of their deployment to Ukraine. Tightening enforcement for young men registering for conscription is therefore a sign that Moscow is trying to ramp up recruitment (The Insider, October 4). Additionally, regional administrations in Volzhsky and military groupings in Kaliningrad held mobilization logistics exercises over the summer, further fueling rumors (Radio Svoboda, June 19; The Moscow Times, August 23).

A new wave of mobilization is unlikely to resemble Putin’s September 2022 televised announcement. The legal justification for mobilization remains, and the unified registration system means that the Kremlin has the information necessary to gradually mobilize reservists without generating the widespread panic of 2022, which led to the exodus of hundreds of thousands of Russians. Forced contract signing, what some analysts call “hidden” or “covert” mobilization, remains prevalent in the regions of Russia and in the occupied territories of Ukraine, targeting vulnerable members of society who are more susceptible to pressure because of economic circumstances, criminal status, or social standing (Radio Svoboda, October 7). The Kremlin sets contract recruitment goals for the regions to avoid another unpopular mobilization, creating incentives for regional authorities and municipalities to meet those goals by any means necessary, and pushing pressure to find contract soldiers down the administrative hierarchy. 

Regional administrations have quotas for contract soldiers. Russian human rights organizations received reports of forced detentions and coercion, including police beatings, to sign a military contract from at least 17 regions of Russia in just July and August (Verstka, August 24). Because regions provide the money for signing bonuses, which are becoming more expensive as supply decreases, poorer regions are more likely to use force to meet their quotas. In the Penza oblast, there have been many recent reports of police detaining men on the streets, in cars, and on public transport, then taking them to sign military contracts (Verstka, June 19). In the Ryazan oblast, Governor Pavel Malkov reportedly even established military contract quotas for employers in proportion to the size of their workplace (Gazeta.ru, April 2; see EDM, June 4).

According to The Bell, the number of people seeking information from human rights organizations about how to leave Russia has increased by 50 percent between fall and spring (The Bell, September 29). This spike demonstrates Russians’ fear of another formal mobilization wave. The massive unpopularity of the 2022 partial mobilization, made clear through a protest movement of the mobilizeds’ mothers and wives and the mass exodus of eligible men to avoid summonses, however, means that the Kremlin is less likely to obtain new soldiers for its ranks in that manner. Putin is more likely to continue to decentralize the dirty work of forcible military recruitment to keep new soldiers nominally “voluntary,” diffuse responsibility for this process, and quietly feed his war machine.